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CHAPTER ONE 
Defining Strategy 
 
 
 
1.  Strategy as a natural and human activity 
 
We have heard – and used – the word strategy countless times. Indeed, we have developed 
and implemented strategies since the moment we were born. Overtime, anybody is capable to 
analyze and react to others‘ strategic moves. We do experience strategy every day.  
 
Certainly, a person can be an accomplished strategist even without to know what strategy is 
or means, simply because strategy is not an exact science nor a defined tool or skill for itself, but a 
very abstract attribute of the intricate human cognition that let us to position ourselves in life 
according to our personal goals. As such, strategy is driven by our individual and characteristic ―way 
to do‖ (or being) or in other words, it is driven by our personality and what determines it.   
 
However, strategy is not an exclusive attribute of the human condition. In nature, strategy 
regards the traits (characteristics) of individuals and populations to deal with the primordial 
objective of surviving.  From this perspective, strategies to survive do emerge and evolve endlessly.  
 
We can illustrate such dynamics through the lenses of the natural selection theory for 
example. When the environment and the resources it provides changes, organisms must quickly 
adjust to new conditions keeping at least one basic objective that is to ensure the maximum possible 
viability of offspring. Individuals and the populations they form will face this challenge through a 
strategic trade off between quantity and quality of progeny. This is known in ecology as the r/k 
selection theory. According to the prevailing characteristics of the environment, organisms will 
exhibit an ―r‖ or ―k‖ strategy. The r-strategy is optimal for unstable (rapidly changing) 
environments, and is based on quick reproduction cycles. Organisms that are r-strategists will 
naturally have small bodies, short generational time, and a large number of offspring capable to 
disperse over large geographic areas (e.g. rats, insects, and bacteria). On the contrary, in stable (thus 
predictable) environments, K-strategists will tend to specialize on effective competition for 
resources. Since resources in ecosystems are limited, k-populations will keep they number near 
constant and close to what is their maximum carrying capacity. Hence, this individuals or 
populations will have larger long life expectancy and body size, and produce fewer offspring that in 
turn require greater parental care until maturity. Obviously, humans populations presents a K-
strategy as do other large mammals (including whales), and some species of threes. However, 
populations rarely exhibit just one strategy but rather a combination of both. This fact, probes the 
existence of a third strategy in which individuals and populations do prepare themselves to survive 
as environments evolve. 
 
In any case, strategies in natural systems seem to emerge spontaneously from the interaction 
between environment and organisms over time. Whether and individual or a population will be more 
o less successful to cope with environmental changes is determined by their capability to respond to 
such changes, or in other words, by their capability of adaptation. Therefore, there is an implicit link 
between strategy and the need to adapt successfully to new conditions in the surrounding 
environment. Here, however strategy seems a little closer to instinct than to deliberation. In general, 
the capability to adapt in organisms is in part determined by the genes dictating appearance (e.g. the 
colour of your eyes) and functioning (e.g. the degree of sight), and for the characteristics of the 
environment (e.g. intensity and regularity of light), in which they develop and struggle to survive. 
Hence, the effect of the environment over adaptation and therefore over strategy becomes twofold: 
 
i) It determines the need of response and in the same time,  
ii) It determines the capacity to respond.  
 
The earlier occurs in the present, the later emerge from the past.  Therefore, strategy also implies 
evolution. Whether an individual or population will be more o less successful to adapt, survive, and 
project its progeny into the future is – to a great extent – determined by the history of adaptation of 
their predecessors and the proper.  In strategy, time and history matter. 
 
For people and their organizations it is not much different, since strategy also regards the 
quest for survival. Whether we are more or less successful in life depends on how we manage to 
respond to the changes in the environment we are immersed into. That capability will be determined 
in part by the traits of our personality and by the dynamic balance between opportunities and barrier 
in our surrounding environment. Naturally, our perception of what is a barrier and what is an 
opportunity will differ according to our cognitive nature and the goals we establish to direct our life.  
Most newborns will respond to changes in the environment (e.g. light or sound) in similar 
(instinctive) ways, often on the base of a trial-and-error strategy. This is basically a problem-solving 
approach that emerges from experience but is triggered by instinct. At later stages of development, 
children (as well as adults) will gradually rely more and more on their cognition, not only to solve 
problems but also to avoid and even prevent them. Unlike other populations, in their rational 
approach, humans do formulate strategies to achieve particular goals beyond the primordial quest for 
survival. In this context, strategy seems to appeal to rational decision-making rather than to instinct, 
although we usually are inclined to make simultaneous use of both approaches.  
 
In advanced organizational levels, humans do formalize strategies as a function to direct and 
focus their efforts. In a business organization (a firm), such efforts will focus on creating value for 
profit and guiding the organization towards future. In this context, the environment is a market with 
limited resources and therefore in which competition exists. This environment might be more or less 
stable, but it is in constant change. Firms will struggle to adapt to avoid being selected-off. Strategy 
in here becomes a systemic and rational act, a process that can be managed in order to successfully 
attain the goals of the firm.  
  
 
 
2. The different meanings of strategy 
 
Although strategy is a buzzword it does lack of a universally accepted definition. Therefore, 
in different contexts and to different people, strategy means different things. In the most broad and 
general context strategy would be defined as a ―plan of action‖.  
 
The Oxford Dictionary (http://oxforddictionaries.com)defines strategy as:  
 
1 [C] ~ (for doing sth)| ~ (to do sth) a plan that is intended to achieve a particular 
purpose: to develop a strategy for dealing with unemployment. It‘s all part of an 
overall strategy to gain promotion.  The government‘s economic strategy 
2 [U] the process of planning sth or putting a plan into operation in a skilful way: 
marketing strategy 
3 [U, C] the skill of planning the movements of armies in a battle or war; an 
example of doing this: military strategy. Defence strategies—compare tactic 
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The etymology  (or history) of the word strategy comes from the Old French ―strategie‖ that 
in turns derives from the Ancient Greek ―stratēgia‖ [στρατηγία] that means ―Office of General‖, 
―Command‖ or ―Generalship‖. Therefore, strategy has in fact a true historic link with deliberation, 
skilful actions, leadership and… warfare.  
 
In the 6
th
 century BC, the Chinese military strategist Sun Tsu wrote one of the first, and 
probably the most influencing, book in strategy ever. ―The Art of War‖ (孫子兵法 or Sūn Zǐ Bīng 
Fǎ) is a military treatise – composed of 13 chapters or 13 basic aspects of warfare – that became the 
basic text for military strategy in Asia, and an influential reference to the Eastern military thinking 
(See the Art of War translated by Giles, 2009). Over time, the work of Tsu has extended its influence 
away from the military world and motivated generations of successful managers and strategist in 
business and beyond. The treatise remarks the importance of positioning in strategy, and that 
position is affected by both the objective conditions in the physical environment and the subjective 
opinions of competitive actors within that environment. Tsu thought of strategy not as detailed plan 
of action but as a response – a fast and appropriated response – to changing conditions. From his 
perspective, Tsu suggests that planning is only effective in stable environments since sticking to a 
plan in changing conditions will rather raise unexpected conflicts.  
 
 
2.1. The common analogies: warfare, and competition  
The old expression ―Business means war‖ reflects the competitive mood and the strategic 
nature of the business world.   In that world, rivals compete for the ultimate dominance in a 
battleground (market) in which each contender has access to and makes use of common resources 
(e.g. available human and technological resources). A basic strategic advantage to win and prevail 
over rivals in the market comes from the differentiated used of such resources. Such advantage 
regards the particular way a firm employs its resources, or in other words, it regards the firm‘s 
capabilities to compete. As in war, competition in business pushes the rivals to the limits of their 
capability. This effort, successful or not, will inevitably change the trajectory (of behaviour and 
performance) of the firms over time.  
 
To illustrate the analogy between business and warfare we can have a look of one of the 
most iconic contemporary conflicts between rival firms: the ―Cola War‖ (See Yoffie and Wang, 
2002). The ―Cola War‖, was a remarkable marketing confrontation between the two giant beverage 
companies Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola between the 80‘s and 90‘s.  From this confrontation, you 
might recall some clichés like the ―Pepsi Challenge‖ ―the taste of a new generation‖ or some of the 
songs in spots featuring artists such as Michel Jackson, David Bowie, Julio Iglesias or Madonna, 
among many others.  The cola war went global and was plagued with anticipation moves, discredit, 
and a good dosage of industrial espionage. For every move of the opponent, there was a counter-
action: A game of action and reaction brought to every possible public media.   Amid each battle, the 
consumers were the ultimate driver of the next move by expressing their preferences for one or 
another. In this context, millions were spent in dead-end (unsuccessful) strategies and thousands of 
jobs were lost. Although we can recall quite a number of different strategies emerging from the Cola 
War, I would like to draw your attention to a very particular series of events starting in 1985:  
 
While Coca-Cola was still keeping its predominance in the beverage market with its flagship 
product ―coke‖, PepsiCo was advancing fast on the base of a successful ―image strategy‖ targeting 
the youngest segment of the market under the slogan ―the taste of the new generation‖. By 1983, the 
market share of Coke plunged below 24% from a solid 60%.  Pepsi had begun to outsell Coke in 
supermarkets while Coke maintained its edge only through soda vending machines and fast food 
restaurants. Although different marketing strategies where ongoing – particularly those focusing in 
public icons – Coca-cola made a strategic breakthrough by far unexpected: it walked away from the 
all-time successful formula of coke. In 1985, the ―New Coke‖ was introduced after an extensive 
study of market trends, surveys, focus groups, and taste tests. The new formula (or taste) was based 
on a different (lower cost) source of sugar: high fructose corn syrup to replace cane sugar. All of 
coca (the plant from which comes the alkaloid cocaine) derivates were also removed from the old 
formula. The new flavour was better that the one of traditional coke and Pepsi in the opinion of 
executives and consumers used in the taste tests. Sure enough, the product was released with the 
blessing of the firm‘s market experts, and after a few days, more than 80% of the population in the 
US was aware of the change. Three months later, Cola-Cola announced the return to the old 
―classic‖ formula of Coke amid one of the most discussed strategic retreat ever. Although, the initial 
sales in the US were promising, the whole idea of a new formula rapidly became a marketing 
nightmare, and the ―New Coke‖ got under fire. After the retreat, the product continue to be sold 
separately under different names (e.g. C2), until it became ―coke II‖ in 1992. Confined to North 
America the production of Coke II was finally discontinued in 2002, seven years after its 
introduction into market.   
 
There are several theories about the reasons for such a huge strategic blunder including some 
conspiracy speculations:  
 
(i) The company intentionally changed the formula in order to upset loyal 
consumers that will demand the return to the original formula causing sales to 
increase rapidly, 
 
(ii) The retreat was a plan to cover up the change from sugar-sweetened Coke to 
cheaper high fructose corn syrup. Here the theory is based on the allegations from 
the U.S. Sugar Trade Association saying that after the retreat and the return to the 
old formula, corn syrup was still being used. Some detractors suggest a link 
between corn syrup and increased obesity and other health problems.   
 
(iii) The retreat provided cover for the final removal of all coca derivatives from 
the drink in order to calm down the mood in the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA). Although by that time DEA was indeed pressing to get the 
cultivation of the crop down in South America, there was no direct pressure over 
Coke to stop using the plant derivates.   
 
As a response to the increasing rumours of conspiracy, the CEO of the company at that time 
said, "We're not that dumb, and we're not that smart‖. True or not, a few months after the retreat, 
―Coke Classic‖ was outselling both New Coke and rival Pepsi by far. Rapidly, Coca-Cola was 
number one again.  
 
In this example, the interesting issue is not about the failure or success of a marketing 
strategy, but about the unexpected and crucial reaction of the public. Of course, market studies can 
assess consumers‘ preferences, and Coke did expend time and resources to do so. According to such 
studies, the new product was supposed to become a best seller because it was better. However it did 
not. The main issue here was that the loyal consumers were honestly outraged by the replacement of 
the formula and took the initiative to boycott the product. Another important issue was that the 
bottlers working for the company were uneasy with the introduction and promotion of a product that 
came to contradict the slogan of the company focusing on keeping the ―real‖ and classic taste of the 
product unchanged. On the other hand, the issue of the sweetener instead of cane sugar also ignited 
quite a few ethical conflicts among the bottlers. Nevertheless, in the eyes of consumers, New Coke 
was never intended to become a major success.  The Director of the company by then, Donald 
Keough, put the whole issue in few words: 
 
  "The simple fact is that all the time and money and skill poured into consumer 
research on the new Coca-Cola could not measure or reveal the deep and abiding 
emotional attachment to original Coca-Cola felt by so many people." 
 
Curiously, at Pepsi market studies proved equally wrong. After the introduction of the new 
Coke, market research suggested to Pepsi top-management that an immediate (and considerable) 
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number of Coke‘s consumers would be gained. However, this study also failed to measure the 
―abiding emotional attachment‖ of Coke consumers as expressed by Keough. Indeed, the consumers 
opted to stop drinking Coke at all rather than to consume the new product or to switch to Pepsi. 
Eventually, as a result of the Coke retreat, Pepsi will decrease its market share. 
 
During the last decades – due the effort paid to win the war – both companies have evolved, 
diversify, and consolidated their positions. One could say that in this case, competition has 
strengthened them. Although both firms have made successful and wrong decisions eventually, 
results have been driven by not only deliberated thoughts, detailed plans or actions, but also by 
chance. There is something else to strategy than purpose and plan – as suggested by Sun Tsu – that 
comes from the constant adaptation to changes in our surrounding environment. Something 
determined by our capability to respond to changes and that arises from the patterns of our own 
background and history. Strategy in this sense can be seen simultaneously as a source and a driver of 
change. 
 
 
 
3. A working definition 
 
Inspired in the work of Henry Mintzberg on the field of strategic management, we propose 
the following working definition for strategy (See Mintzberg et al., 1998): 
 
 
“The means by which an individual or an organization accomplishes its objectives” 
 
By means, we understand ways or actions. In this context, Mintzberg and collaborators 
identify five key means:  
 
(1) Plans 
(2) Patterns  
(3) Positions  
(4) Perspectives 
(5) Ploys  
 
These five means or actions are what Mintzberg calls the ―five Ps‖ of strategy (Mintzberg et 
al., 1998).  
 
Plan is, as we know, is the most popular action to achieve an objective. A plan can be seen 
as a set of intended actions, hence that implies future actions. Plans can be either formal or informal. 
In its most informal form, a plan is made up of abstract ideas that remain as such until 
implementation. Instead, in a formal plan, abstract ideas are translated into documented meaningful 
information. A formal plan is a set of actions, a procedure we can follow repeatedly for a given 
period. In general, plans are very concrete in nature and do not allow any departure (we do not 
change plans, but rather go for new ones).  Consequently, Plans do not evolve. In businesses, we 
frequently hear about plans with a particular purpose (e.g. a plan to reduce cost or to increase 
production) and for a determined amount of time (short, medium or long-term plan). In large 
companies, each department would have a particular plan in the short (annual) and the long run 
(commonly 3 – 5 year periods). From the personal perspective, plans are generally informal; we 
rarely document our thoughts for intended actions.  
 
Pattern is an unintended guide to our actions that emerges from repeated behaviour 
overtime. Think for example, on a firm that by permanently searching for excellence in quality 
naturally positions itself in the high-end of the market (e.g. luxury cars by Rolls-Royce Limited or 
watches by Rolex). In this case, the strategy of the company emerges from its focus (producing and 
selling superior quality products at higher prices) and consistent behaviour (commitment to quality 
and excellence). One can say that the firm has naturally adopted a high-end strategy.  In this kind of 
strategy, the firm avoids competitors by positioning itself in a place in the market in which clients 
are willing to pay extra cash for extra value (luxury). For persons it works in the same way. We 
achieve certain objectives by the patterns arising from our past (e.g. a personal strategy to find a job 
could naturally emerge from the patterns in our past and consistent behaviour regarding tendencies 
in risk taking, passivity, or proactivity).  
 
Achieving our goals by mean of position implies that we locate ourselves in a particular 
place for a particular purpose. In a business perspective, positioning is about locating particular 
products in particular markets (e.g. the iPhone or iPad). In this type of strategies companies look to 
position themselves (or their products) in a market niche (e.g. for introducing an original product or 
function) or seek for an opportunity gap in a given market. The opportunity gap is a position that 
emerges spontaneously after existing products generate new needs among consumers. Take for 
example the development of Notebooks – ultraportable computers – and the increasing need of USB-
enabled products not included in the original design of the machine such as DVD/CD burners or 
portable Hard Disks in the high-end, but also the need for new accessories such as soft-cases or 
screen protective films.  
 
Strategy as a perspective is a more abstract way to achieve a goal since it does not directly 
regard a market or a business action but the style or way a firm does things. This implies a view to 
the inside of the firm and how – over time – things tend to be done in a particular way. Such a way 
might be influenced by the overall perspective of the firm to do businesses: it refers to the vision of 
the company or what the company want to be in the future. The vision is therefore, a permanent 
reference acting as a guidance and inspiration for strategic developments in the firm. These type of 
strategy can be illustrated by looking at iconic firms with a very defined – characteristic – way to do 
business like for example Apple, IKEA, McDonalds or Starbucks.  In these examples, the vision of 
the company strongly determines what the strategy for a new product or move in the market will be: 
there is a strong alignment between the vision of future and the actions taken to achieve that goal 
today. In general, perspective and position are related strategies. So, a successful introduction of a 
new Apple gadget inspired in the vision of the firm still requires of the right positioning in the 
market. Position strategies can be easily adjusted within a long-term and steady perspective strategy. 
On the contrary, it will not be that easy to change perspective even while keeping the same position.  
In other words, firms observe only one perspective strategy and adjust positioning strategies 
accordingly (that is a business fact!).  
The last type of strategy regards the so-called ploy or tactic. This is an intended action to 
defeat or overcome an opponent or competitor.  In businesses, and besides positioning, ploys are 
probably one of the most used means of strategy. Common ploys in businesses are: 
 
 (i) Deception 
(ii) Threat 
(ii) Discredit 
 
 To illustrate what a business ploy is, we can use the tactic of deception. Let us think of a 
large corporation wanting to discourage growing competitors by sending signals that suggest a plan 
for further expansion of operations in a disputed region. Supposedly, the corporation invests in land 
to build a factory right in the region were competitors were planning to start their new operations 
(according to the rumours). Competitors see this action (buying the land) as a clear indication of 
―war‖ and retreat to avoid the now potentially higher cost of competition. They eventually will 
change plans. The ploy here is that the corporation bought the land with no intention to build and 
expand operations but to deceive competitors. The ploy in this case was to make the opponents 
believe the firm was decisively moving first. Buying the land was certainly a low cost strategy to get 
rid of the increasing competition in the region. You can always resale the land later. A counter-ploy 
in this case would be competitors making the corporation believe they wanted to start operations in 
that region forcing it to move and overlook the real issue: a merger of rivals to take over the market 
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in other regions. By moving first and buying the land the corporation lost time, money and focus, 
becoming vulnerable to the future coalition of rivals.  
 
 
3.1. The genesis and status of strategies 
Whether we think of a ploy, a plan or any other type of strategy, we can just think of only 
two possible origins for them.  Strategies can be either deliberately developed or emerge to be 
shaped as such. In other words, strategies can be either formulated (e.g. ploy) or formed (e.g. 
pattern). This also regards the status of the strategy that can be either realized (e.g. pattern) or 
intended (e.g. plan). In businesses as in your personal life, strategies are not absolutely formulated or 
formed nor are they purely realized or intended. In more simple terms: 
 
Strategies are a combination of deliberation and impulsiveness on the base of 
new and past ideas and actions.  
 
Therefore, firms do not strategize only in the base of creating new strategies but also modifying 
existing ones, based on facts as well as on the instinct and wisdom of senior managers. For 
individuals, strategies are an intricate mixture of purpose and instinct that emerges from experience 
and in the same time from our expectations of future. 
 
In spite of their genesis and status, strategies in business commonly seek the creation of advantage. 
Mintzberg suggests four main advantages associated with the deployment of strategies in businesses. 
However, for each strategic advantage we achieve we might as well consider a potential 
disadvantage: 
 
Pros and cons of strategies in organizations (modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998): 
Strategic Factor Advantage Disadvantage 
Setting Direction  
Sets the directions to the future balancing 
internal and external factors 
Following a fix course of direction is a 
blind action with hidden dangers 
Focussing Effort 
It increases coordination of activity 
reducing overall effort and detrimental 
effects of chaos  
Excess of focus reduces the chance of 
spontaneous actions needed for 
adaptation to change 
Defining Organization 
It gives meaning to the organization and its 
people defining the purpose of being 
Increases the chance of becoming too 
simplistic and stereotyped  
Achieving consistency 
It reduces uncertainty and provides order 
facilitating action 
It reduces the chance of creative actions 
emerging from uncertainty and chaos 
 
 
3.2 The lack of strategy 
One can say that an organization can keep running on profit (or even increase it) without 
strategies if we are talking about the absence of formal planning or strategic management.  If we talk 
about strategy per-se, then the answer becomes no, since strategies in their pure form are an intrinsic 
attribute of human cognition and by extension of human organizations, and as such they cannot be 
segregated.  
 
When formalized, strategy becomes a process in connection to organizational functions and 
structure that – as Mintzberg suggests – can hinder the capability of learning, adapting or creating by 
excess of planning and control.  This last thought has been the driver of an increasing interest in the 
potential advantages of informal methods to cope with change and uncertainty. However, studies in 
this emerging management trend indicate that results are very context dependant and therefore, it is 
yet too early to say which approach is better. We can illustrate the paradox emerging from this 
debate in the following way:  
 
EXAMPLE: Let us imagine a small firm that decides to keep decision making as 
flexible and democratic as possible, avoiding setting up strict direction guidance but 
devising a simple communication system that allows quick response to changes in 
consumer preferences and operational logistics. The firm has therefore chosen not to 
formalize strategy but to keep a simple responsive intelligence approach. The 
decision has been made considering that investing in the additional implementation 
of strategic management will increase unnecessarily productions cost and would, on 
the other hand, decrease their chance to quickly adapt to changes in the market and 
the supply chain. After all, the industry is small and unpredictable. 
 
Can we say that in this case, the firm has no strategy at all? Probably the answer is no. 
Although we can say the firm has chosen not to formalize its strategic process, it is evident that the 
firm has implemented an informal strategy too. Such a strategy is keeping ahead of competitors (the 
objective) by means of increasing internal responsiveness and adaptability by keeping a flexible 
organizational structure and function. We could even elaborate a little further, saying that in this 
case the strategy is a perspective (a particular way to do business), and that at the same time it does 
emerge from a pattern (e.g. due to the size of the firm and the dynamics of the market). In any case, 
the firm is setting a direction, its position, and it is defining its organizational setting. To make the 
choice of flexibility over formality the firm needs to know itself and the environment in which exist 
and project itself in time. This is a process, indeed it is the rudiment of a formal strategy process. 
 
Eventually, the paradox about strategy in organizations is that the choice of not having a 
formal strategy (or strategic management) process is in itself a strategy. The question therefore 
becomes, whether or not strategy is to be institutionalized, or in other words, whether we internalize 
strategy as one more process in the organizational structure. In the informal approach strategy will 
be present in the overall decision making process while in the formal process will be concentrated in 
the strategic management process. In large firms, that process can be decentralized and be part of 
each (or most) working units (e.g. Departments such as Production, Finances or Marketing). In any 
case, and from a historic point of view, the ultimate strategist in a firm is often the head, namely, the 
manager (or Chief Executive Officer, CEO).  There are new trends in management, and therefore 
there are new trends in strategy management too. Further, into the course, we will review classic and 
trendy styles of strategic management. For the time being we should keep in mind that in general, 
new trends in strategy management rescue the value of human and organizational attributes such for 
example learning, beyond the classic perspective focused on the manager and his/her skills to 
strategize or simple, to plan ahead.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Strategy in Organizations 
 
Over time, the influence of organizations over our life has increased continuously, 
particularly in most developed economies (Baum and Rowley, 2005). They have become the 
building blocks of societies. Today, individuals and groups derive their identities from organizations. 
They influence our present and shape our future. Organizations share more power than individuals 
do (Grant, 2008b).  
 
People increasingly delegates roles and tasks to organizations. We trust them with the 
production and control of resources and infrastructure. We are gradually becoming dependant on the 
functioning of organizations. As we have seen in the previous chapters, organizations such as 
business entities do increasingly rely in the strategic management of their resources and capabilities 
in order to stay competitive, learn and adjust to changes to survive. Knowing more about 
organizations and their behaviour is an important issue in strategic management. Learning about 
organizations, their origin and evolution is also important for us as individuals. After all, the 
decisions driving organizations – strategic or not – will influence our life in more than one way. For 
better or worse, organizations are here to stay.  
 
In the following chapter, I will describe and briefly discuss on the development of 
organizations over time and the basic way they function and behave. We will depict how an 
organization organizes, grows, and evolves overtime. The focus of this review is on the business 
organization – the firm – and their strategic quest to create value for profit increasingly in order to 
adjust and survive over time.  
 
Since there are as many definitions and perspectives in organizational theory as many type 
of organizations we might find, the review focuses on the unifying work of Baum and Rowley 
(2005) on organizational theory, and Grant on (2008b) on business organizations and industrial 
dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
4. Defining and classifying organizations 
 
Baum and Rowley (2005), suggest that ―although most of us ‗know an organization when 
we see one‘ the diversity and complexity of organizations and their activities is difficult to capture in 
a single formal definition. As a result, multiple and sometimes contradictory conceptions of 
organizations exist, each one highlighting particular features of organizations, but necessarily 
providing only partial and incomplete views.‖  
 
Baum and Rowley suggest the use of a framework based on three definitions suggested by 
Scott (1998) considering ―the spectrum of how organizations are conceived‖. In this framework 
organizations are defined as: 
 
(i) Rational system 
(ii) Natural system 
(iii) Open system 
 
 
Organizations as rational systems are oriented to the search of relatively specific goals and exhibit a 
relatively high formalization of social structures. As a natural system, organizations are collectivities 
whose participants share a common interest in the survival of the system by participating in 
informally structured collective activities. Finally, as an open system organizations become the 
system of interdependent activities linking shifting coalitions of participants. 
 
In this context, the organization (or system) is embedded in the environment in which it 
operates. Scott listed these systems in the order in which they emerged in history. Each new system 
to some extent emerges as a response to the criticism of the prior concept. Therefore, from a 
theoretical point of view, the definition and study framework of organizations as an open system is 
the most contemporary approach. In this view, scholars focus on the behaviour of the organizations 
themselves and not between them, as occurred in the views of the rational and natural systems.  
 
Although each of these definitions represents a theoretical perspective of its own, together 
and in a historical perspective they represent the evolution of our knowledge and perception of what 
organizations are and how they work (Baum and Rowley, 2005). Therefore, it is important to review 
each definition on their own perspective and collectively.  
 
 
4.1. The organization as a rational system 
In the perspective of a rational system, an organization is created or designed to achieve a 
specific goal or objective. This implies the design of formal structures, rules, roles and relationships 
to increase the chance of attaining the specified goal as efficiently as possible. For such a purpose – 
of high efficiency – the design acquires the sense of a well-functioning machine in which each part 
behaves as expected. In such a design, the behaviour of individuals is under control and coordinated 
to ensure the collective objective is achieved with the least amount of energy. In other words, this is 
to achieve the expected result in the most economic way possible.  To do so, the design should 
provide or procure standards for control and coordination. In a rational system, the organization 
operates reliably. Historically, the theoretical foundations of the rational view have dominated the 
study and perception of organizations (Baum and Rowley, 2005). As the industrialization of 
production rapidly advanced since the advent of the twentieth century, also new theories about 
organizational behaviour were suggested. In North America, Taylor proposed the concept of 
―scientific management‖ based on the rationalization of activities of managers and workers on the 
base of an analytical ―regimen of science‖ (Baum and Rowley, 2005). While in Europe, Max 
Webber and Robert Michels evidenced the rise of the ―bureaucracy‖, as a form of organization based 
on the belief of normative and hierarchy of command, the French industrialist Fayol and the 
Americans Mooney and Reiley (General Motor Company) advocated the development of universal 
administration principles. Universal principles would serve to guide a greater and efficient 
specialization, grouping, and coordination of work activities. Baum and Rowley (2005), suggest that 
the work of all these early thinkers was devoted to a common objective, the formal conceptualization 
of organizations as ―an instrument purposefully designed to achieve explicit goals with the greatest 
economy of resources‖.  
 
 In the view of Baum and Rowley, the most influential contribution to the theoretical 
foundations of the rational system perspective was given by the North American group known as 
―the Carnegie School‖ lead by  Herbert Simon, James March, and Richard Cyert. Since the mid 40s, 
they introduced concepts and theories such as ―goals and constraints‖, ―formalized structure‖, 
―bounded rationality‖, ―information processing‖, ―decision-making‖, ―political coalitions‖, and 
―performance programs‖. All those concepts remain central to the research and practice on 
contemporary organizational studies (Baum and Rowley, 2005). In general, the work of the Carnegie 
School departed from the classic narrow view of the earlier rational theories, by focusing not only in 
the organizational activities but also in the choices determining them, and by avoiding the search for 
simplistic solutions. This work, is supported by the idea that human cognition is limited by the 
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extent of available information – the bounded rationality – and because most of the time the 
information we have is incomplete, and our choices will be based on the satisfaction of a minimum 
set of requirements rather than on the best criterion. In other words, fully rational decisions might 
not be possible since available information (and capability to process it) is often – or naturally – 
limited. From the perspective of organizations, the ―behavioural theory of the firm‖ (see Cyert and 
March, 1963) suggest that choices are not made by individuals, but by an organization, in which the 
rationality resides in the structure. By structure, Cyert and March mean the specialized set of rules, 
roles, programmes and procedures within the firm. Eventually, such structure supports the behaviour 
of the firm. However, Baum and Rowley (2005) notice that this perspective of the firm evidences a 
conflict regarding two aspects of the adaptation process of organizations: 
 
“On the one hand, organizations' behavior is directed toward performance 
improvement, compatible with rationalistic assumptions of traditional economic 
theories of the firm. On the other hand, their behavior tends to be complex, slow and 
sensitive to organizational conditions, characteristic of bounded rationality. Thus, 
while intendedly adaptive, organizations' behavior might not necessarily result in 
performance improvement – structures developed to promote rationality may, under 
some conditions, have the opposite effect.” 
 
 
4.2. The organization as a natural system 
Baum and Rowley (2005), indicate that in opposition to the rational perspective, the theory 
of natural systems advocate an organization with an informal structure that adapts to its 
environment, and in which purpose is not fully deliberated but emerges over time because of the 
adaptation process. Indeed, the continuous adaptation is what gives the concept a sense of being 
―natural‖. The role of a formal structure in a natural system is not important. In contrast, what really 
matters is that the informal structure of roles and relationships that emerges among individuals and 
groups is what shapes and drives the different organizational activities and goals. This view opposes 
the sense of deliberated design for efficiency, suggested by the rational or machine-like view, 
suggesting a more ―organic‖ type of organization that emerges and evolves in the light of human 
interaction. Although these views seems totally opposed, in reality they are deeply connected. For 
the natural system to emerge it is necessary first the rational system to exist. In other words, the 
organic organization does evolve from the rational system supplementing or even replacing the 
original actions and purposes intended in the formal structure.  
 
Historically, since the late 30s the focus of scholars advocating the natural system 
perspective such as Barnard, Mayo, Roethlisberger, and Dickson was on the interaction between 
formal and informal structures. In their view, the formal structure corresponds to a conscious 
expression of a cost-effective logic, while the informal structure reflects the human logic that is 
spontaneous and based on emotions and needs. The appearance of informal relationships between 
individuals and groups is what on the view of these scholars, increases the consistency of the 
structure through better communication. One can say that informal relationships in the organization 
are what ―get the things done‖ and constitute the centre of the political life in the firms (Baum and 
Rowley, 2005). By late fifties, the prominent work of Philip Selznick suggested that over time and in 
order to perpetuate themselves, organizations will depart from their original objective, evolving and 
acquiring a life of their own. Consequently, a firm will develop a distinctive character and 
competence beyond the technical requirement of the task it perform. Selznick called this process of 
change a process of institutionalization. Talcott Parson gives a final contribution to this stream of 
organizational theory, by late fifties. Parsons elaborated a general analytical model to identify a set 
of functional needs that all social systems must satisfy in order to survive. The model was named 
AGILE, combining the initials of the following four survival functions: 
 
 Adaptation or the capability to interact with the environment, 
 Goal attainment or the capability to set goals for future, 
 Integration through congruence between norms and values and,  
 Latency or preserving the core norms and values over time 
 
This rather intuitive model became an influential paradigm and reference to sociological 
research during the 60s and 70s.  In addition, the work of Parsons on structural functionalism has 
been also important in the theoretical development of the perspective on organizations as open 
systems.  
 
 
4.3. The organization as an open system 
We have briefly reviewed the views of organizations as rational and natural systems. In both 
views, organizations and their environments are two different components of the systems. They are 
separated by well-defined boundaries. In the third view however, such boundaries become less 
evident. The view of organizations as an open system focuses on the ―relationship and 
interdependencies between organizations and environments‖ (Baum and Rowley, 2005). The 
theoretical framework of open systems has been broadly inspired by general systems theory and by 
cybernetics from mid 50s to late 70s. Baum and Rowley (2005), suggest that: 
 
“Open systems models conceive organizations as both systems of internal 
relationships and as inhabitants of a larger system encompassing the environments 
in which they operate and on which they depend for resources. Organizations are 
conceived of as a throughput model, obtaining resources from the environment, 
processing them and distributing the output back to the environment.” 
 
 
In this view, ―organizations are adaptive and interdependent systems, comprised of various 
interrelated – possibly conflicting subsystems – attempting to meet and influence the dynamic 
demands of the environment.‖ 
 
The findings of Baum and Rowley indicate that some considerable volume of early work on 
open systems did meanly focus on the development of a contingency theory.  In such theory, the 
optimal organizational model was to be found in the proper adjustment of the internal characteristics 
of the organizations (e.g. processes and knowledge), to the demands imposed by the environment in 
which it operates. In general, the contingency theory advocates that there is no absolute best way to 
organize a corporation, to lead a firm, or make decisions, and that the optimal course of action is 
dependent – or contingent – on the organization‘s internal and external situation. Take for example 
the following situation; two companies that operate in different technological environments will 
have different demands to arrange their structure and functions. In an environment in which 
technology is very specialized and complex, the optimal model for organising the firm will probably 
rely in capturing and retaining particular know-how and in developing a competent network of 
specialized suppliers. Contrarily in an environment in which technologies are standard and tend to be 
replaced (or upgraded) rapidly, the optimal organisation for the firm will probably consider a fast 
prototyping and release of new products. In general, when the organisational model increases its 
degree of differentiation of activities (as a response to the environment), the need of coordination 
and control becomes greater and so increases the overall complexity of the system (and the model). 
A slight connection between this logic and the fundamentals of the rational system and the theory of 
bureaucracy can be seen here. Indeed, Baum and Rowley (2005), suggest that the contingency 
theory correspond to a ―content-oriented‖, ―rational-open‖ view of systems.  
 
Nevertheless, contingency is not the unique theoretical approach in the open system research. 
In this context, Baum and Rowley (2005) describe the work of Karl Weick by late 70s as an 
alternative ―process-oriented natural-open‖ view of the system. In this view of the open system, 
―organizational activities are directed toward resolving equivocal informational inputs from the 
environment.‖  This is, focusing on the capability of the organization to interpret properly what 
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happens on its surrounding environment and act accordingly. Organizational activities according to 
Weick are then in three stages: enactment, selection, and retention. These stages regard the 
capability of the ―organizational members‖ (people) to influence their environment (enactment), and 
recognizes the role of human cognition, interpretation, and meaning creation in the survival of the 
firm (selection and retention). Summarising, the natural-open view of the system does emphasize the 
role of human resources as drivers of change and adaptation, in both the internal and external 
environment of the firm. In this view, one key element (and focus of study), is the human capability 
to interpret information.  
 
 
5. Levels of organization 
 
Baum and Rowley indicate that with the advent of the open system perspective, the 
organizational science recognized (and studied) the existence of different levels of organization from 
individual members, groups, departments, to organizations, to populations and even to communities 
(of organizations). These levels form a hierarchy of aggregation that supports the theory that 
organizational systems are hierarchically arranged. Since many other levels can be drawn from this 
hierarchic arrangement, Baum and Rowley (2005), suggest an organizational approach based on ―the 
focus of interest to be explained‖ and that consist of only three levels:  
 
(i) Intra-organizational level 
(ii) Organizational level 
(iii) Inter-organizational level 
 
The intra-organizational level focuses on understanding people (individually and 
collectively), the knowledge, the tools and the tasks that constitute any organization. The 
organizational level instead, focuses on understanding processes, the systems of activity, the 
organizational boundaries, and the strategies of organizations. At the inter-organizational level, the 
focus of attention is on understanding the nature and dynamics of relationships, and interactions 
within and among organizations. The objective of these levels of levels of classification is to 
simplify the analytical process of the complex phenomenon of organization. The multilevel 
perspective aids researchers to attain a richer understanding of this phenomenon.  
 
 
 
6. Organizational environments 
 
Baum and Rowley, describe another important contribution from the open system 
perspective to the organizational science: ―the conceptualization of the nature of organizational 
environments‖. This set of theories regards the existence of different environments in which 
organizational activities take place, resources are exchanged, and interactions occur. Baum and 
Rowley (2005), describe the following three organizational environments: 
 
(i) Task environment 
(ii) Technical environments 
(iii) Institutional environments 
 
The task environment is probably the first and most common view of an organizational 
environment. The task environment compresses all aspects in the environment of the organization 
that are or might be relevant to the setting of goals and their achievement. Hence, such environment 
compresses the sources of input, the market for outputs, the regulators and the competitors.  
 The technical environment on the other hand is the location were organizations produce their 
products or services and such outputs are awarded by the market for their high quality or efficient 
performance.  Both environments, tasks and technical, imply that organizations are activity systems 
conceived with the purpose to achieve economic-driven goals. The rationale behind this perspective 
is that organizations need to interact with their environment in order to survive since they are not 
self-sufficient to produce all required resources and information.  In this context, Baum and Rowley 
indicate that the need for information in organizations creates uncertainty while the need for 
resources creates dependency. On the other hand, when the environment is complex and unstable it 
induces a higher degree of uncertainty (information is complex, fragmented, scarce, difficult to 
collect or interpret). When resources in the environment become scarce and their sources are highly 
concentrated and coordinated, it induces high degree of dependency. Although the conditions in the 
environment affect the organization as a whole, in general one can say that each component of the 
organization could experience uncertainty and dependency in a different way.  
 
Organizational environments also entail normative and symbolic references for the activities 
organizations perform. These set of formal rules and beliefs form the institutional environment of a 
firm. This environment rewards the performance of organizations not on the base of the quantity and 
quality of outputs (products or services), but on the use of proper structures and practices. In the 
institutional environment, conditions will be broadly influenced by the social structure and values 
(e.g. given by the state, professional associations and trade unions and, social and civil groups). In 
general, the institutional environment theory advocates that organizations not only need to be 
rewarded by markets to survive, but also be supported and legitimized by its environment. Such 
approach implies that the environment becomes a source of normative and cognitive constraints to 
organizational activities (e.g. ethic regulations).  
 
Often, technical and institutional environments are perceived as independent forces, since 
each organization can respond to them in very different ways. In other words, some scholars suggest 
that the survival of an organization will be determined for just one of the environments in which it is 
immersed (and according to the activities, it performs). Baum and Rowley illustrate this perspective 
contrasting the activities of an educational organization and an airline. The educational institution 
will be broadly influence by the conditions posed by its institutional environment, while the airline 
will respond to demands emerging from its technical environment. However, there is increasing 
consensus about the interdependency between both environments. Indeed, contemporary views 
advocate the idea that the broad institutional environment defines a particular technical environment. 
Baum and Rowley explain that markets that reward organizations for their efficient performance are 
indeed based on institutionalized rules such as for example intellectual property rights and norms for 
fair trade. However, for some scholars distinguishing between these two environments is wrong in 
principle, since all organization are supposed to respond to both technical and institutional aspects of 
their environments simultaneously.  
 
 
7. Modern organizational perspectives  
 
The present classification suggested by Baum and Rowley (2005), surely does not include 
all possible theories in the field, but it certainly does represent some of the main theoretical streams 
observed in business organizations today (See Figure 1).  This simplified classification, suggests that 
the dominant theoretical stream is the open system perspective. From this stream, three different 
approaches connected to the principle of natural and rational systems emerge. Each of the three 
approaches entails a number of different underlying theories. 
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Figure 1. Ten different contemporary perspectives on organizations in relation 
to the rational, natural and open definition of systems (Modified from Baum and 
Rowley, 2005). 
 
7.1. Natural – open systems 
In the natural-open systems approach, the main theoretical trends include institutions, 
networks, ecology and institutions. The institutions theory advocates the idea that organizations are 
constructed by the increasing rationalization of cultural rules. In this perspective, the role of 
institutional cognition, the construction of social actions by organizations and the effect that 
institutionalized rules and environments have over the organizations are core concerns. In other 
words, as suggested by Baum and Rowley (2005), ―Organizational performance is inherently social, 
depending not on technical and economic competence, but on conformity to rationalized rules and 
requirements necessary to acquire needed social support and resources and to be perceived as 
legitimate.‖ 
 
Networks theory on the other hand, focuses on the nature and dynamics of networks of inter-
personal and inter-organizational relations, and the characteristics that actions acquire because 
networking. This perspective is based in old theories (back to late 1800s) attempting to explain the 
role of social environments as determinants of individual behaviour. During the last decade, 
networks scholars have devoted much effort to explain how certain characteristic of the network 
(e.g. structure and information channels), and their positions within other networks, can be used to 
predict organizational behaviour.  
 
From the perspective of ecology theory the characteristics of the environment (its 
constitution), affects the relative abundance (number) and diversity (type) of organizations and their 
evolution over time. In general, the characteristic of the environment refers to economic, social, and 
politic conditions. The rationale behind the ecology theory is that the members of an organization are 
in permanent struggle to adapt strategies and structures to the demands posed by an uncertain and 
changing environment. In this context, the organizations that are not able to cope with such demands 
are ―selected off‖ as occurs in ecological systems. This process of selection over time induces 
changes in the structure and strategy of organizations and their populations. This principle is often 
observed from the perspective of markets, firms, or industries. 
 
In a similar stream, evolution theory in organizations focuses on the dynamics between 
environments and ―populations‖ or ―communities‖ over time. In the evolutionary perspective there 
are three fundamental processes: variation, selection and retention. These concepts are taken from 
principles of biology and ecology. Variation in the organizational context is a process that produces 
variations in structure and strategy, selection entails a process of selective elimination of certain 
(inappropriate or less effective) variations, while the process of retention represents the preservation 
of and propagation of the variations that were not eliminated. In general, there cannot be a proper 
evolution if one of the three processes is missing. In addition, variation is an erratic process that 
operates ―blind‖, ―by chance‖ or ―random‖ that remarks the role of uncertainty in evolution. 
Although variation is the input to selection and retention, it is the least studied process in the 
evolutionary theory of organizations. In addition, little is known about the ―inheritance‖ process in 
organizations and social structures. In biology, the mechanism of inheritance is explained in the base 
of the propagation of genes, but in organizations, no information unit such as gen has been ever 
identified. Indeed, the process of inheritance in organizations seems to act significantly different 
(somehow more erratic) than a process driven by genetic transmission.  
 
 
7.2. Natural & rational-open systems 
This approach currently entails theories and views such as cognition and interpretation, 
power and dependence, technology, learning, and complexity and computation.  
 
Cognition and interpretation is the application of cognitive principles to organization. In this 
context, the organization can be perceived indistinctly as a system of information or as a system of 
meaning. In the first view, the organization codes and enacts information in a computational fashion.  
Searching and processing relevant information implies high costs and its effectiveness as a process 
rely on the rationally-bounded nature of the managers leading the organization. In the second view, 
the characteristics of the process of searching and processing information are determined by the 
meaning of that information in the social context created by the members of the organization. In 
other words, the first view focuses on processing information while the second focuses on 
interpreting it. 
 
Power and dependence is a perspective based on the principles advocated by Marx about the 
diversification of interest and goals and the role of power on determining which interest or goals are 
to prevail. In the organizational context this principle advocates that it is the (organized) use of 
power (or influences) what determines the success of some organizations over others. One stream 
within this perspective focuses on the ―corporate elite‖ or the use of power for the collective benefit 
of a group of organizations. Another stream focuses on the exercise of power within and between 
organizations. Although these views refer to organizations, the principles behind broadly regard the 
capability of individuals to use resources and capabilities to their advantage. 
 
Technology theory on the other hand, advocates that technology is an important driver of 
organizational structure. Baum and Rowley (2005) indicate that:  
 
―…the greater the technical complexity, the greater the structural complexity; the 
greater the technical uncertainty, the greater the decentralization and lower the 
formalization; the greater the technical interdependence, the greater the need for 
coordination.‖  
 
This perspective however, is less accepted today since it fails to predict technology changes. 
Baum and Rowley indicate that such failure is due in part to the influence that both, informal and 
formal structures in organizations have in technologies and the structures they form. Then, one can 
say that the dynamics of technology change are to some extent, determined by the social context in 
which they take place. However, in the most contemporary perspective on technology theory, 
emphasis is giving to the role of organizations in technology change and diffusion of technologies, 
the dynamics of competition between rival technologies, and the dynamics of technology change in 
organizational environments. Another perspective is based on the role of technology as an agent of 
―creative destruction‖ (Schumpeter). This perspective suggests that technologies do evolve over time 
in long cycles of incremental change until new and superior technologies are created, old 
technologies are replaced, and a new cycle of incremental change is initiated. In this context, Baum 
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and Rowley (2005), suggest ―organizations are ―carriers‖ of technology whose fates are influenced 
profoundly by these technological dynamics. Recently, as the idea that ―knowledge‖ is a key to 
superior organizational performance has become more influential, attention to technology has 
increased dramatically in organization science.‖ This suggests that after a short period of ―theoretical 
weakness‖ the technology perspective is once again relevant to the organizational theory. 
 
Learning as a theoretical perspective has been established as a consequence of the increasing 
interest in the role of knowledge in organizations. Organizational learning theory suggests that 
organizations are transformed by experience.  The process of ―learning‖ however, takes place when 
knew knowledge is introduced and embedded in the organization. New knowledge can be embedded 
in different ―reservoirs‖ such as people, routines or technologies. Eventually, the embedded 
knowledge can be retained and transmitted. However, Baum and Rowley (2005) remark that 
learning in organizations not always implies progress or improvements. Indeed, experience in this 
context can be biased in many ways. Take for example the development of a new operational 
procedure in a transnational firm that has been based on the experience acquired working with 
suppliers in India. Such procedure might not be optimal in the organizational environment outside 
the context of that particular country. Although the organization has learnt a new procedure, the 
value of such knowledge is context dependant. Currently, there has been increasing focus in the fact 
that organizations not only use their own experience, but that also can learn from the experience of 
other organizations. This perspective is reflected in the concept of ―transfer learning‖ in which a 
positive change (e.g. innovation) occurs by sharing direct or common experience among 
organizations or their structural units. This concept also regards the action of constructive imitation 
by observation. 
 
The perspective on complexity and computation emerges from the interest to apply 
complexity theory to organization (e.g. chaos and dynamic equilibrium). This perspective has 
become very popular in recent years, particularly in large and diversified multinational 
organizations. There is an increasing focus on the issues of adaptation in changing environments, 
and of interdependence within and among organizations. Although useful principles have been 
introduced to deal with the increasing complexity of organizations, a serious lack of empirical work 
in the field is observed. In general, some common complexity-based theories suggest that the units 
that form an organization are in permanent transformation until reaching the edge of chaos. In turn, 
the organization is constantly adapting to new demand and condition between organizations and 
their system. If an organization has a rigid structure, and each unit is highly interconnected and 
dependant, each decision and action taken at the unit level can have catastrophic consequences for 
the whole organization. In the same way, if the system of organizations is tightly constructed and the 
degree of inter-dependency is high, the fall of one organization can bring the entire system down. 
 
 
7.3. Rational-open systems 
The perspective of organizational economics is the main theoretical framework in the 
rational open approach.  Baum and Rowley (2005) suggest that this contemporary perspective 
departs and differentiates itself from the neoclassic point of view of the firm, in which the firm 
makes choices of output volumes according to the prices observed in the market. In such market, 
firms have access to the same technology and information therefore, decisions become rational and 
predictable and broadly driven by changes in cost and demand. The neoclassical view consequently, 
does not consider the role of institutional settings and the effect of differentiated capabilities of the 
firm. The market and the organizations immersed into it (the firms) become mere abstractions.   
 
The economics perspective today combines different managerial and economic theories and 
frameworks (e.g. resource-based theory and evolutionary economics), in an attempt to address and 
explain ―real life‖ situations observed in markets and firms, in a less abstract way than in the 
neoclassic view. One stream in this perspective addresses the role of strategic management (and 
therefore of the managers) as focused in the maximization of profits through the development of 
specialized resources and capabilities (of high quality). This stream opposes the neoclassical view of 
strategic management as focusing in tactics or plots to create entry barriers to potential competition.   
 
Another streams in the economics perspective address the question of how firms growth and 
behave beyond equilibrium based on their particular acquisition and management of resources, and 
the boundaries of firms and markets (e.g. transaction cost theory). In general, these perspectives 
acknowledge the existence of dynamic and imperfect markets conditions. In the same line, another 
popular stream is based on the so-called ―agency theory‖. In this theory, the focus is on an agency-
like relation between stockholders and managers (the agents), and the emerging or potential conflicts 
in the ―agency‖ due to the particular (and hidden) agendas of each agent.  
 
Baum and Rowley remark that although these streams are different to the neoclassic view, 
they still observe the basic principles of market competition and organizational rationality. 
Therefore, the economics perspective still does not address the issue of individual choices 
(strategies) but do concentrate on the observation of the events regarding organizational efficiency. 
Eventually, the economics perspective – popular among managers and economists – still considers 
the firm as entity that is driven by entirely rational decisions and actions.  
 
 
 
8. Strategy in the perspective of organizational theory 
 
 
Organizational theory, organizational behaviour or organizational studies, is the systematic 
study and application of knowledge about how people – as individuals or groups – act within 
organizations. 
 
In this context, organizations are studied from multiple viewpoints, methods, and levels of 
analysis. For example, behaviour in an organization can be analyzed from a micro perspective – 
focusing on individual and group dynamics in a given organizational setting – and/or from a macro 
point of view – focusing on the organization‘s dynamics, their evolution and the guiding strategies 
and structures over time. Whatever the focus of study might be, organizational theory not only 
attempts the understanding and modelling of the many factors driving people‘s interaction within 
organizations but also their explanation, prediction and control. Hence, organizational theory is 
perceived by many as an important tool towards the successful (and sustainable) development of 
organizations. Others however believe the opposite, and warn us about the implicit risk of using such 
studies as a tool to control the behaviour of workers (Grant, 2008b) 
 
As a scientific discipline, organizational theory is not recent. Some scholars believe that it 
begun with the advent of ―scientific management‖ in the late 1800‘s. Early studies on organizational 
theory did focus on human and organizational issues affecting productivity. After the First World 
War (WWI), the focus moved to the analysis of how human factors and psychology affected 
organizations. After the end of WWII, the development of large-scale logistics and operations 
research brought interest on a multidisciplinary approach to the study of organizations (e.g. systems 
theory, complexity theory and complexity strategy). During the 1960s and 1970s, the field was 
strongly influenced by social psychology, while the emphasis in academic studies was on performing 
quantitative research. This brought with it a large number of new theories, such as for example the 
―bounded rationality‖, the ―informal organization‖, the ―contingency theory‖, ―resource 
dependence‖, ―institutional theory‖, and the ―organizational Ecology‖ theories, among many others. 
In the 80‘s, the role of culture in organizational behaviour acquired great relevance and new 
qualitative methods based on psychology, anthropology and sociology were developed and broadly 
applied.  
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Nowadays, organizational theory is a steadily rising cross-disciplinary field with formal 
presence in academic departments and programs in faculties of industrial psychology, business 
schools and engineering. Therefore, the field has become highly influential in the business world 
with practitioners translating academic research into business practices all around the world. 
Varieties of analytical methods are used in organizational studies including quantitative methods 
such as multiple regression, non-parametric statistics, time dependent analysis, and ANOVA. Some 
qualitative methods entail ethnography (direct observation), single and multiple case-analyses, and 
other history-oriented methods. In the last decades, the focus on language, metaphors, and 
―organizational storytelling” has increased. Eventually, the theory and practice of organizational 
behaviour is acquiring relevance in the global economy, as more people with diverse backgrounds 
and cultural values have to work together effectively and efficiently. Some new important keywords 
in this context are ethics, leadership and culture.  
 
 
8.1. The evolution of corporate organizations 
The most of our current production of goods and services is in the hands of corporations 
(Grant, 2008b). Corporations are enterprises with a legal identity that is different to the identity of 
their owners. Exemptions to this fact are the activities of agriculture and craft in developing 
countries (family-based production mainly), and services such as education (government-based 
production/control).  Historically, the control of production not always was in hands of corporations 
but organized through networks of self-employed, home-based workers.  Commonly, the largest 
networks were agricultural plantations. Within these networks, a basic “putting-out” production 
system was implemented. Take for example the wool industry in Briton in 1800s: home-based 
spinners who purchased raw wool (on credit) from a merchant to whom they sold the yarn; the 
merchant resold the yarn to home-based weavers from whom he purchased cloth. After the industrial 
revolution, the home-based workers became employees at a textile factory and stop being 
independent contractors. Eventually, they became part of an organization. 
 
  The business organization is often indicated as one of the greatest innovations of modern 
civilization. This is reflected in their increasing role as organizers of production, and therefore in 
their influence over the main features of modern economy.  Hence, we can infer that business 
organizations are effective and efficient organizing the economic activity. In the capitalist economy, 
production can be organized in two places: in markets (by the mechanism of price) and in firms (by 
managerial direction). The potential role of markets and firms in the capitalist economy is 
determined by efficiency: e.g. if the administrative cost of firms is lower than the transaction cost of 
markets, transactions will tend to be organized within firms and not across markets. Hence, if firms 
are more efficient managing their cost than markets, the economy is then organized around the firms.  
 
 According to Grant, the modern business organization or corporation, as we know it today, 
emerged as the result of two changes: (1) the adoption line-and-staff structure, and (2) the creation 
of the multi-division corporation. Initially, most of companies were very small and operated 
(managed) from a single plant or office. The lack of transportation limited the operations and market 
of the firms to their immediate location. With the creation of the telegraph and the railway system, 
such limits did eventually disappear. However, in the perspective of geographically larger markets, 
operations needed to be adjusted originating new organizational structures and management 
methods. Having now physically separated units, the firms needed to provide them with an 
administrative structure. In principle, a basic organizational structure was created on the base of a 
group of units, managed by an administrative headquarter. This was the so-called line-and-staff 
structure. Employees of the firm were either line, allocated to operational task within operational 
units, or staff, as administrators or functional specialists placed at a head office.  
 
 The other fundamental change, the creation of the multi-divisional corporation, took place 
on 1920s because of expanding operations (different products) and businesses (merger of 
companies). Such new organizational arrangement came to replace the predominant centralized 
functional model, giving rise to a more complex functional structure.   At that time, two pioneering 
companies took the lead on the implementation of multiple divisions: DuPont and General Motors. 
DuPont indicated that the ever-increasing complexity of operations raised too many coordination 
problems and the few top managers were just overwhelmed by the load of work and the complexity 
of decision-making. Hence, the firm did transform each different product line into a decentralized 
product division with its own sales, R&D, and support activities. In the case of General Motor, the 
rapid acquisition of other companies brought with it a great deal of coordination and management, 
particularly in terms of a weak financial control and a rather confused product line. Making each 
new company a division under a common management system was a better arrangement for the need 
of the company at that time. This implied that each manager at a division was responsible for the 
operation and performance of the unit, and a director was the responsible for the development and 
control of the entire organization.  
  
 Therefore, the primary feature of the emergent ―divisionalized” corporation was the 
separation of operating responsibilities, now in hands of general managers at the divisional level, 
from strategic responsibilities, now located at the head-office. This basic approach to modern 
organizational structures combines both centralized coordination (top management) an operational 
decentralization (operation management). 
 
 Following the occurrence of these two fundamental changes, business organizations have 
continue to evolve. Since the end of WWII structures and systems of companies have changed 
drastically. Today, the multi-divisional structure of large firms has evolved into a matrix 
organization in which separate hierarchies are coordinated around a variety of products and 
functions at different geographical areas. This increasing organizational complexity demanded a 
higher degree of flexibility and responsiveness. Accordingly, new forms of shared coordination and 
control emerged (e.g. networks, alliances and outsourcing partners).  In the last decade, the focus of 
management systems has rapidly shifted from operational issues towards corporate issues such as 
knowledge management and social responsibility (Grant, 2008b).  
 
 
8.2. The strategic need to align specialization, coordination and cooperation  
 Any organized activity, at any organizational level, does implies the interaction of two 
opposed requirements (Grant, 2008b):  
 
i) The division of labour into various tasks, and  
ii) The coordination of tasks to accomplish the activity 
 
Therefore, it is suggested that the two fundamental organizational requirements are the 
specialization and the division of labour.  
 
 Grant suggests that specialization is the fundamental source of efficiency in production, 
particularly through division of labour in to separate tasks. This might bring to the memory the 
iconic image of an assembling line at an old car factory. In the assembling line (through division of 
labour) each worker does something particular (the task) that only he/she does (the specialization), 
and adds to the assembling of the final product. Henry Ford, the American car maker and creator of 
the moving assembly line, reduced the production time (and cost) of a car from 106 hour to only 6 
hours thanks to specialization and division of labour.  Of course, specialization and division of 
labour do not only regard assembling lines, but any division and coordination of tasks with the 
purpose of increasing production. Indeed, it has been suggested that the huge difference in human 
productivity, between old and modern societies, is the mere result of efficiency gains of individuals 
specializing. However, the highest the specialization, the higher the number of required specialist to 
carry out the tasks will be. Instead, the highest the number of specialists, the higher the cost of 
coordination becomes. If the environment in which the labour takes place becomes unstable, the 
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need of specialized decisions increases together with the cost of coordination. On the contrary, if the 
environment stabilises the division of labour becomes optimal. This is suggested to be true for both 
firms and societies. If a society is immersed in a chaotic environment (e.g. countries in state of war 
or civil turmoil), the chance of specialization to spread among individuals is low, since basic self-
sufficient organizational units prevail over large (and costly) specialized organizations. Such 
societies often subsist on the base of self-sufficient units such as families rather than on the base of 
firms. These economies do not grow and the countries move to a state of mere subsistence.   
However, specialization by itself is not enough. No matter how specialized an individual become, 
production efficiency will not arise if the coordination of such skills with the skills of other 
individuals within the organization is not possible (Grant, 2008b): 
 
“Production efficiency depends on both the specialization and coordination 
of efforts between individuals working together” 
 
As in a sport team, success is most cases the result of an adequate coordination of individual 
capabilities and the collective effort. However, how do organizations coordinate the efforts of 
individuals? Literature depicts four basic coordination mechanisms (Grant, 2008b: p. 176): 
 
Coordination mechanisms in organizations 
Mechanism Description 
Price As in a market, price also drives coordination in firms: Each division or department 
―trade‖ the price of their own assets though an internal price that can be negotiated 
or set by the head office. 
Rules and directives Employees at a firm agree on performing a variety of duties (tasks) according to 
general work contracts. The firm exert authority and control over employees on 
the base of rules (e.g. minimum work period per day) and directives (e.g. not to 
smoke in common areas) set by the contract. 
Mutual adjustment  This is a primary mechanism of coordination of activities. By interaction and 
mutual learning, individual adjust their individual routines to their common 
routine. This kind of coordination occurs in all teams and groups without a formal 
leader. 
Routines A routine is the formalization of frequent activities coordinated by means of rules 
and mutual adjustment. This means that coordination is embedded in routines that 
can be repeated over time. 
   
 
The role of each mechanism is to be determined by the type of activity being performed and 
the degree of collaboration required doing so. Price mechanisms will fit better in straight 
coordination activities such as for example, the coordination of production and sales. In this case, the 
best incentive is to offer to the sales‘ personnel a high commission (price incentive) over products 
with high inventory. Rules mechanisms on the other hand might work better in activities that require 
standardized results such as for example high quality standards. In this situation, operators often 
have limited freedom of decision, and simple rules to coordinate (and standardize) the efforts are 
followed instead. Routines mechanisms are more efficient to coordinate activities where the 
interdependence between individual is very high. This applies for simple or complex activities  
 
Coordination also means cooperation.  Grant suggests that when coordination problems are 
not solved by the simple implementation of a coordination mechanism, due to the rise of individuals 
with conflicting goals, we face a cooperation problem. In order to overcome such issues, incentives 
and controls are required. Incentive mechanisms often entail financial incentives (reward of 
performance), while control mechanisms are often based on supervision of performance and 
behaviour (direct supervision of subordinates). A third mechanism to solve coordination problems 
and conflicting goals without incentives and controls is the share of values. Sharing values in firms 
imply sharing cultural values such as religion or the appreciation for excellence for example. Today, 
the role of corporate culture is receiving a lot more of attention than before. Cultural factors for 
example are suggested as the main driver of success in many Japanese corporations. Sharing values 
can reduce the cost of implementing control and incentive mechanism through self-control and self-
motivation.  
8.3. Hierarchy: The basic organizational design 
In order to address specialization, coordination and cooperation, large-sized organizations 
have implemented a hierarchy system. It has been suggested that hierarchy is fundamental to the 
structure of any organization, indeed hierarchy is believed to be present in all complex systems 
(Grant, 1998b).   
 
Hierarchy itself is a system, composed of interrelated subsystems (e.g. the individual, the 
family, the community, the society). In management, we understand hierarchy as and administrative 
arrangement within superiors and subordinates in which the flow of authority runs from top to 
bottom. One of the main purposes of hierarchy in organizations is to economize coordination efforts, 
time and costs (See Figure 2). In self-organizing groups or teams (with no hierarchy), more 
coordination interactions are needed compared to a basic hierarchy. Another important function of 
hierarchy is adaptability. Hierarchical or modular systems are able to evolve faster than unitary 
systems that are not organized into subsystems. However, such a degree of evolution and 
adaptability to changes implies that each subsystem in the hierarchy must have a certain degree of 
independency. In such arrangements, problems would be detected and isolated rapidly.  
 
 Hierarchy can also be used as a control mechanism, helping to solve problems of 
cooperation in organizations. In this context, hierarchy is used to clearly define who has the power in 
the organization and which the rules to be followed are. Hence, it does establish a system in which 
superiors have the control over subordinates. Cooperation in such a system, often called 
administrative hierarchy, is very high since it can be managed. An administrative hierarchy becomes 
a bureaucracy when rules and norms are standardized and formalized. The main purpose of a 
bureaucracy is to reduce the effect of human behaviour (e.g. emotions, personality) on production. 
For this reason, bureaucratic organizations are also named mechanistic or machine-like 
organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 How hierarchy economizes on coordination: (a) For a self-organizing group of five 
persons with no leader, 10 interactions are needed to coordinate one activity. However, for the 
same number of persons under a (b) hierarchy of one leader and three subordinates, only 4 
interactions are needed to coordinate the same activity. Hence, the hierarchy system ―b‖ saves six 
moves economizing resources 
 - Modified from Grant, 2008b: p. 179- 
 
 
We have seen that hierarchy can be employed to optimize coordination and control 
collaboration in organizations, and that the focus on control to reduce human interference gives rise 
to what we know as bureaucratic organizations.  
 
In organizational theory, bureaucracies are also known as the mechanistic form of 
organization. This name comes from the vision of an efficient working organization without the trail 
of human deficiencies, resembling the view of a tireless, flawless machine. This organizational 
model, reached its peak on popularity and diffusion by the first half of the 20
th
 century. During this 
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period, bureaucracy became the way to organize not only large business corporations, but also public 
divisions such as the Military and the Public Service. However, as more knowledge was gained in 
theory of management, an alternative form of organization started to arise: the organic organization. 
By mid-50s, scholars suggested that coordination and collaboration where also a function of social 
interaction. If an organization is not bureaucratic, it becomes more informal and therefore, more 
flexible. In such organizations, efficiency is also possible but it depends on mutual adjustment and 
interaction. The name ―organic‖ was derived from the non-mechanistic sense of the form.  Today, in 
a single firm both mechanic and organic forms can co-exist simultaneously. Whether an organization 
is more mechanistic or organic depends on the type of activities the organization takes on and the 
environment in which the activities are performed at.  Some companies will find advantage on 
keeping a mechanistic approach when they are required to operate under strict standards.  
 
EXAMPLE: The fast-food restaurant McDonalds is an example of mechanistic 
organization. The firm depends on providing the same quality of food at low 
cost to consumers worldwide. To do so, McDonalds developed highly 
standardized working practices and operational procedures. As a mechanistic 
organization, the firm carefully controls its inputs to reduce variation (work or 
operations out of the standard) and avoid human interference as much as 
possible.  
 
On the other hand, if an organization requires constant development of new knowledge, and 
depends on strong R&D activities, an organic form of organization will be preferred. The main 
characteristics of and differences between mechanistic and organic organizations are described 
bellow (modified from Grant, 2008b: p. 182): 
 
Differences between the mechanistic and organic forms of organization: 
Feature Mechanistic Organization Organic Organization 
Task definition Rigid and highly specialized Flexible and general 
Coordination & Control Vertical top-down management by 
rules and directives 
Horizontal management approach by 
mutual adjustment  and common 
culture 
Communication system Vertical flow Vertical and horizontal 
Knowledge  creation Centralized at the top Dispersed 
Commitment and loyalty To immediate superior To the organizations and its goals 
Environment around the firm Stable with low technological 
uncertainty  
Unstable with high technological 
uncertainty  
 
 
In practical terms, all organizations do organize their functions and divisions based on both, 
the organic and the mechanistic approaches under the same criteria listed above. Stable operations 
such as financing, customer support, or acquisitions will be usually organized in a mechanistic form. 
Contrarily, highly variable activities such as for example R&D, Marketing and Strategic Planning 
will be organized in an organic form.  
 
 
8.4. Alternative organizational forms 
As the organization grows in size and complexity, more layers within the hierarchy will be  
added. In a bureaucracy with centralized power, each additional layer added brings an increment in 
the number of required (top and mid) managers, a reduction in the speed of the decision-making 
process, and an overall deficit of control over the whole system. Over time, the ecological, social, 
cultural, economic, and politic environments surrounding the firm have become more unstable 
forcing firms to quickly adjust their structures and forms in order to survive. In bureaucratic firms, 
the capability to adjust (or respond) to changes in the environment is limited by the rigidity of the 
system. As a consequence, in the last decade less and less companies do completely keep 
mechanistic structures. However, as the mechanistic form still provides the most efficient and 
reliable coordination and control of labour division, new organizational structures are not completely 
free of bureaucracy. Hence, the challenge for these new firms is not to eliminate hierarchy but to 
organize it in a different way, allowing more flexibility and responsiveness.  
 
EXAMPLE (Grant, 2008a): General Electric is a large corporation that has been 
forced to rethink its huge hierarchic system. The company has a large multi-
divisional structure that demands efficient coordination and large control efforts. In 
the current organizational form, the company kept the same divisions but it has 
reduced the number of layers (scales) in the hierarchy, decentralizing decision-
making. This implies that the number of management personnel at headquarters 
was reduced to the minimum possible and that the communication system shifted 
from horizontal to vertical. Control in this new organizational form is based on 
accountability rather than in supervision.  
 
 In the prevailing structure of contemporary (large) firms there are four basic ways to 
organize personnel (according to Grant, 2008b):  
 
(i) Task  
(ii) Products  
(iii) Geography 
(iv) Process 
 
Grouping employees based on the task they will perform, is probably the most basic form of 
labour division. Here the group is arranged on the base of a common task and all members do 
perform the same job (sales, assembling, acquisitions, marketing, etc).  Contrarily, when a company 
offers many products, each product will become a department, and labour will be divided 
accordingly. Let us take the example of Pepsi Co. that has three main production divisions on the 
base of three very different products groups such as PepsiCo Beverages (sodas, juice and water), 
Frito-Lay (snacks-food), and Quaker Foods (cereals and processed food).  On the other hand, when a 
company operates in different local markets, working divisions are commonly organized on the base 
of geography (e.g. 7-Eleven operations organised into international divisions by regions, countries 
and areas). In terms of operations, a company also can organize itself around a particular process (a 
sequence of interrelated activities). In this case, the organization is seen as a set of processes such as 
for example the product development process or the manufacturing process. In general, firms tend to 
organize labour in terms of particular processes regarding a product (e.g. bottling and distribution of 
Pepsi) or a particular task (e.g. PepsiCo marketing: communications and sales of Pepsi).  
 
Firms can be organized not only in terms of grouping personnel and activities but also in 
terms of factors of advantage (Grant, 2008b). For example, there is an advantage in grouping 
together activities where economies of scale are present (e.g. research activities – R&D – through 
projects generating knowledge and research infrastructure within and out the firm). In addition, a 
department can be created with the solely objective of economic utilization (e.g. a Department of 
Maintenance could be more cost-effective that to have maintenance engineers in each working unit). 
On the other hand, a firm can increase its competitiveness by building capabilities through learning. 
In this case, labour can be organized in terms of maximising the effect of mutual learning like for 
example creating cross-disciplinary departments of R&D able to link different knowledge bases at 
the firm. Another criterion to divide labour in a firm is based on the need to standardize control 
systems. Units that do not have the same way to operate require different control systems. In general, 
firms tend to group units into divisions that have the same control system (e.g. manufacturing).  The 
approach of a firm to organize tasks and activities, will determine the organizational and operational 
structure. Grant (2008b), suggests three main types of structure for the contemporary firm: 
 
(i) Functional structures 
(ii) Multidivisional structure 
(iii) Matrix structure 
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Single-business firms adopt functional structures in order to increase their capability to 
exploit economies of scales, learning, capability building, and standardization of control systems. 
This implies that firms group together tasks with similar functionality (e.g. entertainment division, 
medical division, etc). Control in this structure is highly centralized. The Multidivisional structure 
instead, was created with the objective to reduce the problems of diversification by decentralizing 
decision-making in firms producing more than one product and or operating in different 
geographical locations. In this case, each division is able to decide upon local business strategies and 
operation-related options. The so-called Matrix structure in contrast, was created to organize large 
and complex corporations, or groups of them, working simultaneously with different products, 
functions, at different locations (e.g. Royal Dutch Shell Group, Philips, and Nestle).  
 
All forms of organization we have seen so far are to some extent hierarchic arrangements. 
However, in the last two decades scholars and managers have suggested that hierarchy as such is no 
longer efficient and new forms of organizations are needed. This claim is broadly based on the 
apparently endless opportunities for organization and management emerging from new Information 
and Communications Technology (ICT). Grant explains that such technologies are facilitating the 
advent of very different organizational structures driven by efficient self-organization and 
―virtuality‖. Among these raising forms of organization, we can recall at least three forms (Grant, 
2008b):  
 
(i) Adhocracies 
(ii) Team and project-based organizations 
(ii) Networks 
 
Adhocracies are organizations with a high share of values, motivations and high level of 
communication and commitment among their members. In these organizations, a high level of 
coordination is achieved with little control effort. Team-based and project-based organizations are 
very flexible and adaptive forms of organization. Project-based businesses like in the construction 
sector for example, are activities conducted for a limited time focused on solving particular 
problems. Each project demands a different structure and focus. Team-based organization on the 
other hand, is becoming very popular among different type of companies. Activities such as product 
development, R&D, and marketing for example, are mostly organized on teams in order to enhance 
interaction and creativity. Finally, Networks are organizational structures aiming at increasing 
managerial and operational efficiency in highly-specialized firms, producing complex products. In 
the network, different firms will produce a particular part (often a technology) necessary to assemble 
a complex product.  In order to increase coordination efficiency, it is common that one (and only 
one) company in the network is designated as a ―system integrator‖.  
 
 
8.5. Management systems for coordination and control 
Management systems provide the mechanisms of communication, decision-making, and 
control that allow companies to solve the problems arising from coordination and control. There are 
four management systems in contemporary organizations (Grant, 2008b): 
 
(i) Information systems  
(ii) Strategic Planning Systems  
(iii) Financial planning and control systems  
(iv) Human resources management system  
 
Information systems are concerned with the control and coordination of all information 
flowing towards, within and out the firm that are central to all operations. The flow of information in 
an administrative hierarchy is vertical and/or horizontal. Decentralizing communications is 
fundamental in order to increase flexibility. If so, decentralization of information is based on two 
principles: information feedback and information network. Feedback is fundamental to increase self-
control among individuals, and networking to allow the voluntary coordination of activities among 
them. 
 
Strategic Planning Systems are employed at large firms to increase coordination within the 
company. Plans helps to systematically build up on consistency between the decisions made at 
different sections and the goals of the firms. Strategic plans are first developed for particular units 
and then coordinated into a main corporate plan. A basic plan design usually entails five steps: A 
statement of the goals, a set of assumptions about future conditions or forecast, a qualitative 
statement of changes in performance, a sequence of specific actions, and a set of financial 
projections. In general the most important role of strategic planning regards the strategy process or 
the way in which knowledge is shared, ideas communicated, consensus is established, and 
commitment to action and results is built. Currently, there is consensus regarding the following 
aspects: strategic plans are more focused on performance target than in actions, that the focus on 
projections is on strategic directions (vision, mission and strategic intent) rather on forecast, that the 
focus of strategic plan is on coordination rather than in control, and finally that strategic 
responsibility is among senior managers (Grant, 2008b). 
 
Financial planning and control systems are the primary control mechanism for managers. 
The fundamental process to implement such control is the budgetary process. Through a plan on 
what and how much to expend during a given period (the budget), managers have a basic framework 
to base decision making. There are specific and general budgets in a company. 
 
None of the previous systems can work without people or human resources. Hence, it is 
imperative to any coordination and control system to be aligned with the system in which people 
organize their behaviour. The Human resources management system focuses on building up 
collaboration and commitment to the general objectives (and mission) of the organization. Only 
then, the rest of coordination and control systems can be implemented.  
 
Modern companies often integrate different control systems. Currently the trend is creating 
shareholder value by coupling financial and strategic planning into human resource management. In 
this approach, managers try to define qualitative goals for individuals and groups and the 
mechanisms to measure and report the attainment of such goals.  
 
 
 
9. Fundamental characteristics of industrial dynamics 
 
 According to Grant (2008b), there are two relevant environments to a business organization 
or firm:  
 
(i) Internal Environment 
(ii) External Environment 
 
The internal environment (the firm itself), is determined and characterized by three basic 
elements: (1) goals and values, (2) resources and capabilities, and (3) structure and systems.  
 
Instead, the external environment has different dimensions regarding politic, social, 
economic and legal issues, comprising the interaction of many actors. The prevailing view of the 
external environment of a firm focuses on actors rather than on dimensions. The most relevant actors 
in the external environment of a firm are: (1) Competitors, (2) customers, and (3) suppliers.  
 
However, in some emergent management perspectives, the environment of the firm is 
understood as a rather dynamic (changing) system, in which actors and dimensions are equally 
relevant. In this view, there is no distinction between internal and external environments. This is the 
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perspective of business organizations as components of larger systems as in ecological ecosystems 
(e.g. See the concept of business ecosystems proposed by James Moore). In the context of strategic 
management, the ―fit‖ (harmonization) between the internal and external environments becomes the 
reason of developing and implementing strategies (Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
 
 
9.1. The source of industrial dynamics 
In Simple terms, value is the amount of money customers are willing to pay for a good 
(product) or service. Grant (2008b) suggests that business is all about creating value and that the 
main challenges for a business organization are:  
 
(i) To create value for customers, and  
(ii) Transforming part of that value into profit for the firm 
Furthermore, Grant explains that value can be created by means of production or commerce. 
By production value is created physically transforming products that are less valuable to consumers 
into products that are highly valued by consumers (e.g. transforming a grain of coffee three into 
coffee, transforming the coffee into a cappuccino).  
 
Contrarily, by means of commerce value is created through repositioning products in time 
and space. This implies moving or transferring products from individuals and places in which they 
are less valuable towards individuals and places in which they are more valued (e.g. importing dried 
and toasted coffee grains from Ethiopia to Europe). Another variation of commerce is speculation. 
This is transferring products from a given point in time in which they are less valuable to a time in 
which they will be more valuable (e.g. trading gold, jewels, houses and antics). Value, of course is 
not only about money but also about satisfaction. Then, besides the cash, firms also seek to satisfy 
their customers creating a value that exceeds the price paid for the product or service.  
 
 Companies produce value for their stakeholders (employees, customers, society, etc) and/or 
the shareholders (the owners). Grant (2008b) suggests that the balance in the distribution of value 
between stakeholders and shareholders will largely depend on cultural issues since countries differ 
on the approach to value distribution. Grant illustrates these through the following example:  
 
In North America boards are legally requested to act in favour of shareholders, 
instead in France boards are compelled to pursue national interests.   
 
Currently, socio-cultural issues are the base of an ethical discussion. Nevertheless, firms 
traditionally aim to sustain the maximum profit as long as possible. Therefore, most companies 
(worldwide) do focus on the shareholders‘ interest. Consequently, Grant suggests that the main 
determinants of profit in current business organizations are demand and competition.  
 
We have described how value can be created and distributed, and indicated that creating 
value does not directly imply creating profit. In this context, it is suggested that the real margin of 
money you can earn over the cost of the product (the profit) is actually determined by competition. If 
competition increases (many people producing and trading the same product),   the value to 
customers increases since prices go down (same or more value is given to the customer for less 
money), and less profit is left to shareholders (when reducing the price, the margin of gains over the 
cost of producing decreases, and therefore the amount of money left to share is smaller).  
 
 However, profit is not only determined by competition, demand also plays an important role 
here. In this case, you have to see the firm not only as a producer but also as a consumer. From this 
perspective, the firm does simultaneously sell and buy goods and/or services. If so, the company also 
create demands among its suppliers of goods or services. Hence, when a firm requires for example a 
material that is sold just by one supplier (monopoly), its power to obtain a fair price for the material 
is low. Then the production cost will be greatly influenced by the cost of using that particular 
material. If competence increases, the price of the product will be lowered on the base of reducing 
profit (while keeping the value to customers). Concluding, one can say that the profit to be earned by 
a business organization is determined by at least three factors:  
 
(i) The value of the product to customers 
(ii) The intensity of competition 
(iii) The bargaining (dealing) power of the producer among its suppliers 
 
  In modern management, these three factors are analyzed in a common framework: the 
Porter’s Five Forces of Competition framework (Grant, 2008b). This framework, although not the 
only available, has become very popular between managers and planers thanks to its rather logic and 
simple analytical structure. The Porter‘s framework sees profitability as the result of a dynamic 
process determined by ―five forces of competitive pressure” (or what makes you compete). In the 
framework there are three horizontal sources of competition (competition from substitutes, new 
entrants, and established rivals), and two sources of vertical competition (the power of suppliers and 
the power of buyers).  
 
 
9.2. The five sources of competition  
Competition from substitutes:  
This source of competitions determines the price that customers are willing to pay for a 
product. If there is a cheaper substitute, the customer might not be willing to pay what the producer 
of the original product wants to ask for. As more substitutes you have, more competence you get and 
prices go down. When a product does not have a substitute (e.g. gasoline and cigarettes), consumers 
become relatively insensitive to the price. Contrarily, if closer substitutes (alternatives) become 
available, customers will react to high prices for the original product and will probably buy the 
cheaper option. A good example of competition for substitution is given by the creation of internet. 
When the net was created it provided a large number of substitutes for competition affecting the 
profitability of many established industries such as for example travel agencies (electronic booking), 
newspaper (free news), and telecommunication providers (free emails, chats, and calls). The effect 
of substitutes depends on the inclination of customers to replace products by alternatives and in the 
price-performance ratio of such alternatives (quality and social status matters a lot in some 
businesses, like luxury brands such as  Louis Vuitton, and high quality performance products like 
Lamborghini sport-cars.  
 
 Threat of Entry:  
If a business proves to be very profitable, new firms will be tempted to try. If too many new 
firms appear around your successful business, your profits will rapidly decrease for an excess of 
competition. In such a scenario, established firms tend to constraint (reduce) the prices of their 
products or services to a competitive level. The effect of this threat can be reduced in the following 
cases: 
 
(a) The capital to start the business it is too high, so few if not only large 
companies will be able to enter (High tech industries such as pharmaceutics) 
(b) When large-scale operations are needed (e.g. in the car industry only 
companies producing over 3,000,000 units a year can make profits, hence private 
new entrants are discouraged, and only state-supported companies are able to 
enter: e.g. Proton of Malaysia) 
(c) When your company has an absolute advantage in production costs (e.g. you 
are the owner of the main source of row material needed to produce a given 
product).  
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(d) When your product becomes unique by differentiation (e.g. a unique brand: 
Rolls-Royce) 
(e) When the new entrant firms cannot access established distribution or supply 
channels 
(f) Due to legal and/or governmental barriers (protection of a national industry, 
protection of scientific discoveries, etc) 
(g) Aggressive retaliation against new entrants by the side of established firms 
(e.g. rapid price cutting) 
 
Industry competitors:  
Established firms are often the most common source of competition among modern 
industries. The intensity of competition among industry competitors is suggested to have the most 
significant real impact in profits. Sometimes the competition gets so intense that prices are cut below 
the operation cost (at a loss), causing an overall reduction in the profitability of the industry or 
sector. Grant (2008b) suggests that the intensity of such interaction is determined by five factors: (1) 
the concentration of rivals in the market (the highest the more intense); (2) the diversity of 
competitors (the more diverse the more intensive); (3) product differentiation (the more similar the 
highest the intensity); (4) Excess of capacity (the less capacity is used the highest the intensity); and 
by (5) variability of costs (the least variable is the cost, the highest the intensity becomes). 
 
Bargaining power of buyers:  
Firms in an industry are vendors and buyers, hence it is said that they operate in two types of 
markets: markets of inputs and markets of outputs. In the first case the firm buys raw material s and 
good to produce, and in the later they sell what they have produced. In both markets the transactions 
create value for both the buyer and the seller. The profitability in this case depends on the economic 
power of sellers and buyers. The strength of buying power depends on two factors: The buyer‘s price 
sensitivity and the relative bargaining power: 
 
I. The buyer‘s price sensitivity regards how much you are willing to pay for something 
you need, and the ability of the vendor to keep prices as high as possible. This is 
affected by the capability of the vendor to establish certain control over the price by 
means of selling something you really need, something all competitors need, or selling 
the most expensive item you need.  
 
II. The bargaining power on the other hand depends on your capability (freedom) to 
refuse to deal with the vendor. The balance of power here depends on the size and 
concentration of buyers respect to vendors (more buyers than vendors increases the 
bargaining power of vendors), the buyer‘s information (the more the buyer knows 
about the vendor the highest his/her bargaining power), and the capability of 
autonomy (if the vendor find that he/she can do something by him/herself rather than 
to buy it, his/her bargaining power increases). 
  
Bargaining power of suppliers:  
In this case, the firm becomes the buyer and the supplier the vendor. Therefore, conditions 
are analogous to those described in the previous case. Something important to remark about this 
context is that in general, suppliers as vendors have a low bargaining power. This is in general the 
case when suppliers sell to large companies. To increase their bargaining power, suppliers often 
form alliances such as those observed in the coffee industry or the oil production (e.g. OPEC).  
 
 
9.3. The source of competitive advantage 
The previous chapter described how the capability of a firm to make profits can be affected 
(or determined) by the so-called ―five forces of competition‖ suggested by M. Porter. In this chapter, 
we will focus on a different aspect of competition that regards the criterion to increase (and sustain) 
profit trough creating, increasing, and/or protecting particular advantages. This is the approach 
called competitive advantage. 
 
 Establishing advantage in businesses not only means to compete successfully but to keep 
doing so as long as possible. It is suggested that a firm can create value and increase profit by 
focusing on the following two aspects (Grant, 2008b): 
 
(a) What is that the customer needs or wants? and, 
(b) What is that the firm needs to do in order to survive competition? 
 
 In any case a firm need to know first the environment in which operates (both internally and 
externally). From the solely point of view of competition, a firm is supposed to succeed if it is able 
to identify the ―key success factors‖ (modified from Grant, 2008b: p. 90): 
 
 
Identifying key success factors 
Prerequisites for 
success 
 
(a) What do customers want? Analysis of demand: 
 Who are our customers? 
 What do they want? 
 
(b) How does the firm survive 
competition? 
Analysis of competition: 
 What drives competition? 
 What are the main dimensions of competition? 
 How intense is competition? 
 How can we obtain a superior competitive 
position? 
 
 
 In basic terms, a firm will have a competitive advantage over its rival if ―while competing 
within the same market the firm earns (or has the potential to earn) a constantly higher rate of profit‖ 
(Grant, 2008b). Hence, competitive advantage can be defined as the means by which we can increase 
and sustain profit overtime. By ―means‖, we can understand for example key investments, a key 
technology, or even the loyalty of customers.  
 
In general, competitive advantage emerges from a change in the environment (internal or 
external), that makes competitors differentiate.  In times of change, firms are compelled to respond 
and adjust mobilizing their resources and capabilities. In a competitive environment, such response 
can increase or decrease the overall capability of the firm to compete. In other words, it gives to the 
firm a relative or absolute advantage over its competitors.  
 
In the current managerial approach, companies invest a great deal of effort to move ahead of 
changes to take advantage of an early move. This implies that firms have to develop an effective 
mechanism to anticipate or foresee changes. This last aspect is deeply related with current strategic 
management methods that exploit foresight as a tool of advantage. Another way to successfully take 
advantage of changes is innovation. However, the use of innovation as a tool for competitive 
advantage is often narrowed to the context of internal changes in the firm. Innovation in this context 
means strategic innovation by creating value to customers from novel products or services.  
 
 Sustaining competitive advantage is an important requisite for success as suggested by Grant 
(2008b). Generating high profit is meaningless if it is possible only for a short period. The main 
mechanism to sustain competitive advantage over time is the protection or isolation of the source(s) 
of advantage. This is often called the isolating mechanism. Such mechanism regards the barriers we 
pose to our competitors in order to keep our source of advantage unknown, unique, or well-secured. 
According to Grant, the firm can establish such barriers by: 
 
(i) Preventing rivals from identifying and/or analyzing the advantage (secrecy) 
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(ii) Making the rival believe that imitation is not worth the investment (deceiving) 
(iii) Limiting the possibilities of the rival to acquire or transfer the source of the advantage 
(uniqueness, exclusivity) 
 
 
9.4. Types of competitive advantage 
 As you will be able to observe in most of firms, for managers competition is a core strategic 
issue. Taking advantage of what we have at hand – our resources and capabilities – is often managed 
by developing a (Grant, 2008b:p. 202-221): 
 
(i) Cost advantage 
(ii) Differentiation advantage: 
 
Cost advantage occurs when a firm can offer the same or similar product or service 
than competitors, but at a lower cost. If so, profit can still be generated at a lower sale price. 
Instead, differentiation advantage occurs when the firm is able to offer a product or service 
in such a way that the customer is willing to pay a high price for what make the product or 
service different, or unique. 
 
From a strategic point of view, most firms connect cost and differentiation 
advantage to their strategies and organizational requirements (See Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Common strategies and organizational requirements linked to cost and differentiation 
advantages (modified from Grant, 2008b: p.219) 
 
 
 
9.5. The resource-based view of the firm: The strategic role of resources and 
capabilities 
 When strategies are focused on the firm itself, hence on the internal environment, two 
elements acquire strategic relevance: The resources and capabilities of the firm. This is the 
resource-based view of the firm in which competitive advantage emerges not from doing the same 
that other firms do (imitation), but from doing something rather different (uniqueness). This means, 
using to our advantage those elements or attributes that makes us different (Grant, 2008b):  
 (i)  Resources, and/or  
(ii) Capabilities  
 
The resources of the firm are the productive assets owned by the firm. Resources can be 
tangible such as money, machinery and properties, or they can be intangible such as value, know-
how and reputation. For some firms intangible resources are more valuable than tangibles resources. 
Human resources are an independent category since they are tangible but they are not owned by the 
firm. Human Resources bring experience and expertise to the firm and therefore, in modern 
management, the value of human resources is increasing rapidly, taking a central strategic role.  
 
The capabilities of the firm are what the firm can do with its resources. Since resources are 
not productive on their own, a firm must deploy them in order to accomplish an objective. 
Capabilities such as efficiency and commitment to quality can increase the firm‘s competitive 
advantage. Two companies can deploy the same set of resources in different way due to their 
distinctive capabilities.  
 
 Resources and capabilities can be developed over time. Resources can be leveraged by 
concentration, accumulation, complementation and conservation. Capabilities instead, can be 
leveraged by creation (of new capabilities), exploitation (of experience), acquisition (merger), and 
accession (alliances).  
 
 
 
10. Strategy and the performance of corporations: The 
Corporate and Business Strategy 
 
 In this course, we have defined strategy as the means by which an individual or an 
organization accomplishes an objective. According to Grant (2008b), for a business organization two 
basic objectives are to survive and prosper. Survival in this context implies that the firm in the long-
term must be able to earn more than it has invested. This could be done in two possible ways:  
 
I. Locating the firm within an industry in which potential profits are high, or  
II. Developing an absolute advantage over rivals within the industry that allows the 
firm to raise profits over the average of the industry 
 
These two ways of survival are what Grant defines as mechanisms of superior performance.  
 
 
10.1. Strategic levels according to performance 
 The strategic level of a firm will be defined by the two sources of superior performance us: 
 
(i) Corporate strategy, and 
(ii) Business strategy 
 
The corporate strategy sets the scope of the firm with respect to the industries and markets 
in which it competes. Such strategies regard decisions on investment diversification, the style of 
production integration, acquisitions and new ventures for example. In simple terms a corporate 
strategy helps to define the position of the firm in a given industry and market. This is where to 
compete. 
 
The business strategy on the other hand, defines how the firm competes within a particular 
industry or market. This directly implies the need of developing and sustaining a competitive 
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advantage. Hence, it regards the competitive strategy of the firm. In other words, a business strategy 
helps a firm to define how to compete. 
 
 
10.2. Communicating strategies: Vision, mission, business model and strategic 
plan 
  In large companies, corporate strategies are in the hands of top management. On the 
contrary, the business strategy is often in the hands of divisional management. In any firm, the 
responsibility over strategies is primarily with the leader. In large companies that responsibility is 
shared by a group of top managers. In small business that responsibility is often in the hands of the 
leader or founder. In either case, a strategy is often communicated through a (Grant, 2008b): 
(i) Vision  
(ii) Mission  
(iii) Business model 
(iv) Strategic plan  
 
The vision or ―vision statement‖ is the concise description of the image, or an aspiration, of 
what the firm will be in the future. A vision can be seen as the ―ideal image‖ of the firm if all 
objectives are materialized. Sometimes, vision statements can become too idealistic or abstract to 
transmit properly the strategy to the public, or the employees. An example of a vision statement can 
be as follow:  
 
“Our vision serves as the framework for our Roadmap and guides every 
aspect of our business by describing what we need to accomplish in order to 
continue achieving sustainable, quality growth. 
 People: Be a great place to work where people are inspired to be the 
best they can be. 
 Portfolio: Bring to the world a portfolio of quality beverage brands 
that anticipate and satisfy people's desires and needs. 
 Partners: Nurture a winning network of customers and suppliers, 
together we create mutual, enduring value. 
 Planet: Be a responsible citizen that makes a difference by helping 
build and support sustainable communities. 
 Profit: Maximize long-term return to shareowners while being mindful 
of our overall responsibilities. 
 Productivity: Be a highly effective, lean and fast-moving 
organization.” 
The Coca-Cola Company (See http://www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/ourcompany/mission_vision_values.html) 
 
The mission on the other hand, is a statement of purpose describing what is that the 
organization is looking to achieve over the long-term. The mission statement should at least depict 
the direction in which the strategy will take the firm: 
 
―Our Roadmap starts with our mission, which is enduring. It declares our 
purpose as a company and serves as the standard against which we weigh our 
actions and decisions. 
 To refresh the world... 
 To inspire moments of optimism and happiness... 
 To create value and make a difference.‖ 
The Coca-Cola Company (See http://www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/ourcompany/mission_vision_values.html) 
 
A Business model is a statement of the way the business will generate profit. Business 
models vary on complexity, from a simple statement of price advantage, to the description of an 
entire competitive system. However, a business model is just a reference for strategy-making. 
Consider that a business model can be smart and sound, but still the company will need to define a 
good strategy to overrun competitors with the same business model, since – surprisingly or not – a 
business model is not subject of copyright. 
 
Strategic plan is the documentation of the strategy in terms of performance goals, 
approaches to achieve the goals, and a planned commitment of resources over a specific period 
(usually three to five years ahead). In large companies, there are strategic plans for each division and 
the whole corporation, each geographic area and any individual business. Most large companies have 
a cycle of strategic planning that runs over a year (each year a new plan for the next year within the 
overall plan for the period). 
 
In general, the firm is not obliged to have formal ways to communicate or implement their 
strategies. Some even might not have a strategy at all. In most cases however, managers of large 
firms will formulate and communicate strategies as a:   
 
(i) Support to decision-making,  
(ii) Coordination device, or as 
(iii) Target 
 
  As a support to decision-making, strategies help mangers to overcome cognitive limitations 
(as a note in paper would help us to remember something, or a map would help to find a place). As a 
coordinating device, strategies provide the framework to unify behaviours across the different 
components of the organization (as for example, defining the goals, protocols, and control and 
reward mechanisms). Finally as a target, strategies help to define how the firm will compete today, 
and how it will do it in the future. Hence, strategies are forward-looking and they not only set 
directions for the future, but also the perspectives and visions that can drive and motivate people 
today.  
 
 
10.3. The diversification of strategies 
 During the last decades new trends in management thinking has aided the diversification of 
businesses by building competitive advantage on the base of key resources and capabilities. Grant 
(2008b) suggests that the diversification of strategies today is broadly driven by three major goals in 
the business organization:  
 
(i) Growth 
(ii) Risk reduction, and  
(iii) Profitability 
 
In the long-term, all business organisations must change in order to survive and prosper. 
This also implies the redefinition of the business the company runs. In other words, in order to 
survive and prosper, a firm must diversify its business over time.  In this context, Grant suggests that 
strategy is relevant to guide the search for diversification and that diversification itself is a strategy 
to survive (Grant, 2008b).  
 
In the quest to survive and compete, strategies in firms are currently focusing on issues 
beyond resources and capabilities. Some trends in strategic management, for example, focus on 
rethinking the way firms work and adapt to changes. In this context, Adaptability has become a 
major requirement for certain business. In technology-intense industries conversely, the role of 
innovation seems more relevant to survival than adaptability. However, innovation in this 
perspective is not confined to the perspective of an internal process of the firm but rather open to a 
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systemic view. The systemic perspective (or innovation system perspective) is an emerging strategic 
approach in which firms simultaneously compete and collaborate within the industry to innovate. 
This is the strategic perspective of the so-called constructive competition.  In general, new strategic 
approaches to businesses not only demand new ways to do things but also new ways to think. This 
demands in turns the development of new forms of leadership able to encourage and guide the new 
strategic perspectives. In the meantime, new organizational forms with different structure and 
functions are emerging in order to cope with the trends in management and strategy.   
  
In spite of the increasingly diversified strategic approach of contemporary firms, literature 
suggests some basic aspects about strategy in which most of practitioners and scholars agree 
(modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: p.16): 
 
I. Strategies not only concern the firm but also its environment. In fact, firms use strategies to 
cope with the constant changes in the environment.  
II. Strategies are not simple since the changes they are coping with are of a complex nature and 
often, unique events.  
III. Strategies affect the overall welfare of the firm since they regard all organizational levels.  
IV. Strategy involves the content and process of actions in the firm, since they entail the actions 
we take and the process by which those actions are decided and implemented.  
V. Strategies are not entirely premeditated since they also can emerge from past actions or 
experience.  
VI. Strategies exist and co-exist at different organizational levels.  
VII. Strategy implies several thinking processes ranging from conceptual to analytical. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
Strategy as a Process 
 
In this chapter, a generic strategy process is suggested and present together with a synopsis 
of relevant issues related to each of the stages in the process based on relevant literature on 
contemporary organizational management.  
 
 
 
11. Defining a generic process 
 
In a simplistic view, the strategy process – or the procedure to analyse, (re)formulate and 
implement (old and new strategies) over time – can be illustrated as in Figure 4 (below): 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Generic strategy process in organizations: a cycle with three consecutive phases 
such as (a) appraisal, (b) formulation, and (c) implementation resulting in new or modified 
strategies. 
 
 
11.1. Stage one: Environmental appraisal  
The strategy process is a cyclic endeavour beginning with the appraisal or analysis of both 
the internal and the external environments of the organization. The most common type of diagnosis 
of the internal environment involves the identification and evaluation of goals, the organization‘s 
mission and strategic objectives in the light of major strengths and weaknesses. If strategies are 
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already implemented the analysis commonly includes an evaluation of results against the strategic 
objectives.  
 
On the other hand, the appraisal of the external environment often focuses on a basic 
―context analysis‖ to identify and evaluate current and/or expected opportunities and threats to the 
business carried out by the organization. Some widely popular context analyses are the SWOT 
analysis (to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats in a business), the PEST 
analysis (of Political, Economical, Social, Technological and demographic trends), and the 
―competitor analysis” focusing on the evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of current and/or 
potential competitors in the business. Although a common practice around the world in firms of all 
sizes and types, the context analysis is commonly used to produce a strategic plan and not to 
formulate the strategy itself.  This is the base of a common misconception in management and that is 
also rooted in the indistinct – but academically speaking, wrong – use of the words plan and strategy. 
A strategic plan is a well-defined (yet static) course of action that mainly sets the future direction of 
the business for a given period (often short). A strategy is a more comprehensive and dynamic 
guidance, that overtime becomes a driver of both function and structure in the organization. By the 
years, plans do terminate, while strategies continue to evolve and might include many strategic plans 
in the extent of its span.  
 
In general, there are many ways to define and perform an appraisal of the external 
environment of firms. From the perspective of our strategy process model, the analysis of the 
external environment will rather describe an environmental scanning. Unlike the context analysis, 
this broader analytical concept considers the macro-environment around a business (e.g. analyzing 
economic, social and technological variables). In the contemporary firm – particularly the large-
sized, multi-business, and the multinational organization – the environmental scanning is one of the 
core activities of top-level managers since it concerns the acquisition and use of information (the 
primary role of a top manager as suggested by Auste and  Choo, 1993).  Such information will focus 
on those events and trends that are of any significance to the future development of the organization. 
The main objective of the scanning is to transform information into knowledge, increasing the 
organization‘s capability to respond and adapt to external changes. Therefore, environmental 
scanning can be seen as a primary organizational mechanism to learn (hence, a mode for 
organizational learning). In traditional companies, environmental scanning is complementary to 
context analysis, particularly on competitors and market intelligence. In general, a scanning activity 
implies both, viewing at and searching for information. Organizations often distinguish between four 
modes arising from these two activities (Choo, 1991):  
 
(i) Undirected viewing: 
The manager observes the environment with no particular goal in mind in order to 
detect any (relevant) signal of change. This is an informal and unfocussed 
gathering of information. The environment here seen as vast, complex, and 
uncertain as it is in reality 
(ii) Conditioned viewing: 
The manager‘s viewing is conditioned by his/her beliefs (and norms) and so is the 
information gathering.   The information is focused on particular issues of interest. 
The environment is seen as the viewer perceive it 
(iii) Enacting: 
 The manager looks for particular information about the effects or result of an 
induced change in the environment (e.g. about the introduction of a new product or 
technology). Information is gathered and used as in a ―learning-by-doing‖ process, 
hence with focus on actions and their effects. The environment is seen as a 
construction of the viewer‘s mind 
(iv) Formal search: 
The manager devices (or executes) a method or plan to find and systematically 
retrieve particular information on a specific issue. Information is based on 
objective facts of what is happening in the environment. The environment is seen 
as it is in reality  
 
The quality of the information increases with formality, systematisation, frequency, and 
objectivity of the scanning. However, a comprehensive and efficient environmental scanning should 
consider all four modes of information. By doing so, the firm will increase its awareness on potential 
threats and opportunities arising from external changes and/or internal actions such as the attempt to 
shape the surrounding environment. Overall, the constant gathering and use of information in all its 
modes will enable the organization to develop and strengthen a knowledge-based decision making 
system.  Nonetheless, the acquisition and use of information will always depend on or be influenced 
by the characteristics of the environment (and their evolution), and the perception, previous 
experience, beliefs and knowledge of the manager about it. Another fundamental driver in this 
context is the cost effectiveness of the appraisal over time. Firms will commonly avoid costly 
acquisition or time-consuming use of information (Auste and Choo, 1993).  
 
 
11.2. Stage two: Strategy formulation 
The second stage of the strategy process following the appraisal of both, the internal and the 
external environment is formulation.  This stage is often connected to the decision and action 
mechanisms in the firm, particularly to the decision making process. After the situation appraisal, the 
firm should be able to increase its situation awareness and formulate options and recommendations 
to actions. Therefore, how to guide or base the action of choosing in the light of several options 
becomes an important issue at this stage.  Such choice often relies on the perception, knowledge and 
experience of top managers, and therefore is rather a subjective action. In large and complex 
organizations, strategy formulation has different levels of focus and scope with respect to function 
and structure. In general, we can identify three levels of strategy formulation that are highly 
integrated and interdependent: 
 
(i) Corporate level, 
(ii) Business level, and 
(iii) Functional level.  
 
 
11.2.1. Formulation at corporate level 
At the highest level of function and structure, corporate strategies regard broad decisions 
about the scope, direction and position of the organization in the long-term. In general, this level of 
strategy formulation defines the organizational growth objectives and the actions to achieve them. In 
addition, it also regards the portfolio of different line of business and its degree of diversification and 
integration within the portfolio. In other words, corporate strategies are formulated to define what we 
do sell and where we do sell it. From the classic point of view of markets and competition, this 
becomes the strategy defining what is (are) our product(s), how diversified and integrated is 
production, and the place in the market in which the organization will compete. Common examples 
of this type of strategies are: 
  
I. Vertical integration: a basic concentration strategy to increase the 
organization competitiveness by internalizing functions otherwise 
carried out by suppliers or other organization up or down in the value 
chain. 
II. Horizontal integration or horizontal growth: is the acquisition of 
businesses or organizations at the same level in the value chain to 
increase competitiveness  
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III. Strategic alliances, mergers, and acquisitions: generic growth 
strategies to strengthen, concentrate, or diversify a business portfolio. 
Vertical and horizontal integration are the result of these generic 
strategies. 
 
11.2.2. Formulation at business level 
The formulation of strategies at the business level instead, broadly focuses on competition.  
At this level, the main objective is to develop and sustain competitiveness in all the lines of business 
the organization has decided to participate. A popular theoretical and conceptual framework in 
businesses that regards this strategic level is competitive advantage. One can say that a firm that 
generates profit over the average of its industry has a competitive advantage over rival firms. From 
a strategic point of view, the objective is to sustain such an advantage over time as long as possible. 
This strategic viewpoint has been very influential among firms since its introduction in the early 80s 
by the Harvard Business School‘s Professor Michael Porter. In theory, a firm can excel 
competitiveness by means of strategic positioning in a market or industry. Such positioning can be 
based on an advantage achieved by either cost or differentiation. Cost advantage is achieve when a 
firm is able to offer the same benefits than other firms but for a lower cost, whereas a differentiation 
advantage is achieved when the benefits of the product of the firm exceeds those offered by rival 
products. In any case, the firm is creating and delivering more value to customers than competitors 
while generating more profits (Porter, 1998).  
 
Another increasingly influential perspective on competitive advantage is the so-called 
Resource-Base View of the firm or RBV (Barney et al., 2001). Any firm has resources or assets 
(tangible as well as intangible) and capabilities to compete, however competitive advantage is only 
achieved and sustained when the firm makes a strategic use and management of such assets to create 
superior value than competitors. In the theory of modern RBV suggested by Jay Barney in the early 
90s, strategic resources must be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not substitutable. This 
implies that a firm should not only develop superior assets than competitors but also be able to 
protect or isolate them from being acquired, learnt or replicated by competitors. However, imitation 
will occur eventually, and the achieved advantage will be lost to competition. The quest to develop, 
maintain and regain the advantage will in turn propitiate a dynamic cycle of development. Such 
dynamism is deeply connected with the dynamic nature of strategy process.  
 
Today, many firms formulate their strategies at the business level combining the positioning 
and RBV perspectives in competitive advantage (Grant, 2008b). In this context, resources such as 
for example know-how, patents, or reputation can be used to acquire a cost or differentiation 
advantage. On the other hand, the capabilities of the firm emerging from the effective utilization of 
resources will define either or cost advantage by for example delivering a product faster than the 
competence. Over time, resources and capabilities will define a set of characteristic competencies of 
the firm like its approach or degree of innovation, quality or service. In this context, a firm can 
formulate its business strategy by managing its assets and capabilities to position itself in the 
industry with either a low cost structure or a differentiated product. Both cost and differentiation 
strategies can be formulated for a narrow or broad segment in the market (scope).  The combinations 
arising from cots, differentiation, and scope is what – in the view of Porter – defines the generic 
strategies of the firm. As the ultimate quest in the formulation of these business strategies is yet the 
creation of value, Porter conveniently illustrates value creation as a quantifiable group of activities 
named the value chain. At each activity in the chain, the product gains value. Such value at the end 
of the chain is higher than the sum of added-value of all activities in the chain. The chain entails 
(Grant, 2008b): 
(a) Primary activities: 
Inbound logistics > Operations > Outbound logistics > Marketing and sales > services   
(b) Support activities: 
Administrative infrastructure > Human Resource management > Technology > Procurement  
 
This visualization of value creation is widely used to analyze mainstream and downstream 
activities that can create competitive advantage. Since the drivers of cost and value can be easily 
identified for each activity, the value chain analysis has become a common input to the appraisal 
stage in the strategy process.  
 
 During the last decades has been a prominent shift in the strategic approach of firms, 
particularly in those embracing innovation as a core strategic activity. At the business level, the 
strategic selection of industry and positioning has been a prevailing umbrella for profit creation and 
competitive advantage over rivals for decades. However, the globalization of businesses has 
increased and changed the dynamics of competition. Today, it is not enough to find the right industry 
to compete in, or strategize for the search of a safe positioning in the right market segment. Hence, it 
is not enough to compete just trying to do better than rivals also do (Grant, 2008b). The RBV 
approach is acquiring increasing popularity among firms facing tough competition since offers a 
strategic alternative to positioning. In strategic terms, the main difference between the RBV and 
classic positioning is that the earlier focuses on exploiting the differences between firms while the 
former focus on similarities. If firms can effectively development and use of their resources and 
capabilities to the point to become unique, then the capability to develop and sustain a competitive 
advantage (even in tough or saturated markets), increases greatly. The ability to differentiate the firm 
from competitors due to a unique management of resources and capabilities is to some extent, 
connected to the firms‘ capability to learn and apply (Grant, 2008b). Your chance of effective 
specialization increases with the extent and accuracy of your knowledge about the resources and 
capabilities you have and you need to do that you are better at (or it is needed the most). Not only at 
the business level, but at any of the strategic levels in the firm, the management of resources and 
capabilities will to some extent influence and be influence by the innovation process. Those, there is 
an implicit link between innovation and competition. One can say that being innovative increases the 
chances to develop and sustain a competitive advantage. Innovativeness by itself can be considered a 
competitive advantage.  
 
11.2.3. Formulation at the functional level  
The formulation of strategies at the functional level (commonly but erroneously restricted to 
the term ―operational strategies‖) focuses on short-term activities (commonly plans) to support the 
implementation of corporate and business strategies. Although each functional unit commonly have 
a certain degree of independency over strategic choices, each functional strategy must be aligned 
with the general long-term strategy of the firm. At this level, three aspects such as the short-term 
character of objectives, the specificity of scope, and the direct involvement of mid-level or 
operational managers characterize the formulation of strategies. The formulation of strategies at the 
functional level focuses on performance and performers in a functional unit or a group of them. 
Thus, these strategies would often guide the development of new or existent key actions and actors 
in one or more departments within the firm. They will commonly regard functional aspects of 
strategic relevance such as productivity, pricing, logistics, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, product 
design, product branding and image, product-life cycle, etc. In other words, they regard the activities 
at the value chain.  
 
In large firms, functional strategies are commonly organized according to major functional 
departments such marketing, finance, production (or operations), Research and Development 
(R&D), and Human Resources strategies. The formulation of strategies at this level therefore, also 
considers the coordination and alignment of the decision-making process and communication and 
control systems of all functions or operations within the firm.  At this level, strategies define the 
balance between available and needed resources and capabilities, determining for example the 
strategic choice of outsourcing of activities.  
 
The formulation of a standard Marketing strategy for example, deals with the choice of 
products and services and their features (including price), and requirements for markets, distribution 
and promotion. Financial strategies will on the other hand focus on decision and actions regarding 
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capital, its acquisition and allocation, and the overall management and policy of investment.  
Operations strategies instead are of a broader scope including decision and actions regarding on haw 
and where products or services will be manufactured and/or delivered. They also concern the 
technological choice for production, and the management and logistics of resources, supplies and 
suppliers. R&D strategies commonly regard the approach to technology and innovation in the firm, 
the degree of centralization of R&D decisions and activities within the firm functional units, and the 
framework for technology development. Human resources strategies on the contrary focus on the 
acquisition, development and management of the human asset in the firm such as for example policy 
and framework for personnel recruitment, evaluation and incentive schemes, etc.  
 
In general, the weight of functional strategies is to some extent related to the organization 
specialization (Grant, 2008b). In high-tech industries, firms will for example give a high weight to 
R&D strategies, while in service-oriented firms the formulation of Human Resources strategies will 
be more important. Operations or production strategies are crucial in firms within the retail industry, 
meanwhile marketing strategies and financial strategies are of relevance to any firm. However, the 
higher the importance of the function of a unit in the value chain, the lowest its degree of decision-
making decentralization. In general, R&D and human resources strategies are formulated with a high 
degree of top-management involvement.  
 
11.2.4. Choosing among potential strategies 
Strategies are often formulated as a set of alternatives. Hence, a formulation process rarely 
concludes with just one strategy but with a choosing process.   Of course, decision-making is a 
subjective and complex activity and managers often have to rely on their personal experience or 
instinct. However, literature offers many insights in the issue of strategy choosing since not one but 
many books have been written on the subject. In this course, we will observe a basic set of criteria 
derived from the logic statement (or perspective) that ―strategy should help to solve problems 
without to rise new ones‖, therefore when choosing among alternatives we could at least consider 
that: 
 
I. The strategy was conceived considering both expectations and facts about internal 
and external environments, hence it is aligned with resources, capabilities, barriers 
and opportunities 
II. The strategy completely solves the issue in question and it is a permanent solution 
III. By solving the issue (or even by failing to do so), the strategy does not produce a 
new problem, 
IV. By itself, the strategy is simple and easy to implement and evaluate,  
V. A successful full implementation of the strategy does not require of additional 
strategies 
VI. In any case, the implementation of the strategy does not conflict with ongoing 
strategies  
VII. In the end, the effect of the strategy will not conflict with the basic mission and 
goals of the organization 
 
 
11.3. Stage three: Strategy Implementation 
Once we have discerned which strategy fits best our goals at the end of the formulation 
stage, it is time to put the chosen strategy into practice. The execution of a strategy in an 
organization is the process of implementation: 
 
Even a masterfully formulated strategy becomes useless if not well implemented! 
 
Implementation is a determinant of success or failure that is deeply connected to the 
formulation process, and the functioning and structure of the organization.  However, in spite of its 
relevance, implementation is by far the least studied and documented stage in the strategy process 
(Hitt et al., 2006).  In general, studies in the field place formulation and implementation at the same 
level in the strategy process, as if being one continuous stage, while evidence (and logic) suggests 
that although highly intertwined, they are two very different phases.  
 
Literature also suggests that implementation could be a major determinant of the 
organizational performance (Hitt et al., 2006). We can illustrate this by saying that in the eventuality 
of two firms implementing the same strategy the resultant performance is likely to be different. This 
might be explained once again in terms of resources and capabilities, and the uniqueness resulting 
from their distinctive use and development over time. You can visualize this fact in the form of a 
domestic activity: cooking! Let us say that two cooks will never obtain the same result while 
following the same recipe. Although ingredients (resources) might be the same, the resultant dish 
(objective) will anyway differ in terms of (performance) appearance and flavour, and eventually in 
terms of quality. Disparities in this case arise from (or are determined by) the different capabilities of 
the cooks to perform with respect to the same recipe (strategy) and ingredients (resources). Such 
capabilities are related to personal characteristics – or the individuality of each cook – and not by the 
recipe itself. In strategy is just the same. A strategy (recipe) produces different performance (flavour) 
according to the characteristic functioning and structure of the organizations (cooks‘ individuality) 
that is determined by its unique use of resources and capabilities (ingredients and talent). 
 
Imagine now a more complex situation where instead of a domestic kitchen we have a 
higher organizational level: a restaurant. In this case, the elements are just the same: one or more 
recipes, cooks, ingredients, stove and utensils, etc. A professional kitchen it is quite a complex 
organizational arrangement that not only depend on the skills of the personnel to deliver a good dish 
but that also rely heavily on the efficient division and coordination of activities and the decision 
making process. So how is it influenced the performance of the organization in this case? What 
makes a restaurant perform better than others do? Are their recipes, their cooks, the ingredients? 
Probably you will go for guessing that the answer involves a bit of everything and everyone, right? 
Unfortunately, the issue is a little more complicated than that. In a small organizations (or in a one-
person-case), although it is likely that strategies will be formulated and implemented by the same 
people (or person), success not only depends on the knowledge of what to do, but also on motivation 
and control. In large organizations on the contrary, the persons that implement the strategy are not 
usually involved in the task of formulation, and therefore additional focus (and efforts) on 
coordination and communication mechanisms is necessary.  
 
The implementation of strategies in organizations is a research area that cuts across different 
fields of the social sciences including strategic management, organizational theory, and organization 
development. Of course, there are quite a number of theories about such endeavours but not much of 
an agreement. In this section, we will observe some of the main theories about the implementation of 
strategies in organizations with aim to define a simplified process. 
 
11.3.1. Strategy Implementation and high organizational performance 
Hrebiniak and Joyce (2006), suggests that implementation is not only an important and 
difficult process but also a complex field of research. Implementation research is miscellaneous, 
interdisciplinary and particularly concerned with the integration of management disciplines. As a 
practice, it greatly focuses on the performance of organizations. Based on an extensive analysis of 
firms exhibiting and sustaining an unusual high-performance and firms able to achieve such a state 
in the short run, Joyce (2000) identified four key factors influencing high performance: 
 
(i) Direction: developing a clear strategic direction 
(ii) Efficiency: establishing a fast and effective organization 
(ii) Adaptability: developing an adaptive culture 
(iv) Focus: Shifting from focus on customer and cost reduction to the broad picture 
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Only the first of these factors concerns strategy formulation, the rest are directly concerned 
with the strategy implementation. In this context but also as in general when regarding strategy, 
implementation deals with change. In this case, focus is on the changes caused by the intended 
strategy, and the projected response of and effect in the function and structure in the organisation. 
This of course regards the mobilization and coordination of resources and capabilities within the 
firm. The degree of difficulty while implementing depends on the level of complexity of both the 
strategy and the organization. Large organizations tend to have complex structures due to their 
multifunction performance character and they often formulate equally complex strategies. In general, 
one can say that the implementation process becomes radically more difficult (time consuming and 
costly) whenever the strategy to implement is complex and or the size of the organization is large.  
 
According to Hrebiniak and Joyce (2006), the people in charge of implementation need both 
a sequential and a simultaneous thinking.  This particularly applies to key decisions. The sequential 
thinking defines a logical sequence or chain of causality, or the relationship between consecutives 
and interconnected events (cause and effect): 
 
Event (A) -> Event (B) -> Event (C) ---> Event (Z)             Causal chain (sequential thinking) 
 
To design this chain, a manager should decide on the event (A) or the first action to be 
implemented. This raises the questions of what are the effects on event (B) and alternatively what 
are the necessary changes in (B) to support the implementation of (A). This of course implies that 
the relationship between event A and B must be established. After it will be necessary to discern the 
link between the following events until the last relationship is established (-Z). Although the utility 
of such step–by–step analysis is relevant to the rational development of the implementation process, 
the underlying simplicity and narrowness of scope is not enough. Consequently, the manager will 
need of an integrative vision of the events, to infer the total or final effect in the function and 
structure of the organization if each event (from A to Z) is implemented and takes place. This is the 
need of simultaneous thinking.  
 
We can illustrate sequential and simultaneous thinking in the following way. Let us say that 
the strategy to implement is the ―dematerialization‖ of distribution activities (so to produce more 
with fewer resources). From the perspective of sequential thinking, the first step or event in the 
causal chain could be the development of an on-line-sales system (Event A). Event (B) considers the 
effect that (A) will have in the structure of the organization like the creation of a new division and/or 
the elimination of an old one (B). Following steps from (C) to (Z), might imply for example the 
reorganization of the sale force (C), and the effect of such event in the design of work and balance 
between hiring and firing personnel (D), and emerging financial issues such as personnel salary and 
budgets (E)…. etc. On the other hand, if we apply some simultaneous thinking to the same situation 
we could infer that dematerializing distribution might have an implicit negative impact in 
transportation logistics due to the eventuality of reaching more and distant markets raising the need 
of newer and additional infrastructure and more complex and specialized operations. This in turn 
could increase the total amount of CO2 emissions of the organization due to increased transportation 
activities. Such a resultant environmental negative impact was not an observed event in the causal 
chain but depending on the industry, such an omission (or implication) could decrease the 
competitive advantage of the firm over competitors with higher prices but higher environmental 
standards or ―greener‖ branding.  
 
Analysis in the implementation process should therefore be conceptually broad and not 
entirely focused on specific events. Of course, embedding sequential and simultaneous thinking into 
the decision-making process of organizations is not an easy task, and in some cases, it might be 
impossible. In general, we would tend to reduce the complexity of problems by fragmenting them 
into smaller and manageable parts, often at the cost of losing the broader perspective. However, as 
occurs in the formulation stage, the role of managers and their individual capabilities can provide the 
necessary combination of specific and integrative analysis.  However, an organization must be able 
to institutionalize key capabilities embedded in individuals in order to sustain functions over time. 
 Hrebiniak and Joyce (2006) suggest an “eclectic implementation model” integrating 
different managerial perspectives and theoretical viewpoints (Figure 5). The model suggests that a 
successful strategy implementation is a function of variables that in theory have been developed and 
studied separately but that in practice must be fully integrated. The integration of such variables 
defines the implementation process. The degree of usefulness of the process on the other hand is 
driven by at least six criteria. An implementation process (or model) increases its value if at least it 
is: 
 
(i) Logic 
(ii) Operational  
(iii) Economic  
(iv) Balanced 
(v) Manageable  
(vi) Efficient  
 
Logic is necessary to build an implementation process within a rational framework that is 
meaningful to the organization. Logic also allows deductive construction from which we can derive 
further implementation activities or sequences. Logic is not entirely based on experience or instinct 
but also in facts and therefore allows us to develop an implementation framework that combines 
both theory and practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Implementation model suggested by Hrebiniak and Joyce, depicting a logical, 
serial progression of key implementation decisions in the perspective of strategic 
management, and organization theory literature (modified from Hrebiniak and Joyce, 2006) 
 
 
 
A useful model for implementation should, in addition to logic, be expressed in terms of 
operational and concrete actions that are tangible and verifiable, or that at least are meaningful and 
objective. By doing so, the model will allow us to induce greater change (by identifying or solving 
more issues).  
 
A model will be more useful if can deal with complexity in simple terms. In this context, 
implementation should be economic or frugal, or in other words, capable to address a complex 
process with the minimum number of variables.  
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If the model is also capable to balance theory and practice – as well as facts and assumptions 
– then it will allow a more accurate implementation. In this contexts model should not be a recipe of 
what to do but also of about the implications of doing. This regards the balance between the 
contingency (eventualities) and the prescription (directions) perspective, or in other words the 
reconciliation between theories and laws.  
 
One of the most difficult tasks when implementing strategies is that decision-making occurs 
in a context of complexity and uncertainty. Hence, a useful implementation model should be able to 
make sense of complexity and uncertainty and therefore, to be manageable according to the 
limitations of our cognitive capabilities.  
 
The last criterion for a useful implementation model or framework is efficiency. This implies 
that decision and actions not only should deal with complexity but also with constraints or limits to 
available resources and capabilities. In the perspective of efficiency, we can depict at least three 
forms: economic, cognitive and ethical efficiency. Economic efficiency is the most known of these 
forms and regards the development of actions with the least financial cost as possible. 
Implementation always carries additional cost that must be considered in addition to future cost. In 
general, implementation should not be too expensive or imply considerable (or too many) unforeseen 
cost in the end. On the other hand, cognitive efficiency regards the efficient use of decision making 
in the face of limited cognitive capabilities. If a problem is too complex, we could expend 
unnecessary resources trying to understand what we cannot. An efficient use of our cognition 
implies to develop awareness about our capability to deal with complex issues. The last criterion for 
efficiency is ethics. Ethical efficiency is achieved when decision and actions are performed at the 
lowest possible level of intervention in order to prevent unexpected and harmful consequences for 
individuals. In the words of Hrebiniak and Joyce: 
 
“...The point of these arguments is that when faced with a problem, the 
organization should respond so as to solve it, but not at unnecessary financial, 
cognitive, or human cost. Disregard for these considerations results in 
unnecessary change and potentially negative impact on individuals involved in 
the implementation process.” 
Hrebiniak and Joyce (2006) 
 
 
11.3.2. The role of adaptation and search in a robust implementation 
If a firm is capable to develop an implementation model or process taking into consideration 
the six criteria for higher usefulness, one could anticipate a higher degree of congruence between 
achievements and expectations. A robust implementation, or an implementation with a strong fit, 
should be highly congruent. In the strategy process, the principle of congruence applies not only to 
the desirable alignment between expectations and results, but also to the alignment of theory and 
practice, and of function and structure. One should not forget that after all, the strategy process 
originates in part from the need to align systematically the function and structure of the firm with 
changes in the environment. In the overall context of congruence and fit, but particularly in the 
perspective of implementation, two activities are of great relevance: adaptation and search 
(Hrebiniak and Joyce, 2006).  
 
The adaptation of organizations to changes in its environments has been the focus of 
extensive literature during the last decades. From the perspective of strategic management such 
research broadly focuses on the creation of strategies for efficient adaptation and the reasons why 
some firms evolve to perform better than others do. Porter for example explains these issues from 
the point of view of advantageous positioning in markets (competition), while other views 
emphasize the role of developing specific capabilities (differentiation) as a more effective adaptation 
mechanism. In spite of such a debate, an additional and very important organizational activity 
regarding adaptation and change (although less studied) is the search for information. This implies 
the active search for information in order to understand the own and others‘ behaviour, as well as to 
identify potential threats and opportunities. In general, a firm that is not efficient or able to search 
and use information whatsoever is likely to fail while responding to environmental changes. All the 
same, such a firm will be unable to formulate and implement strategies. From the perspective of our 
view of the strategy process, search is an activity central –but not restricted – to the appraisal stage.  
In the implementation stage, search might refer to activities aimed at producing information useful to 
reach an efficient fit among strategies, the organizational capabilities, resources, and the ongoing and 
intended practices and procedures.  
 
In general terms, the search in organization is believed to be influenced or driven by few 
factors. Literature suggests that commonly, a search will be focused on the areas of the firm with a 
relatively high competitive advantage or on those more competitive resources and capabilities. 
Conversely, resources that are keys for performance will drive the search towards the ways to 
enhance their effect over competitive advantage. Past performance is by itself another driver of 
search. Firms with poor past performance will tend to direct the search towards potential ways to 
improve performance while firms with a good past performance will tend to search for ways to keep 
the advantage (e.g. creating barriers to competitors).  Another important driver of search is learning. 
When a firm learns that past decisions or actions have been repeatedly and consistently right, then 
the search will probably focus on such decisions and actions, affecting considerably the strategic 
direction (and management of the firm). Eventually, from the strategic point of view, all factors 
influencing or driving the search in the organization are equally important.  
 
 
11.4. Summary  
In this chapter we have defined and described a generic strategy process and the 
characteristics of its different stages. The process consists of three well-defined, yet highly 
connected activities such as the Appraisal, Formulation, and Implementation of strategies (see Figure 
4). Although the process has been illustrated from a sequential perspective to facilitate its 
understanding, in practice the process takes place and evolves in a less chronological way. This fact 
eventuality regards the dynamic and non-systematic nature of strategies themselves, since they can 
be the result of an induced – rational – process, or emerge over time as the result of changes in 
behaviour or by chance, as the result of new and unexpected opportunities (see Figure 6).  
 
Another useful visualization of the process regards the focus of each stage (See Figure 7). In 
most cases the process deal with the appraisal of ongoing strategies and the need to adjust them to 
changes in the internal and/or the external environments. In general, firms do not use the strategy 
process to develop new strategies constantly, but to modify existing ones. This fact underlines the 
complexity of the process, and its apparently costly and time-consuming implementation. In any 
case, the main role (and objective) of the process is the alignment of both the function and the 
structure of the organization with the changes occurring in the internal and the external 
environments. Such environments are dynamic and do evolve, so does the process and the related 
strategies. In this context, it is argued that over time, most implemented strategies in corporations are 
not as intended, and therefore that the strategy process is far from being a fully rational or 
deliberated action. However, the strategy process is still regarded as a core activity of management 
and therefore, its systematisation and or potential degree of embeddedness depends to some extent 
on the top-management approach to strategy. Regardless, the process of strategy will always regard 
people: strategies are formulated and implemented by people not organizations. 
 
Although the strategy process has been relatively well studied and documented, the study of 
strategy itself – as a trait of human cognition connecting to organizational behaviour – has been 
rather neglected. This implies that most of research on the subject regards the process from the point 
of view of practice in (large) firms and not from the perspective of human cognition. Overall, the 
implementation stage is the least studied and documented part of the process although its weight in 
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the success of a strategy is suggested to be very high. Indeed, it is suggested that even a perfectly 
formulated strategy will fail if it is not well implemented.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Different strategy forms and their link to the strategy process and the alignment of 
changes in the environment over time. 
 
 
 
Although, at the highest organizational echelon – the corporate level –strategies seem 
general in scope, they come to define the fundamental objective and mission of the firm, or in other 
words, they define the business of the firm and its future development. The strategy process at this 
level regards the basic functions and structure of the organization and the necessary resources and 
capabilities for each line of business. One level down – at the business stage – the focus of the 
strategy process –concentrates on resources and capabilities to compete effectively on each business 
line. Instead, at the functional level, the focus of strategies become specific and regards the 
operational efficiency of each functional unit in the organization and their coordination as a whole. 
However, the main objective (or role) of functional strategies is to support the corporate and the 
business strategy.  
 
In general, corporate strategies are very difficult to formulate and implement since they 
imply radical changes (or a shift), in the function and structure of the organization, and therefore 
their practice is rare. On the contrary, business and functional strategies are broadly formulated and 
implemented in most organizations. Yet, the most common type of strategy will be observed at the 
functional level. However, it is common that firms will focus functional strategies on short to 
medium-term plans. Eventually one of the most difficult tasks of managers, or anyone directly 
involved in the strategic process, is that strategies must be aligned at all organizational levels in 
order to succeed. All strategies in an organization are to some extent related to each other, and 
therefore new strategies must be aligned with ongoing ones. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Representation of the strategy process according to the focus of each component 
with respect to changes in the internal and/or the external environments of the firm 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Strategy as a Field of Theory and Practice 
 
 
 
12. Defining Strategic Management 
 
From the perspective of theory and practice, strategy is directly associated with the 
management of the business or corporate organizations. Strategic management is a relatively recent 
discipline without a unified theory supporting its increasing practice. Indeed, strategic management 
is as difficult to define as strategy is. According to French (2009), strategy management was first 
proposed in early 80s at the Pittsburgh Conference, although organized with the specific purpose of 
defining a new paradigm for business policy. The concept of business policy was then rephrased as 
―strategic management‖ and defined as: 
 
“…A process that deals with the entrepreneurial work of the 
organisation, with organisational renewal and growth, and more 
particularly, with developing and utilising strategy, which is a guide to 
the organisation’s operations.” 
 
This rather abstract definition states that as a discipline, strategic management implies both 
the development and implementation of strategies. Since the word strategy is often employed as a 
synonymous of plan, it should not be a surprise to know that strategic management is commonly 
used as a homologous of strategic planning, and to some extent of strategic thinking. However, as 
French indicates, strategic planning is a rather newer form of what is already known as ―Operational 
Planning‖ or ―OP‖ that focuses on budgetary plans for operations in the long-term. Strategic 
thinking on the other hand, focuses on the process of developing (forming) strategies, while being 
less formal than strategic planning and strategic management.  
 
The field of strategic management has rapidly evolved during the last four to five decades. 
In a general context, the focus of the field has rapidly moved from the initial ―financial budgeting‖ in 
late 50s, towards the phenomena of globalization and the learning organization at present. In 60s, 
strategic management was more about corporate planning, and therefore about the formalization of 
the planning process.  In 70s, market positioning became a core issue for companies facing greater 
competence in rapidly growing economies, thus studies and theories back then did broadly focus on 
market dynamics. A decade later, the focus shifted towards the analysis of acquisition and 
development of resources and capabilities in firms, and on the probably most common concept in 
contemporary management, the concept of competitive advantage. Since the year 2000, strategy 
management has broadly focused on the advent of a ―new economy‖ supported by the increasing 
role of knowledge and communications (technology) in businesses, and therefore it has focused in 
issues such as innovation and technology change. Today, French (2008) suggests, the focus is 
globalization underlines issues such as business ethics, standardization, international markets, and 
on what managers calls the ―global-scale strategies‖. Therefore, one can say that along the 
development of Strategic management as a field of research and practice, its focus has move from 
specific ―intra-firm‖ issues towards the broad (and complex) dynamics of systems beyond the 
organizational boundaries. 
 
 
13. Strategic thinking: The soft side of Strategic Management  
 
Mistakenly, strategic thinking is broadly used as a generic term to name anything without a 
proper (or clear) meaning within the realm of strategic management, even beyond of what it is the 
act of thinking (Liedtka, 2006). Logically, strategic thinking regards thinking, but in a characteristic 
way. The act of thinking can be understood as the process by which we formulate and manipulate 
mental constructions (or forms) arising from the mind‘s own interpretation of reality, according to 
personal goals, desires or plans. Thinking is nevertheless creating, or in the words of Mintzberg 
(1998), “thinking is synthesizing”.  What makes thinking strategic is the focused, rational, and 
systemic synthesis of thoughts in order to adjust to a change. Hence, in the face of change we do 
think strategically when our mind focuses on ―synthesizing virtual answers‖, in order to properly 
adjust and accomplish our objectives. We can think strategically to face, avoid, or even prevent the 
effects of change. The points of reference to our response are our objective set beforehand and the 
intensity and length of the change. 
 
In firms, strategic thinking is seen as a process that ―fosters the identification of strategy‖ 
(Casey and Goldman, 2010). In this context, Heracleous (1998:485 p.) defines the purpose of 
strategic thinking as ―to discover novel, imaginative strategies which can re-write the rules of the 
competitive game and to envision potential futures significantly different from the present‖. 
Although the awareness about the relevance of strategic thinking in firms has increased during the 
last decades, still there is no agreement on a definition of the concept or on a full description of its 
process. Indeed, the concept has been often used as a higher category in strategic planning or even as 
a synonymous of it (Heracleous, 1998). In this course, we consider the perspectives of Mintzberg 
(1998), Liedtka (1998), and Heracleous (1998), suggesting that strategic planning and strategic 
thinking are two different processes. 
  
Considering the work and perspective of Mintzberg in strategic thinking, Liedtka (1998; 
2006) suggests five (5) elements or attributes that make of strategic thinking a process: 
 
i. Systemic perspective 
ii. Intent  
iii. Intelligent opportunism 
iv. Time  consciousness  
v. Theory-based 
 
The first attribute – systemic perspective – regards the need to think (or perceive reality) in 
the broadest scope possible. This implies that strategic thinking demands the capability to overview 
systems, not only processes. At the firm level the view of our thoughts should go beyond the limit of 
the organization and its industry. As James Moore (1993) suggests, the view of the firm should be 
constructed in the perspective of a business ecosystems – an economic community supported by a 
foundation of interacting organizations and individuals – within industries that are mutually 
dependant, and co-evolve influencing each other‘s capability to innovate and survive. On the other 
hand, the limits of the managers‘ view – and therefore the limits of his or her thoughts – are given by 
his/her particular ―images of how the world works‖, the ―images that limit us to familiar ways of 
thinking and acting‖ (Senge, 1990). This implies that the limit of our vision of the world is the limit 
of our strategic thinking. Going beyond that limits systematically is a great challenge to all 
managers. In the business context, Liedtka (2006) suggests that the ―strategic thinker‖ must be able 
to ―see‖ the vertical linkages within the system from multiple perspectives. Hence, the manager in 
this case should be able to see “the relationship between corporate, business level, and functional 
strategies to each other, to the external context, and to the personal choices he or she makes on a 
daily basis. In addition, on a horizontal basis, he or she needs to see the connection across 
departments and functions and between communities of suppliers and buyers”. In other words, the 
manager should have a ―mental model of the complete end-to-end system of value creation, and 
understands the interdependencies within it‖ (Liedtka, 2006). 
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The second attribute of strategic thinking or intent, regards the shared sense of direction, 
purpose, focus, and fate by individuals in the firm. For Liedtka (1998), intent ―provides the focus 
that allows individuals within an organization to marshal and leverage their energy, to focus 
attention, to resist distraction, and to concentrate for as long as it takes to achieve a goal‖. In this 
context Liedtka also suggest that ―(...) in the disorienting swirl of change, such psychic energy may 
well be the most scarce resource an organization has, and only those who utilize it will succeed.‖ 
Strategic thinking therefore, should be driven by and put it to the service of the common intent in the 
organization to induce greater synergy. Ideas that do not consider the common intent in the firm will 
divert focus and consume much effort and time.  
  
The third attribute or intelligent opportunism, regards the openness to strategic opportunities 
within the intent-driven focus of the firm.  In the view of Liedtka, intelligent opportunism is the 
condition of being aware of any opportunity that might not only represent the chance to strength 
ongoing strategies but also a chance to open to new and unforeseen strategic moves more suitable to 
the environment‘s condition of the period.  A firm should be able to adjust to its changing 
environment without to exclusively rely on the capability of its top-management to foresee changes 
but also on their capabilities to consider and take unforeseen strategic opportunities.  Managers will 
be aware of such opportunities by being conscious of what they have experienced and understand of 
the system and the firm‘s intent. To some extent, intelligent opportunism regards what Mintzberg 
(1998) refers to as emerging strategies. 
 
Time consciousness – the fourth attribute or element of strategic thinking – is the continuous 
awareness and use of the strategic relationship between past, present and future. In this context, it is 
argued that strategic thinking observes three principles. The first one is that future emerges from 
past, the second is that the present events that really matters for the future are those that depart from 
past trends and patterns, and finally the third principle implies a continuous and cyclic comparison 
of present and future. This suggests, that strategic ideas based on the solely characterization of the 
present or a vision of future, without to include the learning from past experience, are likely to fail.  
 
To some extent, the last attribute of strategic thinking or the theory-based element, mirrors the 
scientific method, since it also deals with the systematic formulation and testing of hypothesis. 
Liedtka (1998; 2006) argues that due to the increasing volume of data and information in 
contemporary firms, and the decreasing amount of time available to process them, the capability to 
formulate and test good hypothesis efficiently has become critical to managers. The scientific 
method in this case, couples both the creative and the analytical thinking in a sequential and iterative 
cycle of hypothesis formulation and testing. As Liedtka (2006) suggests: 
 
―Hypothesis generation asks the creative question ―what if…?‖ Hypothesis testing 
follows with the critical question ―If…, then…?‖ and brings relevant data to bear on the 
analysis, including an analysis of a hypothetical set of financial flows associated with the 
idea. Taken together, and repeated over time, this sequence allows us to pose ever-
improving hypotheses, without forfeiting the ability to explore new ideas. Such 
experimentation allows an organization to move beyond simplistic notions of cause and 
effect to provide on-going learning.‖ 
 
Finally, strategic thinking considers the integration of the five attributes described above. Then, in 
the words of Liedtka (2006), the ―strategic thinker‖ can be defined as: 
―(...) someone with a broad field of view that sees the whole and the connections between 
its pieces, both across the four vertical levels of strategy (corporate, business, functional, 
and personal) and across the horizontal elements of the end-to-end value system. This 
view includes a sense of the future that drives the institution, including a sense of both 
where that future connects and disconnects with the past and demands anew in the 
present. The process toward which an institution moves into that future is an experimental 
one, that makes use of creative thinking to design options, and critical thinking to test 
them. Finally, the strategic thinker remains ever open to emerging opportunities, both in 
service to the defined intent and also in question as to the continuing appropriateness of 
that intent.‖ 
The purpose of strategic thinking is in the end, the creation of value wherever and whenever 
possible. This purpose can be explained in terms of a classic view focused on competition or from a 
more contemporary perspective regarding change and adaptability. From the viewpoint of 
competition, the objective of strategic thinking is to generate ideas to increase the competitiveness of 
the firm, ideas that are difficult to imitate (by competitors).  In the view of change, the objective of 
strategic thinking is to increase the firms‘ capability to adjust to its changing environment, internally 
as well externally. In other words, the objective is adaptability. 
 
 
14. Strategic management in a basic taxonomy 
 
 Mintzberg et al. (1998), suggest that the theory and practice in strategic management 
observes three main perspectives (or ―streams‖) entailing ten different schools of thought. The three 
streams are: 
 
(i) The ―Prescriptive‖ perspective 
(ii) The ―Describing‖ perspective, and  
(iii) The ―Configuration‖ perspective 
 
Each stream entails a number of schools of thoughts. The prescriptive perspective focuses 
on how strategies should be formulated. Instead, the describing perspective focuses on illustrating 
(or describing) how is that strategies are made. Finally, the configuration perspective focuses on the 
integration of the previous views and therefore, it focuses on how strategies are formed and how 
they work.  
 In general, each school within these three perspectives has followers and detractors among 
scholars and practitioners. The main theoretical difference between schools emerges from their 
particular understanding of what strategy is, and what is useful for. Considering this milieu, 
Mintzberg suggests that there are five basic perspectives or positions to approach strategy 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998):  
 
(i) As a plan 
(ii) As a pattern 
(iii) As a position 
(iv) As a perspective 
(v) As a ploy  
 
As a plan strategy is a guide or future course of action with a well-defined goal and 
deadline. As a pattern, strategy is the result of a repetitive behaviour over time, a particular way to 
do things that emerges from the past. In contrast, as a perspective a strategy represents the way we 
naturally do the things. As a position, strategy strives to find the best place in which to position 
your-self and operate. Finally, as a ploy, strategy is the action or manoeuvre by which we can take 
advantage over, or defeat a competitor.  
 
 
15. Schools of Strategic Management  
 
Each of the five approaches to strategy we have mentioned earlier, has a specific meaning in 
management and business and implies a distinctive process of strategy formulation. The following 
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chapter will introduce and briefly discuss each of the ten schools proposed by Mintzberg et al. 
(1998): 
 
Mintzberg’s taxonomy of Strategic Management Schools 
Perspective School 
Prescriptive Design School 
Planning School 
Positioning School 
Describing  Entrepreneurial School 
Cognitive School 
Learning School 
Power School 
Cultural School 
Environmental School 
Configuration Configuration School 
 
 
15.1. The Design School: Strategy as a process of conception* 
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 23-45) 
 *Conception: something conceived in the mind: a concept, plan, design, idea, or thought 
 
Mintzberg suggests that the design school is still the most influential perspective in 
contemporary strategic management. Its view and concepts are present in all strategy courses in 
MBA programs, and are very familiar to scholars and managers. The basic concept of the school is a 
centralized strategy formation process that although simple, looks for developing and implementing 
an entire business model and the overall perspective for the firm. In the design school, ―the idea 
comes before the action‖, ideas are taken by the leader (brain) and actions implemented by the 
followers (muscles). In this approach, internal and external factors are contrasted in order to identify 
opportunities according to capabilities and constrains. A common example of these popular concepts 
is the popular SWOT analysis or the ―Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses of the Organization 
in light of the opportunities and Threats in its environment‖, a strategic planning tool used to 
evaluate a project or a potential business venture. SWOT therefore, involves specifying an objective 
and identifying the internal and external factors that might help or hinder the achievement of that 
objective. 
 
Hence, in a simple view, the design school proposes a model of strategy-making that seeks a 
match between internal capabilities and external possibilities. In other words, scholars of this school 
suggest, ―Economic strategy will be seen as the match between qualifications and opportunities that 
positions a firm in its environments‖.  
 
In academic terms, the Design School find its origins back in late-fifties – early-sixties. Two 
influential books – Leadership in Administration by Selznick (in 1957) and  Strategy and Structure 
by Chandler (in 1962) – introduced some of the fundamentals principles and concepts of the school 
such as the idea of ―distinctive competence‖, the firm‘s ―internal State‖ and ―external expectations‖, 
and the process of ―implementation‖ based on the idea of building ―policy into the organization‘s 
social structure‖. This aided the introduction of the notion of business strategy and its relationship to 
structure. By mid-sixties, a crucial publication on Business Policy: Text and Cases by the 
Management Group at Harvard University became an emblematic management textbook postulating 
the motto ―find the fit‖ (between internal and external factors). 
 
The basic model of the Design School implies two different but interconnected appraisals – 
internal and external – amid which a strategy is created and thereafter implemented (in a separated 
process). The external appraisal focuses on the idea that a firm operates in an environment that poses 
threats and opportunities, and that hold the keys to success. The chance of success of such a firm 
regards its own organizational strengths and capabilities – the internal appraisal – and that 
eventually define its distinctive competences.  Figure 8 illustrates the model.  
 A good example of what an external appraisal might be is the question, what is the structure 
of the industry in which the company compete? Another basic question is how changes in politics, 
laws, social preferences or structures can affect the firm?  External appraisal is therefore, the view 
and consideration of all those factors beyond the organizational boundaries of the firm influencing it. 
Commonly, such factors have a political, economic and/or social connotation (e.g. stability of the 
politic environment, social preferences, religion, entrepreneurship, and education system), and are 
dynamic (they evolve and therefore change: e.g. social preferences and political trends).  The model 
consider at least two other factors (see figure 8) that might affect the strategy formation process: 
Social responsibility (external) and Managerial values (internal).  The ethics of the society in which 
the firm is immersed (social responsibility) and the preferences and values of those how lead the 
firm (managerial values) might influence the design of a strategy, in some cases, decisively. 
However, it is important to remark that some scholars do not believe that ethics and values are 
important at all (Mintzberg, 1998). 
 
Since a firm will probably find more than just one possible strategy, due to the potential 
diversity of factors, the next step in the model is discriminating among possibilities through 
evaluation and choosing. A coherent evaluation should then consider the following (modified from 
Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 27-28):  
 
By: The strategy must warranty that:  
Consistency Goals and policies are mutually consistent (no conflict) 
Advantage A certain competitive advantage is achieve, increased  or 
sustained 
Consonance (response and 
adaptation)  
It is in line with changes and trends occurring in the external 
environment 
Feasibility  Available resources are enough and no other (unsolvable) 
problems are created  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Basic model of strategy formulation in the Design School (modified from Mintzberg 
et al., 1998: p. 26) 
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When evaluation is over, the strategy must be implemented. Implementation is another 
process with many possibilities and steps. In the design school, several methods to implement a 
strategy can be fund. Although it is indicated that the overall SWOT methodology – entails 
formation and implementation, the design school does not contribute considerable to the theory and 
practice of implementation. An example of such practice is the checklist of environmental variables 
and of strengths and weaknesses. See Table 1. 
 
The design school has a number of basic premises or basic assumptions that make the body 
of its theoretical development. The postulates are not only the base for the characterization of the 
school among others but also the origin of criticism. A set of seven basic premises is as follow: 
 
 1. ―Strategy formation should be a deliberate process of conscious thought‖ (you 
know what you are really doing);  
2. “Responsibility for what control and consciousness must rest with the chief 
executive officer: that person is the strategist” (the leader leads);  
3. ―The model of strategy formation must be kept simple and informal‖ (keep it 
simple, don‘t be that serious);  
4. ―Strategies should be one of a kind: the best result from a process of 
individualized design‖ (one specific solution for a specific need)  
5. ―The design process is complete when strategies appear fully formulated as 
perspective‖ (the strategy becomes the overall concept of the business);  
6. ―These strategies should be explicit, so they have to be kept simple‖ (a strategy 
brings simplicity to a complex organization) and; 
7. ―Finally, only after these unique, full-blown, explicit and simple strategies are 
fully formulated can they be really implemented‖ (think first, then act) 
 
 
Main critics to the Design School argue that a ―strategy that positions a firm into a niche can 
narrow its own perspective‖ (mintzberg et al., 1998). This critique implies that strategy formulation, 
analysis, choice and implementation can overlook opportunity if they just concentrate on a limited 
set of factors either internal or external, and only depends in just one architect such as the chief 
executive.  This in turns implies that the design school tends to deny the role of incremental (and 
opportunistic) change in organizations and the role of human resources, other than the manager, in 
the decision making process.  This last point suggests that in this ―style‖ of strategy formulation, the 
role and ―weight‖ of actors is primarily divided into ―thinkers‖ and ―doers‖. Thinkers have the role 
of formulating the strategy and doers have the duty of implementing it. Such a division of roles 
implies that ―thought is independent of action‖ and that strategy formation is a process of conception 
(purposeful creation), rather than one of learning.  We can see this point illustrated in the following 
question: can an organization be certain about all its strengths and weaknesses?  
 
Another important aspect is that in this school, strategy controls the organization’s structure 
and can even determine it (e.g. a new manager will conceive a new strategy and the structure of the 
organization will be adjusted or completely changed to that end). On the other hand, when a strategy 
becomes too explicit it loses flexibility. In real life situations, a firm might be sure of what it is 
needed, however, there is always a certain degree of uncertainty about how things will really happen. 
Hence, a strategy should allow changes when changes take place.   
 
 In spite of such criticism, the Design school has been a dominant architect of contemporary 
strategy management.  Its focus on simplicity and on a centralized (unilateral) decision-making 
process has helped many firms to strengthen their market position. However, this ―easy to do and 
implement‖ recipe requires of certain conditions to succeed:  the person (―brain‖) taking the role of 
strategist, should be able to handle efficiently all needed information. Only then, she or he becomes 
capable to understand and manage the situation in detail. This implies that the required knowledge 
should be in place before the strategy is implemented. However, to be implemented successfully, a 
strategy that is centrally conceived must be adopted and supported by the entire organization.  In 
general, Mintzberg suggest that this type of strategy process (formulation plus implementation) fits 
better organizations amid a period of turmoil and one of operating stability.  
  
 
 
Table 1. Checklist of environmental variables and of strengths and weaknesses of firms  
(Modified from Mintzberg et al, 1998: p.29-30) 
 
Environmental variables checklist Strengths and weaknesses checklist 
1. Societal changes Changes in customer 
preferences and population 
trends affecting product 
demand, design and 
distribution 
1. Marketing Product quality, number of product lines, 
product differentiation, market share, 
Pricing policies, Distribution  channels, 
promotional programs, customer service, 
marketing research, advertising, sales force 
2. Governmental 
changes 
New legislation and legal 
priorities affecting product cost 
and demand, and capital 
investment 
2. Research and 
Development 
(R&D) 
Product and process  R&D capabilities, and 
pilot plant capabilities 
3. Economic 
changes 
In personal income and interest 
and exchange rates affecting 
national and international 
demand 
3. Management 
Information 
System 
Speed & responsiveness, quality of current 
information, expandability, User-Oriented 
System 
4. Competitive 
changes 
new technologies, competitors 
prices and products affecting 
production, distribution, prices, 
market share, and product 
quality 
4. Management 
Team 
Skills, value congruence, team spirit, 
experience, coordination of effort 
5. Supplier changes Changes in input cost and 
supply chain affecting 
production, distribution, cost 
and price 
5. Operations  Control of row material, production 
capacity, production cost structure, facilities 
and equipment, inventory control, quality 
control, energy efficiency  
6. Market changes New uses of products, new 
markets and product 
obsolescence affecting 
distribution, demand and prices 
6. Finance 
 
Financial leverage, operating leverage, 
balance sheet ratios, stockholder relations, 
tax situation 
 
 
 
7. Human 
Resources 
Employee capabilities, personnel systems, 
employee turnover, employee morale, 
employee development 
 
 
 
15.2. The Planning School: strategy formation as a formal process  
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 48-79) 
 
The Planning school was born together with the Design school at a time in which the 
emerging trend on procedure formalization was permeating businesses, education and governments. 
However, at the beginning, the idea of ―strategic planning‖ at the core of business and decision-
making, was not as successful as the attractive simplicity of the Design School rationale.  
Afterwards, the central message of the Planning School found a better fit among managers and 
scholars fond of rigorous procedure, numbers, and accountability.  
 
Although the theoretical production of the School during the 70s was considerable, 
publications did lack of quality and depth. However, the idea that strategic planning was necessary 
was fervently encouraged, together with an enormous amount of models to apply in all kind of 
organizations and situations. Nevertheless, the attempt to study and eventually understand the 
process of planning in real life was feeble. Ironically, the conceptual development of this school 
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gave origin to the term ―strategic management‖, and later on it opened an opportunity for its 
formalization as a field of theory and practice. 
 
The models developed under the Planning School share in principle, a basic idea taken from 
the Design School: the SWOT analysis. A basic strategic plan is formed therefore, on the base of a 
SWOT model is divided into carefully defined steps, and supported for numerous checklists. 
Particular attention is given in the model to the setting of objectives and the creation of supportive 
budgets and operational plans (backups). Figure 9 gives one example of such models. 
 
In practice, the strategy formation process is guided and executed by a number of highly 
trained planners acting at a specialized strategic planning department in a firm.  About the model, 
we can say that in principle, a strategic plan consist of at least six stages (Mintzber et al., 1998): 
 
(i) Objectives setting 
(ii) External audit 
(iii) Internal audit 
(iv) Evaluation stage 
(v) Strategy operationalization 
 
 The objectives setting stage is about qualifying and whenever possible, quantifying the 
goals of the organization. Here therefore, goals or objectives are quantifiable and not mere 
abstractions such as values (as in the Design School). This of course poses an additional challenge: 
how to formalize a goal or a value? Experience indicates that this is a difficult task. Hence in such 
context, strategies such as ―increasing the number of production lines‖ are considered as goals (e.g. 
increase the sale of products). Certainly, the difference is almost a rhetoric matter. 
 
Once the objectives are set, the following step is to formalize the internal and external 
conditions of the firm. The second step is therefore an external Audit. At this stage, the ―planners‖ 
identify external factors with focus on future conditions –forecast– commonly using an extensive 
number of checklists of varied complexity. This allows a firm to ―predict and prepare‖. Nowadays 
this practice has evolved into the popular scenario building method. A third stage the internal Audit, 
would formalize the strengths and weaknesses of the firm through checklists (of considerable less 
complexity than the ones employed in the external audit). Having set the objectives, identified and 
quantified internal and external conditions, the planner moves to the evaluation stage. At this step, 
the planners will evaluate different strategies to fit objectives with internal and external conditions. 
Ironically, this implies that many possible strategies are delineated (proposed) rather than evaluated. 
In general, the strategies derive from financial analysis (e.g. investment return, risk analysis, or value 
curve) in the search for the highest ―value creation‖ and assuming that ―you can make money by 
managing money‖. 
 
Once the winning strategy is chosen, the strategy operationalization stage begins. Here the 
model pays a lot more of attention to details and the strategy is divided into parts, as a major plan is 
divided into sub-plans. This, according to some scholars, is because ―all strategies must be broken 
down into sub-strategies for successful implementation‖ (Mintzberg et al., 1998). At this stage, the 
fragmentation of the strategy gives rise to a new set of hierarchies at different levels and perspectives 
within the operations of the firm. Objectives, for example, belongs to a hierarchy in which ―long-
term strategic plans‖ (often 5-years long) are at the top of complementary (subordinated) ―medium-
term plans‖ that in turns entails several plans in the ―short-term‖. Other hierarchies can include for 
example budgets and action programs. In a sense, the whole model outlines a ―master plan‖ that 
works on the base of many other plans (See Figure 10).  
 
Although the effort of creating a ―master plan‖ is aimed at attaining a better implementation 
process, it is argue that the real objective of exhaustive planning is the gain of control. By reaching 
every far end of the organization and determining budgets, sub-strategies, programs and positions, 
the planner gains control over all actions, since all divisions of the organization must carried out the 
plan as specified. In the next stage, (6) the ―scheduling of the whole process‖ each specified step in 
the process and the timetable to carried it out must be defined. Some call this a ―plan to plan‖.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.  The Steiner Model of Strategic Planning (Modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: p. 50) 
 
 
Considering the previous ―basic model‖, it is easy to see that the Planning School is just a 
mere formalization of the basic strategic outlook developed by the Design School. Hence, both 
schools share several fundamental premises. An important difference is that in the Planning school 
although a top manager is yet the architect of the strategy it is the planner the real designer and 
implementer. Hence, I this school, top management is relegated to approve rather to design.  In 
general, we can summarize the premises of the Planning School as Follow: (1) Strategies results 
from a controlled, conscious process of formal planning, divided into different steps delineated by 
checklists and supported by techniques. (2) Responsibility for the overall process is on the chief 
executive‘s hands, while in practice the responsibility of execution is on the hands of planners. In 
addition, (3) strategies appear completely developed after the planning process so they can be 
implemented through a strict control and execution of diverse objectives, programs, budgets and 
operations.  
 
Nowadays, two important trends within the school have become popular among planners 
and managers. They are Scenario Planning and Strategic Control. The first is a tool to particularly 
aid planners in the search for flexible long-term plans, and it is broadly based on military 
intelligence techniques. The second, strategic control, is a strategy-making style in which the 
organization tries to keep on their intended strategic tracks.  
 
The main critic to the Planning School is that strategic planning does not generate a new 
strategy but rather provides useful means to implement one. In fact, it is argued that the whole idea 
about a strategy being developed in a structured, formalized process is a fallacy (myth).  There are 
particular critiques to the fact that strategic planning is strongly based on the assumption of a future 
scenario might never occur. This problem rises from the very rational nature of planning, and 
therefore from the need to plan and program on the base of certainty and stability.  A scenario of 
future provides a static possibility in an unchanging environment. However, in real life, future is far 
more dynamic and unpredictable than the most complex scenario ever conceived. A final critique to 
the school is the assumption that ―innovation can be institutionalized‖ and that the ―genius‖ and 
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inherent ―spontaneity‖ of entrepreneurship can be replicated by rigorous (strategic) planning and 
analysis. However, in practice innovation is far from being ―planned‖ or programmed. In fact, the 
dynamics of innovation are not yet fully understood, and therefore its systematic synthesis is still far 
from possible.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. ―System of Plans‖ proposed by the Stanford Research Institute, US 
(Modified from Mintzberg et al, 1998:p. 54) 
 
 
 
15.3. The positioning school: Strategy formation as an analytical process 
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 82-122) 
 
The Positioning School rises on 80s capturing some of the premises of both the Design and 
the Planning schools but adding some new perspectives and contents. The emerging school did 
emphasize the role and importance of strategy itself beyond the mere process of formulation. Such a 
new focus, on the content of strategies, encouraged a completely new line of studies among scholars 
and practitioners starting the ―take off‖ of what we know today as ―strategic management‖.  
Probably the most influential scholar in this trend in Michel Porter, the author of an iconic book 
titled Competitive Advantage. Porter suggested a new theoretical framework for strategic 
management detached from the Design and the Planning schools. Competitive advantage rapidly 
captured the attention and favour of practitioners and scholars, and paved the way to the positioning 
perspective to become the most dominant school in the field.  
 
 However, the premises of the positioning school do not greatly differ from those of the 
Design and Planning schools, a fundamental point of departure is the fact that in the positioning 
view, a limited set of strategies can fit any given firm. In the Design and Planning perspective, there 
was no limit to any possible strategy in any possible case. The idea behind the Position premise of a 
limit number of strategies is based on the theory that for a given firm there are just a few positions to 
its advantage in the market place. Such positions can be ―defended‖ from existent and potential new 
competitors. If the position requires a low defence, it means that, the firm holding that position is 
more profitable than its competitors. This in turns allow the firm to ―keep‖ and eventually 
―accumulate‖ resources that can serve to the purpose of consolidating the position or even expanding 
it. Such a logic is no other that a military logic, of which the Positioning school has taken a great 
deal of maxims. Books such as the Art of War written by Sun Tzu have been notably influential 
within the Positioning School theoreticians. Take for example a Tzu‘s maxim about the numerical 
strength in battle (Tzu, 1910): 
 
“…When ten to the enemy’s one, surround him… When five times his 
strength, attack him… If double his strength, divide him… If equally 
matched, you might engage him…  If weaker numerically, be capable of 
withdrawing… And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding 
him…” 
 
 Other important strategic concepts generated from the Positioning School for example ―the 
first mover advantage‖ also are based on war strategizing and Tzu maxims: ―Generally, He who 
occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at easy; He who comes later to the scene and 
rushes into fight is weary…‖  
 
 We can summarize the basic premises of the Positioning school as follow: 
 
I. Strategies are generic, specifically common and identifiable positions in the 
Market Place (the Battleground!).  
II. The Market place is economic and competitive.  
III. The strategy formation process is only a matter of selecting any of the 
generic positions of the firm in the market place, based on analytical 
calculation.  
IV. Although the analysis process is fundamental, the top manager has the 
control over the choices (results).  
V. After the analysis and choice, the strategy is ready for implementation. In 
general, is the market structure that drives position strategies and therefore, it 
is the market that also drives the organization‘s structure  
 
 As we mentioned earlier, Michel Porter‘s concept of Competitive Advantage is an icon of 
the Positioning School theoretical viewpoint and development. An important conceptual framework 
based on such an idea, is the Porter‘s model of Competitive Analysis (See Figure 11). 
 
 The model identifies (only) ―five forces‖ coming from the environment surrounding the 
organization, and that are capable to affect the capability of such an organization to compete. These 
forces are:  
 
(i) Threat of new entrants  
(ii) Bargaining power of firm‘s suppliers 
(iii) Bargaining power of firm‘s customers  
(iv) Threat of substitute products, and  
(v) Intensity of rivalry among competing firms 
 
 The characteristic of these forces with respect to the firm and its current position in the 
market, will determine the adoption of any particular strategy. Although the combination of the five 
forces could in theory result into a large number of potential strategies, Porter suggests that only a 
few generic strategies would survive to competition in the long-term. Further, in his assumption, 
Porter identifies only two factors that can determine the competitive advantage of a firm:  
 
(i) Low Cost, and  
(ii) Differentiation 
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Considering that different firms will have different competitive scopes (broad or narrow), 
but only two factors driving their competitive advantage (cost and differentiation), then only three 
generic strategies can be generated (See Figure 12): 
 
(i) Cost leadership: an strategy aiming at being the producer with the lowest cost in the industry  
(ii) Differentiation: the strategy of developing a unique product or service, and  
(iii) Focus: aimed at concentrating all efforts in a narrow market segment (niche) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Porter‘s Model of Competitive analysis  
(Modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: 101) 
 
 
Another emblematic strategic outlook of the Position School is also given by Porter‘s work: the so-
called Value Chain. In 1985 Porter suggested that operations at any firm can be divided into two 
mutually supportive activities: Primary Activities and Support Activities. The fist of them, regards 
the flow of products towards the customer including inbound logistics, operations, outbound 
logistics, marketing and sales, and service. The second group of activities, considers the solely 
support to the primary activities, and includes procurement, technology development, human 
resource management, and the firm infrastructure (e.g. general management, finances, etc.). The 
particular coordination and management of primary and support activities – the value chain – 
determines the margin of profit the firm can obtain (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 12. Porter‘s generic model of strategies 
(Modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: 103) 
 
 
  In porter‘s view, the value chain can be employed to better understand and analyze 
all activities in the firm, and therefore it can be used as an important analytical framework to support 
strategy formulation. However, Porter remarks that a strategy must consider the entire value chain in 
order to be successful.  For example, a firm with good marketing and sales strategies is forced to 
produce and distribute faster, but any potential gain in competitive advantage will be feeble if 
operations activities (and available resources and capabilities) do not match the challenge of a 
sudden increase in demand (you cannot offer more than you can really produce).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Porter‘s Generic Value Chain Model  
(Taken from Mintzberg et al., 1998: 105) 
 
 
 Although influential, the Positioning School has many detractors. Main critiques are the 
same that for the Design and the Planning School: The strategy formation process separates thinking 
from doing, giving to the top management total control over the strategy formulation. In addition, the 
School heavily rely on analysis and data for present and future conditions. Such a deliberate 
development process might narrow the possibilities of strategic learning (learning by doing). 
Particular critiques regard the excess of focus on market disregarding the role of social and political 
aspects in strategy, and the lack of interest on studying the strategic process in small firms. Large 
companies will produce more data and have greater analytic power than small companies with fewer 
activities in the value chain.  On the other hand, the Planning School proposes an ―in-house‖ 
approach to strategy formation, based on a strong analysis and calculations of what happens inside 
the firm rather than in the totality of the system (the outside). Hence, the firm acts according to a few 
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possible strategies developed in consideration of a few variables. Such an approach, in view of 
many, does not encourage creation and breakthrough motion but imitation and passivity.  
 
 Besides critiques, the Position school has made important contributions to the contemporary 
strategic management. A contribution of significance has been its interest in the strategy itself 
beyond the process of formulation.  
 
 
15.4. The entrepreneurial school: strategy formation as a visionary process 
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 124-147) 
 
 As its predecessors, the Entrepreneurial school also recognizes the top manager as the 
natural architect of strategies. However, a fundamental distinction is that this school includes into the 
strategy formulation process the role of mental attributes such as for example intuition, wisdom, 
judgement, and experience.  Hence, in this School strategy becomes a perspective or a vision in the 
mind of the architect. This vision can be understood as an inspiration (a path to follow) rather than a 
detailed plan. Here strategy is both deliberated and flexible since it does set directions that can 
change or adjust according to the leader experience (and vision).  
 
 As the Positioning school, the entrepreneurial viewpoint is inspired by economics. Often 
entrepreneurship is a concept learnt together with capitalism. Indeed, economics suggests that 
entrepreneurship is the engine of capitalist economies. Hence the core function of entrepreneurship – 
the practice of starting new businesses organizations or revitalizing them, in response to new 
opportunities – is seen as a driver of western (capitalist) economic models. In this model one person 
– the entrepreneur – has the capability to identify the opportunity to transform something ordinary 
into something different. That capability is what we can call the vision.  For the influential economist 
and scholar Joseph Schumpeter, the capability to present ―new combinations‖ or ―the doing of new 
things or the doing of things that are already being done in a new way‖ is the key roles of 
entrepreneurship.  
 
 In a contemporary approach, the conceptual value of entrepreneurship is associated with a 
personal capability – or characteristic – defining a leader. Hence, leadership – and visionary 
leadership – play an important role in the strategy process of this school. The acknowledgment of 
―strategic‖ leadership allows the existence of entrepreneurial organizations, and not only 
entrepreneurs. The main premises of the school regarding the strategy formation process are: 
 
(1) Strategy exists in the mind of the leader as a long-term perspective, or vision 
(2) Strategies are born from a semi-conscious process based on the experience and 
intuition of the leader,  
(3)The leader promotes the strategy fervently, and keeps tight control over it in order to 
allow adjustments if necessary  
(4) The vision, and consequently the strategy, are flexible and can change over time 
(5) As a consequence, the organization requires flexibility to enable the leader to move at 
will   
(6) The entrepreneurial strategy often considers specializing (differentiation) in a niche 
protected from hard competition  
 
 The main contribution of the Entrepreneurial School to strategy formation is the role of 
personalized leadership and strategic vision, thus, the role of mind attributes. This rescue the 
importance – and strategic value – of factors in the organization such as vision, direction, identity 
and integration that cannot be easily formalized and quantify. This is particularly meaningful to the 
strategy process in small businesses, where the role of a leader is more decisive than in larger firms. 
However, main critiques also arise from this rather ―behavioural‖ strategic outlook: Personal 
attributes such as leaderships cannot be easily replicated or institutionalized. Therefore, the 
systematization of such strategies is very limited. A leader brings to the firm a vision and wisdom 
that is solely his or her. If the leader departs, the organization might be (strategically) blind.  
 
 Although the contribution of the School to the strategic management practice is large, its 
contribution to the theoretical development of the field is rather poor.   
 
 
15.5. The cognitive School: the strategy formation as a mental Process 
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 150-173) 
 
 The Cognitive School focuses on the strategist‘s mind and on the understanding of the 
creative process from which strategies emerge. In this school, the manager (the strategist) creates 
strategies based on his own experience and perception of life. As knowledge and experience are 
acquired, the strategist mind forms its own structures for thinking and doing. The school suggests 
that experience shapes what the strategist knows, and that knowledge influences what the strategist 
does. The endless cycle described by knowledge and experience is at the core of the school 
theoretical foundations. However, the Cognitive School does not account for any particular line of 
studies in the field, but for a compilation of different works in the area of cognitive psychology. 
Notably, the work of the school has been very prolific in the study of strategic groups (e.g. business 
partners in the airline industry) and strategies of divestment (the opposed to ―investment‖ that in 
business means the reduction/elimination of an asset in a firm for ethical or financial reasons: e.g. 
the sale of a business – division – that was not fully related to what the organization does better). 
The production of the School is steadily growing, and some scholars believe that this work will 
change the way we now see and practice strategic management.  
 
 The main premises of the Cognitive School reflect the evolving nature of its perspective:  
 
I. Strategy formation is a cognitive process that takes place in the mind of the 
strategist.  
II. Hence, strategies become perspectives (e.g. concepts and schemes) that 
influence (or drive) the way people deal with their environment.  
III. The inputs from the environment are mere interpretations in the mind of 
the strategist according to her/his perspective or perception: the world we 
see (perceive) can be modelled and framed… it can be constructed.  
IV. As concepts, strategies are difficult to accomplish in the beginning and sub-
optimal when they are finally attained. Strategies as a concept are difficult 
to change once they are no longer necessary. 
 
 Since the studies conducted under the theoretical umbrella of this school are diverse (there 
are many ways to approach human cognition, it is difficult to point at a particular and emblematic 
piece of work. However, there are interesting studies on cognition as an information process. For 
example, studies focusing on the complex dynamics of strategic decision-making: In an organization 
the flow of information is fundamental to decision-making however, information is often distorted 
by each of the participant in the flow and their particular ―understanding‖ and ―assumptions‖ of the 
piece of information they hold, and the system they work at. In large companies, the volume of 
information can be overwhelming, originating the need to deal with information in a systemic way. 
The information system in this case is essential for the coordination of management and operations 
(thinking and doing). It is a common task for senior managers to dedicate an important part of their 
time to process a vast amount of information and deal with distortions and loses. In many cases, the 
managers will not be able to cope with anything else than to process information, becoming unaware 
of the external reality.   
 
 Some scholars of the Cognitive School suggest that individuals and organizations deal with 
information under the same basic principles. Information always begins with attention, followed by 
encoding, storage and retrieval, and ends in choice and the assessment of results (outcomes). 
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Attention determines what information will be processed and what will be ignored (we keep what we 
choose to keep). During the encoding stage, we give meaning to the information according to a sort 
of classification, in which we find a match between the information and any existing category. The 
information then is available for storage or retrieval. In individuals, memory is what provided the 
storage for information, meanwhile in organizations is the formalization of information through 
rules, forms, procedures, etc. The availability of information at any time allows its retrieval. In 
firms, the memory of individuals and the formalization of information are linked through a process 
called socialization (when an employee memorizes a rule, a routine is established and the 
information is not lost and can be retrieved, since it has been embodied). Although we exercise a 
certain degree of resolution along the entire process, choice is the part of the procedure in which 
information goes into action or more information is gathered. Once a choice for action has been 
made, the impact of the results (outcome) will initiate a new wave of information than need to be 
processed into a new cycle (it goes back to attention). Figure 14 shows a model of strategic decision-
making based on such rationale. The model adds on the basic information process including 
organizational and individual outcomes to generate strategic information.  
 
 Another interesting stream of work within the scope of the Cognitive School, regards the 
study of human cognition as a process of mapping. This underlines the existence of an important 
prerequisite for strategic cognition: the need of mental structures to organize knowledge.  Although 
such structures refer to any concept, scheme, plan or mental model conceived at the mind of the 
strategist, nowadays the understanding of mental structures is mainly associated with the concept of 
map – and mapping in the sense of a process. A map gives a metaphoric sense of guidance to 
navigate through the unknown. In management, there all sorts of maps like for example a list with 
detailed information about the profiles of main competitors; or a chart with all potential suppliers.   
This type of information helps manager to identify factors relevant to strategy with easy. However 
when there is too much information at hand, it is complicated to gather a mental image quickly. 
Maps presenting the information organized at different levels of knowledge, can make decision-
making easier.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Example of a Process Model of Strategic Decision Making 
(Modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: 156) 
 
 
 However, in management is not only necessary to have a ―quick mental reference‖ of 
external factors but also an idea on how those factors interact within them and with internal ones. 
Thus, managers also have the so-called casual maps, or mental models that suggest actions under 
certain circumstances (e.g. competitor‘s actions as a response to price cuts). Such ―mental models‖ 
can be very detailed, entailing the relationship between many variables such as supply, demand, cost, 
price, time, etc. They can have a considerable impact on the behaviour of the manager and can 
become a decisive map of action in times of uncertainty (you stick to the directions in the map no 
matter what).  
 
 Mintzberg (1998:p. 159-160), quotes an old anecdote to illustrate the intrinsic influence of 
maps as a guide of human behaviour. This traditional tale of the Hungarian military says:  
 
―…several military units were having a training session in the Alps when the weather turned bad and 
they were forced to return to the base and to safety. One unit was unable to return in time and was 
trap in the mountains. The storm went for two more days, at the end of which the unit was 
completely lost. At the third day, the unit returned to the base. One of the men told how just in the 
moment they thought they were lost forever, somebody found a map on his pocket and that calmed 
them down. They settle a camp and wait for the storm to pass and found their position on the map 
and the way to base‖. Amazed with such a lucky strike, the lieutenant in command borrowed the 
map and studied it in detail. He discovered, to his astonishment, that the map in question was not a 
map of the Alps but of the Pyrenees‖. The moral of the story is that ―when you are lost, any map will 
do‖. The soldiers saw in the map what they expected to see, their perception of reality changed as 
closer as possible to that shown by the lines in the map. However, the map was just a metaphorical 
reference, a psychological support to organize the knowledge and information they already have. As 
occur with managers, the soldiers used the map to guide their own experience.  
 
 It is suggested that the contribution of the cognitive school to strategic management has been 
more potential than concrete. In the field however, it has been important the claim that strategy 
formation is also a mental process, and that the dynamics of such process are complex and so far 
unknown. This has point out the need to further study human cognition, and cognition psychology. 
Under this perspective, understanding the human mind and the human brain is important to 
comprehend strategy formation. In management however, the role of human cognition and 
psychology as a conceptual foundation is yet poor.  
 
 
15.6. The learning School: strategy formation as an emergent process 
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 176-231) 
 
 The previous schools depicted a rather complex vision of strategy and its process. In spite of 
their different viewpoints, all these schools have suggested that strategies arise from a linear, 
purposeful process. The Learning School in contrast, sees strategies as the result of an evolving – 
emergent – process, driven by learning. In here, strategy emerges when people – individually or 
collectively – come to learn from a situation and from the particular way the organization uses 
resources to deal with it. Eventually, common patterns of successful behaviour will emerge and 
converge, paving the way to common learning.  
 
The premises of the school can be summarized as follow:  
 
I. The complex and unpredictable nature of the organization‘s environment 
and of knowledge diffusion is an impediment to purposeful control.   
II. The organization should learn collectively, and not only through a set of 
selected individuals (managers), in order to not miss the appearance of any 
potential strategist.  
III. Learning does not follow a pre-established path since it can arise in totally 
unexpected ways. In spite of this unpredictable behaviour, successful 
initiatives always create streams of experiences that can converge into 
patterns that become emergent strategies that once recognized, should be 
purposefully formalized.  
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IV. Therefore, the role of leadership in this context is not to deliberately create 
strategies but to manage the process of strategic learning from which new 
strategies can arise.  
 
 The theoretical foundations of the school can be traced back to the late 50s, when a series of 
studies argued that policymaking and management where not controlled processes, but chaotic ones 
in which practitioners will be always trying to cope with a too complicated world. Later on, some of 
these studies went into the stream of strategic management proposing for example, concepts like 
logical incrementalism. The theoretical developments of this school have added to an unsettled 
debate on fundamental questions such as: Who really is the architect of strategy? Where in the 
organization does the strategy formation process take place? Is the process fully conscious and 
deliberated?  
 
 Nevertheless, the Learning School has questions of its own. A very important one deals with 
the organizational role in strategy formation. How does strategy actually form in organizations? The 
Learning scholars indicate that in average only 10% of formulated strategies are actually 
implemented and that failures at the implementation stage are the direct result of failures in 
formulation. This is, they say, the results of an excessive emphasis on searching for ―smart 
strategies‖ rather than for effective ones.  Management is usually blamed for the wrong search, 
remarking the fact that conventionally management (the formulation) is delinked from operations 
(the implementation). However, the scholars noticed that effective strategies at institutions are not 
the result of a planning effort or the merit of managers, but the convergence of a variety of actions 
initiated by all sort of people within the organization. Such array of small actions and decisions – 
often born out of chance – over time become major drivers of change in the strategic direction of the 
firm. This implies that any well-informed individual in an organization can decidedly contribute to 
the strategy formation process. This indirectly suggests that in an organization, formulation and 
implementation of strategies are not isolated events. People do think and act simultaneously, 
sometimes against management plans, imposing their own strategy to ―do what they know or do 
best‖. Such autonomy of choice can have unforeseen consequences to the strategy formulation (and 
implementation) process.  Such assumptions have been important to change the perspective (and 
focus) of contemporary studies on strategic learning. ―The learning organization‖, evolutionary 
theorizing, ―knowledge creation‖, ―the dynamic capability approach‖ and the ―chaos theory‖ are 
some examples of emergent fields associated with the new direction of strategic learning.  
 
 Learning as knowledge creation, has become a popular concept among managers and 
scholars during the last decade. In the study of knowledge, we differentiate within the tacit and 
explicit form. Tacit knowledge – the inherent inner knowledge we cannot easily formalize 
(transcript) and share – has an important role in strategy formation over the explicit knowledge (the 
codified form of knowledge we can share). In management, the conversion of experience and 
wisdom of the strategist into a codified (transmissible) sort of knowledge is crucial to the 
sustainability of the strategic process. Middle managers in large organizations, play a key role 
converting the tacit knowledge of workers and top managers into meaningful codes to incorporate 
into new products and technologies. Figure 15 illustrates the Nonaka and Takeuchi ―Knowledge 
Spiral‖ depicting the different degrees of conversion between tacit and explicit knowledge.  
 
In the knowledge spiral, socialization implies the implicit sharing of tacit knowledge, 
usually without the need of oral language (e.g. experience is the prevailing form of knowledge in the 
Japanese corporate behaviour). Externalization implies the conversion of tacit into explicit 
knowledge commonly through metaphors (images or descriptions) and analysis (e.g. special form of 
language). Combination on the other hand, the preferred form in Western corporations, implies the 
combination and transference of formally codified knowledge, from one person to another (e.g. 
training at a MBA course). During the Internalization stage, explicit knowledge goes back to a tacit 
stage, and occurs when people internalizes knowledge by applying it (―learning by doing‖). This not 
only regards ideas (experience), but also skills (practice).   
 
  
 
Figure 15. The Nonaka‘s Knowledge Spiral Model (Modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: 211) 
 
  
The rationale of Nonaka‘s model is based on the idea that ―…the essence of strategy lies in 
developing the organizational capability to acquire, create, accumulate, and exploit knowledge‖ 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). However, if we assume that ―knowledge is only created by individuals‖ the 
role of the organization becomes the facilitation of learning, by supporting and increasing individual 
learning, embedding it into the group through dialogue, discussion, sharing experiences and notably, 
through observation.  
 
 A prominent contribution to the concept of organizational learning is the so-called  unifying 
framework by Crossan et al. (1997),that  suggests ―organizational learning is the process of change 
in individual and shared thought and action, which is affected by and embedded in the institutions of 
the organization‖. The framework consists of three levels (individual, group and organization), four 
different processes (Intuiting or sensing, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing), and a 
number of possible inputs and outputs to those processes (See Table 2). 
   
 
Table 2. Unifying framework for organizational learning  
proposed by Crossan, Lane, and White (Taken from Mintzberg et al, 1998:213) 
  
 
 
The capabilities of an organization might influence and condition the learning process of 
individuals. Nowadays, many practitioners believe that strategy depends on learning and that in turn, 
learning depends on capabilities. If true, under this approach strategic management becomes a 
―collective learning process‖ aiming the enhancement and exploitation of particular capabilities – 
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competences – that are difficult to imitate. Such capabilities make the organization unique and 
therefore, competitive. This of course, focuses on the ―invisible‖ or intangible assets of 
organizations, and particular on the aggregated value of the human capital. In contrast, the previous 
schools do predominantly focus on the strategic role of quantifiable assets, often with a clear 
economic value or meaning. Nevertheless, recognizing the value of resources and capabilities 
implies that organizations also should pay attention on what they lack. A common strategic approach 
in this aspect is to learn how to leverage a limited resource base. Common strategies include: 
  
(i) Concentrating resources around an strategic goal 
(ii) Accumulating resources by maximizing learning from your own experience and 
that of other companies 
(iii) Complementing different resources as much as possible in order to aggregate 
value 
(iv) Conserving resources (and energy) whenever possible, and 
(v) Recovering resources (from the market) as soon as possible (re-capitalization) 
 
However, doing the most of limited capabilities will not always suffice to succeed over 
competitors. When companies are pushed to the limit of their capabilities, and yet they continue to 
lose ground in the market, managers can think on ―breaking the rules of the game‖. Then, strategies 
become groundbreaking, and companies use them to change radically the basis of competition in the 
industry they play at. Such strategies commonly have a strong component of wisdom, and appeals to 
the very character and vision of their architect. However, Hamel, a prominent writer of the Learning 
School, suggests that conventional wisdom can be ―undermined‖ by three competition myths when 
the strategist attempt to break the rules of the game (Mintzberg et al., 1998: p. 221): 
 
Myth (1): Industry analysis is key to strategy. The strategist should (must) 
know that it is becoming harder to define were a industry begins and ends, 
and therefore, that to define in which industry you are in, and what is your 
role and position are very difficult tasks. Under such conditions, analysis 
becomes complex and worthless.  
Myth (2): You should focus on your direct competitors. Nowadays it is just 
too difficult to say who the real competitor is, as well as to distinguish 
between collaborators, suppliers or buyers. In a time of intensive and 
intricate networking, it has become hard to distinguish between the ―good‖ 
and the ―bad‖ guys.   
Myth (3): In strategy, it is you against the world. Managers usually 
overstate the effect of their strategies. However, strategies have a limited 
effect over the whole value chain. A single strategy might not change the 
rules of the game in a significant way.  
 
The boundaries of organizations and those of the industry they play at are becoming 
increasingly blurry. Hence, the manager should consider that the firm does not control completely all 
assets required to succeed (e.g. if a firm outsources an activity, the control over that activity is 
limited). Therefore, the strategist not only should be aware of what is under his/her control, but also 
of what is beyond that control and yet, is relevant for the firms‘ operations. 
 
 In the perspective of ever-changing conditions, unclear boundaries, and increasing 
complexity, an institution might see its learning capability limited. Learning requires of certain 
conditions to take place such as for example, a certain degree of environmental stability, and the 
steadiness of trends. If things change too fast, the organization might not be able to cope with the 
increasing and faster flow of new information. However, scholars suggest that in chaotic conditions, 
strategic learning is still possible. This regards the so-called chaos theory – originally proposed by 
physicists –attempting to understand complex systems and situations. In management, the chaos 
theory is exactly the opposite of organization, planning and order. It implies dynamisms and 
unpredictability, and ultimately, the acknowledgement that in dynamic organizations, equilibrium is 
not an everlasting condition, but a temporal stage as a consequence of change. In this context, 
strategies would arise from the learning because disturbances in operations caused by crisis or 
unforeseen changes. Some scholars, fond of this theory, argue that disturbances in operations can be 
intentionally induced by management in order to increase the creation of new knowledge and 
therefore, of learning. In other words, ―order can produce chaos and chaos can produce a new order‖. 
In the creation of such new orders (e.g. production schemes or methods, products, technologies, 
services, resources, and assets) there is an implicit strategic advantage.  
 
 Critics argue that, although the logic importance of strategic learning is undeniable, an 
excessive focus on learning might eventually induce the disintegration of strategies. Learning is 
incremental and requires time to be acquired and of certain degree of formality to be embedded into 
the organizational system. Yet, learning emerges spontaneously and therefore, a manager cannot rely 
upon it in certain cases. Crises are probably the most evident of these situations. In a situation like 
this, the strategist cannot wait for new learning to emerge at the required moment.  During a crisis, a 
firm requires of decisive actions often preconceived in the particular vision of the leader. Often, 
actions do not account for a full strategy but rather for a contingency plan to save the firm.    
 
 On the other hand, over emphasising learning can also weaken strategies that are perfectible 
viable. Often, people in organizations move away from the path of a good strategy (this is called 
strategic drift), due to their effort to incorporate new or interesting knowledge. In here, excessive 
learning might blur the sense of (right) direction.  
 
 The excess of learning might not only induce a strategic lack, but also can lead to the 
implementation of unwanted strategies. Wrong strategies can emerge one-step at a time, from a 
cumulative set of wrong decision and actions. This is the result of an underestimation of the effect of 
minor changes and actions can have on the strategic direction of the firm in the end. 
 
 Although learning might become a powerful strategic asset, organizations and people should 
use it carefully. In the opinion of some critics, learning can distract us from what we are supposed to 
do efficiently. The accumulated learning should be applied wisely and not be dismissed because a 
constant search for new knowledge: There is a time to learn and a time to apply what we have learnt. 
Nevertheless, the contribution of the school to strategic management is considerable:  
 
“Strategy is in fact a learning process, individual and collective” 
 
 
 
15.7. The Power School: strategy formation as a process of negotiation 
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 234-261) 
 
 The role of power and politics in strategy is not considered at all by the previous schools. In 
the Power School, however, politics and power receive all the attention, and are used to negotiate 
strategies that are favourable to particular interests. Consequently, for this school the strategy 
process is an obvious process of influence.  
 
Power is the exercise of influence beyond the solely economic ground, bringing it closer to 
politics. However, as in politics, the use of influence to the mere organization‘s benefit becomes a 
matter of illegitimacy. Thus, this implies the use of undercover moves to weaken competitors (e.g. a 
―cartel‖), or open ones to reach cooperative agreements (e.g. alliances). The political game in 
organizations implies the acknowledgement of individual characteristics such as for example 
emotions, dreams, fears, jealousy, hopes, and ambitions. Although the role of such attributes in the 
process of forming and implementing strategies is obvious, their theorization is a major contribution 
of the school.  The premises of the Power School entail: 
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I. Strategy formation is shaped by power and politics, whether as a process 
inside the organization, or as the behaviour of the organization in its 
surrounding environment.  
II. Strategies emerging from that process tend to evolve, and take the preferred 
form of ―positions‖ and ―ploys‖. Power as a game of influences, for strategic 
purposes, takes both a micro and a macro form.  
III. Micro power sees strategy as an interaction, through direct or indirect 
persuasion or bargaining between   the interest of the firms and partners.  
IV. Macro power instead, sees the strategy as the capability to promote the 
organization‘s own welfare, by controlling or cooperating with other 
organizations, and by conducting strategic manoeuvring within networks and 
alliances.  
 In the context of micro power, there are all sorts of ―political games‖ that people at 
organizations can play. Some common games are (modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: p. 237-
238):  
 
Name of the game  The purpose 
Insurgence Played to resist authority and exert power through unity, particularly those in the 
lower ranks of the organization 
Counterinsurgency A ―retaliation game‖ played by the authority in order to achieve certain political 
gains.  
Sponsorship: Played to build up a power base by engaging into an ―alliance‖ with 
a superior in the hierarchy 
Alliance-building Played among peers, usually managers or experts, who negotiate supports 
contracts for each other, in order to build power bases and advance in the power 
line of the organization.  
Empire-building: Played by line managers in order o build power bases not with 
peers, but with subordinates 
Budgeting Played with clear rules in order to build a power base, not in light of achieving a 
higher position but more resources (similar to the empire-building game) 
Expertise Played to build a power base in light of knowledge, by becoming the unique who 
knows or better does 
“Lording” Played to create a power base by employing legitimate power in an illegitimate 
way against those with less or no power at all 
Line versus staff A game of rivalry commonly played by line managers against staff-advisors in 
order to gain power, and eliminate opposition 
Rival camps Played to defeat an emergent rival power block. The blocks can emerge from 
other games such as ―alliance‖ or ―empire-building‖ (e.g. marketing v/s 
production) 
Strategic 
candidates 
Played to promote change in the organization, by individual or groups with 
particular political interests 
“Whistle-blowing” A brief and simple game played by an insider (with low rank) in the organization 
to induce change. The insider has privileged information to be use against the 
organization by any outsider with considerable influence and particular interest in 
the issue 
“Young Turks” Played by groups of people close to, but not at, the centre of power. The objective 
is  to reorient the organization‘s basic strategy by displacing somebody from 
power, replacing his/her prevailing culture, or getting rid of his/her leadership 
 
 
 The adoption of political strategies in organizations during the last decades has grown 
steadily. New intended strategies are not only guides to change actions, but also signals of shift in 
power relationships. When in a decentralized organization a strategy acquires high relevance, the   
chance of political manoeuvre to arise is considerable. Often, the ploy itself would compromise the 
integrity of the strategy, since political interests might blur the strategic direction. Politics in 
organizations can be seen as a set of actions or situations, in which individuals and groups interact to 
fulfil ambitions, resolve disputes, or simply exert their will over others. Such actions commonly 
imply the formation of coalitions around a common interest. The coalition however, is formed on the 
base of differences: each member has a different (ultimate) objective. Most important decisions in 
this context (the coalition), are taken in order to allocate a resource (determining who gets what). 
The differences among members in terms of objectives and resources encourage the search for 
power within the group (who gets more). Goals and decisions as well as actions, will be determined 
by negotiation and bargaining (using what you have to get more). This will eventually change the 
roles and positions in the coalition in a dynamic fashion (shift of the power balance).  
 
 A very interesting characteristic of power and politics in organizations is that they involve 
all individuals and groups within the organization no matter their position in the hierarchy. Hence, 
everybody can gain and exert power and play a political role. In strategic management, this mean 
that strategy formation is not a straightforward process, solely taking place in the mind of the 
architect, or a dedicated group of planners. In the context of power and politics, strategy emerges 
from the interaction of several individuals and coalitions pursuing their own interests and agendas. 
The Power school also suggest that the power of subordinates groups (bellow the managerial rank), 
can play a decisive role in the formation process and even distort strategies. Another important 
consideration is that such strategies are not optimal since they often represent the ―winning‖ interest 
of a particular group (or individual). Hence, the emerging strategy might not represent the collective 
interest, but the interest of the most powerful group(s) in the organization.  
 
 If we accept that power and politics games in organizations are the drivers of the strategy 
process, and that the process is spontaneous and unpredictable, then the following question arises:  
Can the organization make significant strategic decisions deliberately? In the view of the power 
school the answer is no. Organizations in this context, can only take decisions, they cannot make 
strategies. Thus, the school assumes that all strategies emerge from a process of evolution derived 
from the constant bargaining and negotiation of resources. Strategies emerging from a political 
process are positions rather than visions.  They set directions and actions to consolidate a shift of 
power, and eventually consolidate new goals, a new culture, o simply a new leadership. Although in 
reality strategies do not only emerge from the political process, it has been suggested that the ―use of 
politics‖ in the strategy process is important. Some clear advantages on its use are:  
 
I. Exerting pressure and legitimizing positions looking to correct irresponsible or inefficient 
behaviour (of groups or individuals) 
II. Ensuring that only the strongest individuals in the organization will reach positions of power 
and leadership (―natural selection‖)  
III. Promoting a broader debate over an issue ensuring all concerned parts reach an agreement 
(democratic decision-making) 
IV. Promoting a change that is necessary, even against the will of authorities (the formal power)  
V. Politics can easy the path for the execution of changes (use of influence and power to 
implement them)  
 
 In the context of macro power, beyond individual and groups, the strategic outlook emerges 
from the interplay among organizations and their environment. Here, suppliers, buyers, investors, 
competitors, and an increasing number of players associated with the organization‘s functioning, are 
seen as ―pressure groups‖. The firm in turn, is part of a pressure group in the activity field of other 
firms. In this context, strategy focus on: 
 
(i) Managing the demands of the players, and  
(ii) Selectively making use of the players to the benefit of the organization  
 
In theory, the school suggests that organizations can adapt and change to fit environmental 
requirements, or can try to modify such environment until it fits their capabilities. Based on this 
assumption, we can depict three basic strategies an organization can employ: 
 
I. An organization can deal with each demand as they arise: you deal with each 
problem one at a time  
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II. An organization can make a strategic use of information: the knowledge of what 
each group or player does and gets, is used to your advantage. You let them know 
only what they need to know 
III. An organization can play a player against another: You can reduce the threat 
(influence) of a player by turning it against another player with conflicting 
interest  
 
 In general, organizations tend to search for a lower dependency from other players and the 
environment (e.g. forming monopolies). Sometimes, organizations will group making a common 
cause with their environment (partnerships). The environment can be for example a national market, 
in which organizations try to position themselves competing or collaborating. The government will 
set conditions or warranties to the organizations. Companies will adjust to that environment or 
eventually attempt to change it, individually or in groups. Often, organizations will use their 
―political influence‖ – power – to do so (e.g. promoting, suggesting, or supporting the enforcement 
of a law or normative that opens new market opportunities, or decreases the competitiveness of the 
rivals). It is suggested that the most effective way to control the power of external players or 
pressure groups, is by controlling their behaviour. This is the main objective of the so-called 
―strategic manoeuvring‖. Of course, this implies the use of politics, but as means of accomplishing 
goals without the need of physical (and destructive) confrontation. As an example of such 
manoeuvres, we can recall the work of Bruce Henderson on Corporate Management (1979). He 
depicts five competitive manoeuvrings (modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: p.254): 
 
I. You must know (accurately) what your competition has to lose or win in the 
contact with you. Conversely,  
II. The least your competitor knows about your capabilities (and interests) the 
smaller the advantage he has over you 
III. To negotiate with advantage, you have to know about the character, 
motivations and behaviour of your competitor  
IV. When negotiating, the more subjective your demands are, the better your 
competitive position becomes (looking imprecise and undecided shows no 
particular emotions)  
V. The lees arbitrary you seem, the more arbitrary you become 
 
 The previous set of manoeuvres is of a competitive nature, however in macro power, 
organizations also can set collective and collaborative strategies through networks, collective 
strategizing, joint ventures, strategic alliances, and strategic sourcing.  
 
These relatively recent concepts for strategic collaboration, rescue the strategic value of 
negotiation over persuasion. Here, the organization negotiate through a network of relationships in 
order formulate a collective strategy that would not be possible acting alone. The principles of 
collaborative advantage according to Hamel and collaborators (1989) are (Mintzberg et al., 1998: p. 
259): 
 
I. Collaboration is competition in a different form: firms cannot forget that new 
partners are yet competitors, thus, it is essential to enter to the alliance with a 
clear strategic purpose you keep from beginning to end 
II. Harmony is not the most important measure of success: conflict in fact might 
be a clear signal that partners remain competitive, and yet searching for 
mutual benefit 
III. Cooperation has limits: a strategic alliance evolves on the base of constant 
bargaining and negotiation, and often goes beyond the original legal 
agreement. The firm must defend itself from excessive compromise  
IV. Learning from partners is fundamental: The alliance is a (open) window to 
the partner‘s capabilities. You can build up on the base of such learning in 
areas even beyond the limits of the formal agreement.  
 
 Strategic alliances can vary in form and length according to their purpose. Here some types 
and some examples of them (Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998: p. 257): 
 
 
Alliance types Examples 
Collaborative advertising American express & Toys ‗R‘ Us for cooperation on TV 
advertising and promotion 
R&D Partnership Cytel & Sumitomo Chemicals to develop new generation of 
biotechnology drugs 
Lease service agreement Cigna and United Motor Works to provide financing services 
to foreign (non-US) firms and governments 
Shared distribution Nissan & Volkswagen to distribute each other products in 
Japan and Europe  
Technology transfer IBM & Apple Computers to develop next generation 
operating systems software 
Cooperative bidding Boeing, General Dynamics, & Lockheed to cooperate in 
advanced (military) tactical fighter contracts   
Cross-manufacturing Ford & Mazda to share design to use same assembly lines 
Resource venturing Swift Chemical Co., Texasgulf, RTZ, & US Borax to form a 
Canadian-based venture on natural resource mining 
Government-Industry 
Partnership 
DuPont & the National Cancer Institute developing and 
testing technologies for cancer treatment 
Spinoffs Cummins Engine & Toshiba Corporation to create a new firm 
(and market) on silicon nitride products  
Cross-licensing Hoffman & Glaxo to allow Hoffman-LaRoche to sell 
―Zantac‖ (anti-ulcer) drug in USA 
 
 
 The main critique to the Power School is an obvious one: the school does overstate the role 
of power and politics in strategy (―strategy formation is about power but not only about power‖). By 
emphasizing on the role of ploys, games, and manoeuvres, the strategy process does not allow room 
for deliberated strategizing. However, the use of politics in strategizing is particularly useful on the 
following situations:  
 
I. During a period of major change where significant shifts in power and 
positions rise conflicts 
II. In large and mature organizations  
III. In complex and highly centralized organizations of experts  such  as 
universities 
IV. During of period of lethargy, when legitimate power (the authority) does not 
let change to take place  
V. During periods of instability, when decision-making becomes erratic, and the 
organization is unable to set a clear direction  
 
15.8. The cultural School: strategy formation as a collective process 
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 264-283) 
 
 Opposing the Power school, strategy formation in the Culture School does not look at the 
self-benefit, but to the collective one. Strategy formation in here is based on the social force of 
culture, a force that is shaped by individuals and the aggregation of their particularities.  Such a force 
can influence strategic stability, and that sometimes, can actively oppose strategic change. The 
school suggest that culture is everywhere, but in the same time, it is unique. Thus, culture affects 
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everything and everyone making of each organization something unique. Contemporary strategic 
management acknowledges this dual nature of culture.  
 
 The School starts at some point in the 80s, when culture became meaningful to management. 
By that time, Japanese companies where quite successful in the international arena, and their way to 
do things differently, were seen as the result of culture. Many concepts and ideas based on ―culture‖ 
where developed, and consultant and practitioners notably in America, brought the word culture to 
almost every aspect of management. However, such an effort did not account for a considerable 
contribution to the understanding of strategy. Culture in this context did only focus on organizational 
motivation. Paradoxically, the Learning School would better understand the role of cultural 
differentiation later on, through studying the capability of Japanese corporations to encourage social 
learning (a cultural difference with Western firms).  
 
 In general, the premises of the Culture School suggest that: 
  
I. Strategy formation is a process of social interaction based on the belief and 
perceptions shared by the members of an organization  
II. Individuals acquire such beliefs through a process of socialization that 
commonly is tacit and non-verbal, and sometimes is directly influenced by 
doctrines. As a consequence,  
III. The members of the organization are able to only describe part of the belief 
shaping their culture  
IV. Therefore, strategies take the form of perspectives rather than of positions. 
The perspectives are rooted in the collective purpose and reflected in the way 
resources and capabilities are protected or used for competitive advantage. 
Strategy here is always deliberate, even not being fully conscious  
V. Finally, culture – and particularly ideology – does not encourage strategic 
change, but the continuation of existing strategies. In the best of scenarios, 
culture will promote a shift of positions within the organization‘s overall 
strategic perspective   
 
 Considering these premises, one can say that culture and strategy interact in particular ways. 
Culture can influence the organization‘s style of thinking and analyzing things; hence, culture 
influences the decision-making style.  Conversely, before a new strategy is developed and 
implemented in the organization, the old culture or way to things, should be totally replaced and 
forgotten. However, culture in organizations naturally resists strategic change. When a ―way to do 
things‖, a style, or belief is shared by the organization‘s members, the organization develops a 
consistent behaviour – a culture – that is difficult to be replace (without a good reason to change, or 
the need of, we would continue doing what we believe is the right thing to do). It is suggested that a 
corporation does not have a culture, since the corporation is the culture. That is why, in the view of 
Karl E. Weick, it is so difficult to change. In this context, a manager can be impeded to see the need 
of change due to the organisational cultural settings. Even if the manager is able to ―see‖ beyond the 
cultural barrier, she or he will probably face the changes according to her/his organizational culture. 
Hence, managers tend to stick to those beliefs that worked well in the past. Thus, change (strategic 
or not) is resisted by culture.  
 
 Can we overcome the resistance to (strategic) change? The culture school has devoted 
attention to this question, and explored the ways an organization can overcome strategic inertia. The 
answer they suggest is – yes – organizations can (willingly) embrace change if certain conditions are 
observed. One (initial) condition is that top managers should accept innovation and flexibility as a 
major part of the organization‘s culture. To do so, several actions can be taken, like for example 
having a top manager ―without portfolio‖, so without any particular project, but to rise questions, 
new ideas, and perspectives. Another strategy to induce flexibility and innovation is the systematic 
rotation of managers among the different functions and businesses in the organization, encouraging 
learning and a broader ―view‖ of the organization‘s functioning and capabilities. Consequently, 
strategic changes can be naturally resisted or willingly accepted by the organization‘s culture. 
However, when the needed change is radical, only an equally radical change in the organization‘s 
culture will allow that change to take place. Bjorkman (1989) suggests that such a change occurs in 
just four phases: 
 
(i) Strategic drift  
(ii) Braking-down of the current culture 
(iii) Trial and re-formulation 
(iv) Stabilization 
 
In the first phase before a radical change becomes evident, there is a widening of the gap 
between the organization‘s basic beliefs and the characteristic of the environment surrounding the 
firm. The strategic perspective or position of the firm (emerging from the prevailing culture), is not 
currently efficient to adapt to external changes (the firm‘s environment). Culture, strategy, and 
environment are in disarray.  
 
In the second phase and in most cases, the strategic drift leads to financial decline and 
eventually to the perception of a state of crisis.  At this stage, the prevailing beliefs of the 
organization are questioned and challenged, resulting in the breakdown of harmony and 
homogeneity. The culture of the organization is bound to change. 
 
In the third phase, as embedded beliefs change (they are ―forgotten‖), the organization 
often undergoes a period of confusion. At this stage, new strategic visions (perspectives) are more 
likely to emerge and be embraced. The new strategic decisions would commonly arise from a 
period of trial (experimentation) of old and new ideas. When some positives results arise and the 
collective sense of consistency increase, the commitment to the new way of doing things also 
increases. Finally, at the fourth phase, a positive feedback on the implementation of the new 
strategic outlook will encourage the commitment towards new beliefs. A different organizational 
culture has allowed a major strategic change.  
 
 Over time, the success of a firm can be driven by the ―dominant values‖ in the organization 
– for example commitment to service, quality, or innovation – defining its competitive advantage. 
Such idea is often associated with the term ―excellence‖ (e.g. excellence in quality and service), 
where the strategic goal becomes the development of an organizational culture in which the key 
dominant values (service and quality) are deeply embedded. Companies therefore, can develop a 
―strong culture‖ based on those values. In strategic management, the strategic merge of companies 
often focuses on a common perspective on product or market issues, not properly considering the 
weight of culture and the possibility (often high) of problems arising from conflicting values. Such 
conflicts are the result of a ―cultural clash‖ in strategies of merger, acquisition, and joint ventures. 
Organizations with strong culture, will try to impose their dominant values. When firms have similar 
cultural settings and commitments, they will struggle to keep their unique organizational cultures.  
Therefore, successful strategies will overcome or avoid any actual or potential cultural clash by 
aiming at the greatest fit or harmony possible.  
 
 From a pure economic sense, culture regards the competitive advantage of organizations. In 
this context, culture is not only about a group of people interacting though social activities, but also 
about the interaction that takes place between them, and the resources they employ. This is known in 
management as the ―material culture‖, or the culture that regards resources that are tangible (e.g. a 
computer) or intangible (e.g. scientific know-how). Beliefs and values create objects, and objects 
create and shape values. This can be illustrated by the historical race to lead the automobile 
production. The car was created in Europe, as a handcrafted luxurious machine built by skilled 
artisans for the privilege of the rich-class. The Americans took the same idea but remake the 
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concept. For them, a car should be a rather affordable machine, built in a low-price standardized 
process by an unskilled (large) labour force 
 
This outlines a basic cultural difference: Europeans have a long tradition of craftsmanship, 
while Americans were increasingly fond of mass-production. Eventually, this started a race for 
supremacy. European tried to reproduce the American system but it did not work although materials 
where the same, and skills were even superior. However, the entire functioning of the system (the 
recipe of success) remained unknown. Later on, the Japanese tried to do the same but rapidly gave 
up. They understood that the American model did not fit the Japanese culture, and developed one of 
their own. In 80s, the Japanese model took the lead over the American supremacy in the car industry. 
Since then, American manufacturers (not only from the automotive industry) did pay a lot of 
attention in the ―Japanese way‖ to organize production. 
 
 The way organizations develop their own particular capabilities and resources is the result of 
a particular cultural background, a particular social setting that conditions our way to understand and 
do things, and therefore, the way we manage available resources. This, in the end, implies that 
companies developing unique products can also develop unique organizational characteristics, 
capabilities, and resources.  An interesting question arising from the cultural school is how to know 
what resources are of strategic value? The answer comes with the analysis of four basic criteria: 
 
I. Valuability: a resource must be valuable to be strategic since it must increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the firm  
II. Rarity: a resource is strategic if it is rare and in high demand  
III. Inimitability: a resource not only should be valuable, rare, and in demand, 
but also difficult to imitate (it takes to much money, time and effort to 
replicate)  
IV. Substitutability: a resource may be rare and imitable, but with no strategic 
value if competitors can find a substitute for it.   
 
Then, culture can be considered as a key resource since:  
 
 Culture encourages the production of unique results, and  
 Culture is ambiguous and therefore difficult to understand and imitate 
 
 The simple logic of the school premises, although valuable to management, has been 
criticized for its lack of conceptual clarity.  Encouraging a strong culture can deny the chance to a 
necessary change to occur. On the other hand, changes can take place even against the cultural will 
to change. Furthermore, even cultures with sound dominant values will eventually face stagnation, to 
finally decline. Culture, after all can encourage and resist change.  
 
Another critique to the school regards the role of uniqueness in competitive advantage, and 
the idea that to some extent if a firm is successful, it is unique. In real life, uniqueness is an 
important strategic advantage, but in an economy, not all businesses can be unique: many firms 
might just encounter strategic advantage on doing just the same others do, but in a more efficient 
way. In the theoretical context, the school‘s contribution is considerable in terms of ―what we know‖ 
about culture as a strategic driver, however its contribution is less considerable in terms of ―what we 
should do‖ with culture to improve the strategic performance of organizations.  
 
 
15.9. The Environmental School: strategy formation as a reactive process 
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 286-300) 
 
 In this school, environment is not a mere external force, but the main factor influencing the 
strategy process. In this perspective, the organization is rather passive, while the environment sets 
the strategic direction. In an extreme position, the school suggests that strategists are at the mercy of 
external forces and therefore, their capability of strategic choice is limited (if not denied at all). In a 
moderate perspective, the external context of an organization presents different dimensions in which 
the strategist can base a strategy. The theory of the Environmental School derives from the 
―contingency theory‖ – a behavioural theory suggesting that there is no best way to organize a 
corporation, to lead a company, or to a make decision. The theory postulates that on the contrary, 
the optimal strategic approach is contingent, or dependent upon the balance of internal and external 
situations. In the vision of the school, the more stable an environment remains, the more formalized 
the internal structure of the organization becomes. The firm would ―naturally‖ find its position 
(niche) in the environment.  In this ―natural order‖ if a firm does not find the right niche is ―selected 
off‖, as would occur in an ecosystem due to a process of natural selection.  
 
 The premises of the environmental school entail four basic assumptions:  
 
I. The environment, a set of general forces, is the central actor in the strategy-
making process  
II. The organization must respond (react) to this forces or else be ―selected off‖  
III. In this perspective, leadership becomes passive and its main role is to 
identifying the acting forces, assessing their impact, and preparing an 
adequate adaptation of the organization  
IV. Finally, organizations group together into different niches or positions, 
where they remain until resources decrease, or competition becomes too 
hostile. Then the organizations die. 
 
 The environment of an organization can vary on its degree of stability, complexity, diversity, 
and hostility, given rise to a variety of combinations. Strategies – as an answer to the acting forces in 
order to adjust properly – will vary according to the characteristics of the environment 
(combinations). For example, it is suggested that more aggressive (risk-taking) strategies will 
emerge as a response to more dynamics environments (e.g. higher market diversity and complexity). 
The almost organic view of the environmental perspective has encouraged the introduction and 
adaptation of concepts and theories coming from ecology. Among them, the influence of the 
―ecology of populations‖ is notable. Accordingly, the work of the school also focused on study and 
adaptation of concepts such as ―selection‖, ―carrying capacity‖, ―variation‖, and ―punctuated 
equilibrium‖, among others. These works have been broadly criticized since it is argued that ecology 
of populations considers an evolutionary long-term process that goes beyond the real spam of any 
social or business organization.  
 
 Max Weber, the so-called father of ―organization theory‖, saw organizations as being 
shaped by the endless advance of technical and managerial logic. As the logic increases, the 
bureaucracy also increases in an endless process. Contemporary scholars developed the ideas of 
Weber further on, and proposed an ―institutional theory‖ focusing on the institutional pressure that 
an organization encounters in its environment. The pressure in this theory comes from other 
organizations, and from the self-pressure of being an organization. In this vision, the environment is 
the store for two types of resources: economic and symbolic.  
 
 Economic resources are tangibles such as money, land and machinery. Contrarily, symbolic 
resources are intangibles like for example prestige and fame. Strategy in here focuses on finding the 
best way to acquire economic resources and to transform them into symbolic ones, and the other way 
around. The aim of such strategic outlook is to protect the organization as much as possible from the 
uncertainty of its environment.  
 
In real life, the environment entails suppliers, consumers, competitors, and regulatory public 
agencies. In due course, the environment becomes more complex because the increasing number 
(and power) of norms regulating the practice. To be successful, the firm is compelled to meet and 
master the norms. In the end, all organizations in the environment will adopt similar structures and 
practices due to the normative pressure. This resultant process of increasing convergence, is driven 
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by imitation of practice and behaviour, and is called in institutional theory, the institutional 
isomorphism.  
 
Accordingly, there are three main forms of isomorphism:  
 
(i) Coercive,  
(ii) Mimetic, and  
(iii) Normative  
 
Institutions become alike by coercive pressure emanating from standards and regulations 
(e.g. safety regulation in airlines). In the mimetic isomorphism, companies imitate and borrow 
procedures from successful benchmark companies. This implies the ―copy‖ of best practice methods 
employed by leading companies. Finally, the normative isomorphism, results from the strong 
influence of professional expertise. Experts can influence decision making by exerting pressure to 
make their own norms prevail.  
 
 In a more moderate environmental perspective, strategies can be a rather active answer to 
pressure in a variety of ways:  
 
(i) Acquiescence (fully accepting the pressure)  
(ii) Compromise (partially acceding to the pressure)  
(iii) Avoidance (avoiding the need to accept the pressure)  
(iv) Defiance (actively resisting the pressure), and  
(v) Manipulation (attempt to change the pressure)   
 
For each strategic response to environmental pressure, there are three possible tactics to 
consider (Modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: p296): 
 
 
 
Strategies Tactics Example 
Acquiesce  Habit 
Imitate 
Comply  
Following taken-for-granted norms 
Imitating institutional models 
Obeying rules  and norms 
compromise Balance 
Pacify 
Bargain 
Balancing expectations of various stakeholders 
Conciliating institutional elements  
Negotiating with stakeholders 
Avoid Conceal 
Buffer 
Escape 
Disguising inconformity 
Relaxing institutional attachment  
Changing goals, activities or domains 
Defiance Dismiss 
Challenge 
Attack 
Ignoring norms and values 
Challenging rules and requirements 
Attacking  the sources of pressure 
Manipulate Co-opt  
Influence 
Control  
Importing influential elements 
Shaping values and criteria 
Controlling elements and processes 
 
 
 The main critique to the environmental school is the idea that organizations do not have 
strategic choice. The supposed environmental ―imperative‖ of this view, totally override the 
capability of organizations to choose a direction or position. In real life, the role of environment 
although acknowledged, is believed to be less determinant. In fact, in contemporary management, 
the boundaries of environments are less evident due to the increasing occurrence of merge and 
networking. In such cases, to define the boundaries and the components of the environment is almost 
impossible. In strategic management, the relationship between organization and environment is 
rather reciprocal, and not unilateral as proposed by the Environmental School.  
 
15.10. The configuration school: strategy formation as a process of 
transformation 
(Adapted from Mintzberg et al., 1998:p. 304-347) 
 
 This school builds its perspective on the premises of the other schools: 
 
I. Usually, an organization can be described in terms of a particular state of 
stability regarding its configuration. Thus, in a particular moment the 
organization adopts a particular form and behaviour that matches a particular 
situation. In such times, particular strategies will arise too.  
II. These periods of stability are occasionally interrupted by a process of 
transformation that eventually will move the organization to another state of 
configuration.   
III. The periods of stability and change alternate into consecutives successions, 
forming their own distinguishable patterns (e.g. life cycles of organizations).  
IV. Therefore,   the key to strategic management becomes the capability to 
sustain stability. This implies the need of periodic transformation without to 
destroy the organization in the process.   
V. Consequently, the strategy formation process in the Configuration School 
can take the form of a conceptual design or a formal plan, a systematic 
analysis or a vision of leadership, a cooperative learning or political gaming, 
either focusing on individual cognition, collective socialization, or becoming 
a simple response to forces of the environment.  
VI. As a consequence, the resulting strategies can take the form of plans or 
patterns, positions or perspectives, or even ploys. Whatever the form, the 
strategy must be applied at its own time and in its own context.  
 
 In 70s, following the path of the Configuration School, the Canadian McGill University 
started a project to track down the strategy of several companies for a period of 30 to 50 years. This 
project took therefore a historical perspective on the path of change of organizations. They focused 
on the identification and characterization of periods of stable strategy and of transformation. 
Fundamental research question entailed, which are forces driving strategic change? How do 
different strategies connect to each other? In addition to, how do strategies emerge? 
 
 The results of the McGill project indicate that strategies took the form of patterns through a 
defined period, defining particular stages in the organization history. Some of the observed stages 
were:  
 
I. Stage of Development (e.g. establishing systems and consolidating strategic positions) 
II. Stage of Stability (refining strategies and structure) 
III. Stage of Adaptation (minor changes in the strategic positions and structure)  
IV. Stage of Struggle (looking for a new sense of direction by any means) 
V. Stage of Revolution (rapid transformation of characteristics taking place simultaneously)  
  
 Overtime, the sequence of stages can follow different patterns. The results of the McGill 
project suggest that there are four of such patterns: 
 
I. Periodic bumps: Very common in conventional organizations and 
characterized by long periods of stability interrupted by short periods of 
revolution.  
II. Oscillating shifts: A period of adaptation towards stability is follow by a 
period of struggle  
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III. Life cycles: A stage of development is follow by one stage (period) of 
stability 
IV. Regular progress: Relatively sustained adaptation overtime 
 
 This type of research did focus very much on the process of change and certain theories 
were elaborated. Among them, the Quantum change, proposed by Miller and Friesen (1980), 
suggests that the change of elements occurs at the same time and not step by step. Although that 
change is rapid, it unfolds gradually. Hence, in the view of the quantum change theory, a company 
constantly faces two opposing forces – change and continuity – and resolves any conflict attending 
first to change and then to continuity. This implies that, strategies will be always changing 
marginally and not radically. Therefore, companies would often stick to their strategic positioning 
and vision, while allowing minor reorientations. This suggests that success is not achieved by 
changing an already ongoing strategy, but by exploding it efficiently. This can bring the company to 
a steady condition of equilibrium.  
 
However, the environment in which the firm is immersed will eventually change, and then 
the equilibrium will be lost. At this stage, it is said that the configuration of the firm is out of 
synchrony with its environment, and at the edge of a revolutionary change. For this reason, in order 
to survive, the firm will look for a new set of strategies, structure and culture. In other words, it will 
look for a new configuration.  On the other hand, when new strategies emerge spontaneously, the 
quantum theory advocates that they are kept in some place within the organization to be employed at 
times of revolutionary change. This by itself, is and strategic advantage, since in times of change a 
company do not need to form strategies from scratch, or copy what the competition does, but to 
follow its own strategic patterns.  
 
 Although the Quantum Theory of Change seems to fit particularly well to large-production-
companies, in which stability runs along long-periods and procedures are highly standardized, it 
does not satisfy the dynamics of smaller and active firms. In small firms, change is not 
revolutionary, but rather incremental. In the field of strategic management, the debate among 
scholars taking either position for change – revolutionary or incremental – is yet very active (and 
inconclusive).  The reason for such a disagreement is that the nature of change is too closely related 
to the point of view of the observer. A change in a point of history could look revolutionary is the 
scale of time is small, but the same event in the perspective of 1000 years might just look as an 
incremental change. 
 
 Another perspective of the configuration school is that configuration itself, could become 
the ―essence of strategy‖. In this view, success is closely related to the particular configuration or 
organization of the firm. In such case, success can be determined by the simple mind of a competent 
manager, able to bring the company into a perfect strategic track. This rather simplistic (though 
logic) perspective finds many detractors among the same school. Simplicity in this context as 
suggested by critics implies that a firm could emphasize too much on particular skills reducing its 
own capability to respond to changes (by not matching those skills). The advantage and danger 
implicit in simplicity becomes a paradox, called the Icarus Paradox (named after the Greek tragedy). 
As an example, four simple trajectories that could bring firms from success to failure are presented 
as follow: 
 
I. Focusing trajectory: Techno-oriented firms with masterful engineers and 
solid operations that succeeded on innovation turn personnel into compulsive 
―thinkers‖. The firm bothers customers with ―perfect‖ but irrelevant 
products.  
II. The venturing trajectory: Transforms growth-oriented firms lead by 
entrepreneurial builders, into impulsive imperialist, that steadily expand into 
a business they do not really know.  
III. Inventing trajectory: Transforms pioneering firms with excellent R&D 
departments, think-tank operations, and state-of-the-art products into utopias. 
The firms become ―cults‖ for a few and follows hopeless futuristic 
inventions.  
IV. Decoupling trajectory: It transforms firms that excel sales through unrivalled 
marketing skills, known brand names, and broad markets, into erratic 
vendors of ―me-too‖ products. Firms sacrifice design, quality and prestige. 
 
One can say that firms do follow alternating trajectories of success and failure, growth and 
decline as individual do. This cyclic view, is to some extent suggested in the work of David Hurst, a 
prominent executive and practitioner interested in organizational change. Hurst describes 
organizational change as an ―ecocycle model‖ of crisis and renewal (See Figure 16). 
 
The idea of such a model is based on the ecological cycles or ―ecocycles‖ observed in a 
forest where the phases of growth and exploitation alternate constantly (colonization, growth, 
conservation, destruction by fire or human intervention, colonization, growth, etc). In organizations, 
entrepreneurial action leads to conservation through the establishment of procedures. Such 
procedures induce confusion and crisis. Consequently, they induce an active and creative response, 
eventually starting a new cycle. The first loop (on a continuous line), is the usual cycle in which 
strategic management plays a role. On the contrary, the cycle in dashed lines, represents a less 
frequent loop of learning, in which firms face critical choices challenging its configuration. In the 
learning-loop, charismatic leadership plays a fundamental role over strategic management.  
 
 
 
Figure 16 The Hurst‘s Organizational Ecocycle Model  
(Modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: p. 323) 
 
 
 An important question that the Configuration School tries to answer is what does change 
really means for an organization? We often understand change as a concrete action such as a new 
product, a new venture or as a more abstract objective, like revitalization or cultural change. In the 
perspective of configuration, change is a matter of strategy and structure – erroneously – thought 
under control. Although change can be ignored, resisted, avoided, or accepted, it cannot be managed. 
Mintzberg represents change in organizations as a cube, where change takes different strategic 
dimensions regarding both strategy and structure (See Figure 17).  
 
Examining the cube of change, we can deduce that an organization can easily change a 
product or personnel (people), but it cannot easily replace its vision or structure. The most difficult 
task, as suggested by the cube, is the change of culture. Nevertheless, whatever the level of change 
you go for, you might observe (or consider) that everything below that level must reciprocally 
change. A change in structure for example, would be senseless if systems and people do not change 
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too. Equally, a change in strategy, such as vision, might not be effective whatsoever if strategic 
positions, programs, and products do not change accordingly. Eventually, a radical change in an 
organization involves all concerned actions and actors within its strategy and structure.  
 
As changes take place, whether small or large in magnitude, they can be mapped. Mintzberg 
suggests a map in which two dimensions of change – micro and macro – are contrasted with three 
basic approaches to change. Figure 18 depicts a generic map depicting different methods firms do 
employ to cope with changes at different scales. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. The Mintzberg‘s Change Cube  
(Taken from Mintzberg et al., 1998: p. 326) 
  
 
 
 In this map, micro change focuses on any part/function of the organization (e.g. creating a 
new product or changing a production line), while macro change does focus on the organization as a 
whole (e.g. renewing all facilities, or changing position in the market). On the vertical axis of the 
map, planned change (first from top to bottom), refers to a programmatic approach or answer to a 
change defined by the procedures to be follow. Driven changes on the contrary, refer to an answer 
determined by individuals or small groups with authority (they see the change coming and they 
make it happen). Finally, the evolved approach does spontaneously emerge as an answer among 
people without absolute power, and unfolds even against managerial control.  
 
 Even major changes can be induced by the single choice of individuals with enough power 
(e.g. the corporation‘s CEO). Such changes are usually implemented by means of ―programmes of 
comprehensive change‖ involving both the strategy and the structure at the organization.  Although 
there is no unique and unbeatable formula, the Configuration school suggests a few strategies to 
achieve a comprehensive degree of organizational change:  
 
I. Evolutionary/ institution building: gradual reshaping of values, top-level 
(managerial) structures, and performance and control systems in order to 
allow managers to drive change 
II. Jolt and refocus: a change in the focus, attitude, and style of management to 
redefine a new direction 
III. Follow the leader: The leader initiates major changes from top to bottom in 
order to achieve immediate results  
IV. Multi-front focus: Change is driven by dedicated task-teams with a wide 
focus 
V. Systematic redesign: In order to improve performance, task teams drive 
changes and plan the core process redesign in parallel  
VI. Unit-level mobilizing: Change leaders designates task teams to induce 
change within a unit, focusing on middle managers and their subalterns  
 
 These strategies focus on changes at either the top or the bottom level of an organizational 
hierarchy. In some firms, such changes run along the hierarchy affecting the organization as a whole. 
They are not exclusively top or bottom changes but rather Top-down or Bottom-up transformations.  
 
An example of strategy aiming a successful transformation of a firm from a top-down 
perspective of change considers:  
 
I. Establishing a sense of urgency (identifying crisis and opportunities)  
II. Forming a powerful coalition (forming a group with power enough to drive 
the change)  
III. Creating a vision (establish a vision to be follow and the strategies to do it).  
IV. Communicating the vision  
V. Empowering others to act on the vision (getting rid of any obstacles to 
change) 
VI. Planning and creating short-term wins (plan, execution and reward of 
achievable performance and practice)  
VII. Consolidating improvements and producing more changes (using achieved 
credibility to materialize the vision, and finding new ways to bring it 
further)  
VIII. Institutionalizing new approaches (making evident the links between 
success and the new vision and behaviour, making them a tool of 
leadership and management) 
 
From a bottom-up perspective of change, there are at least six steps to effectiveness:  
 
I. Mobilize commitment to change through joint diagnosis of business 
problems (shared role in the problem and the solution) 
II. Develop a shared vision of how to organize and manage for competitiveness 
(share new roles and responsibilities) 
III. Promote consensus for the new vision, the necessary competence to attain it, 
and the cohesion (unity) to walk along the way (promote the shared benefit 
and the challenge)  
IV. Spread revitalization to all departments without pushing it from the top (let 
them find the way and reorganize themselves)  
V. Institutionalize revitalization through formal policies, systems and structures  
VI. Monitor and adjust strategies in response to problems in the revitalization 
process (share the responsibility to learn from the change) 
 
 Although the Configuration school has succeeded on presenting a simpler and rather 
conciliatory view of strategic management, detractors argue that configuration is a simplistic and 
flawed view of reality. In reality, they say, organizations are far more complex entities, and their 
response to changes is therefore not straightforward. Firms, often deal with change in a flawed way, 
since managers usually work with flawed strategies. However, the contribution of the school is 
considerable, particularly about its vision and interpretation of change. Simplicity is necessary in 
order to establish a strategic base. After all, our logic is rather simple, and our imagination limited.  
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Figure 18. The Mintzberg‘s Map of Change Methods  
(Modified from Mintzberg et al., 1998: p. 328) 
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This work is the result of an ongoing study on the patterns and trends on both the theory and
practice in the field of strategic management carried out at the Section of Innovation Systems
and Foresight. The report focuses on different issues regarding the broad topic of strategy
in organizations, but special attention is given to three relevant issues regarding the current
diversification and fragmentation in the field of strategic management:
• The lack of a universally accepted definition of what strategy is,
• The multi-disciplinary nature of the field, and
• The development and evolution of our knowledge on human cognition and organizations’
    behaviour.
These issues are addressed from the perspective of influential scholars and practitioners of
different disciplines, yet they are discussed from the angle of business organizations.
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